







The challenge presented by dissociations and synaesthesia for the  




A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
















This thesis has, as its primary target, the neo-cartesianism, or property dualism of certain 
philosophers of mind: David Chalmers, Tim Bayne, and others. All begin with a pre-theoretic 
commitment to the view that all perceptual states are conscious. They define consciousness 
by saying that it is synonymous with having ‘qualia’ – a term directed at phenomenal 
properties which defy reduction to physical states. The thesis argues that this position is 
challenged by certain neurological conditions, - blindsight, visual form agnosia etc- which we 
can generalise as ‘dissociations’: conditions in which functions are separated from awareness. 
The thesis holds that these are examples of unconscious perception, which present the case 
for a different pre-theoretic position, and a redefinition of concepts used in the vicinity.  
Insofar as the neo-cartesians recognise the empirical, their inclination to reject the 
dissociations is challenged with new cases and paradigms which have emerged in recent 
years. It is contended that the dissociations disrupt Chalmers’ coherence between the 
phenomenal and the psychological, Bayne’s commitment to the Unity of Consciousness, and 
Phillips’ campaign against unconscious perception. In addition, synaesthesia is advanced as a 
problem case for Bayne’s unity contention. I argue that the dissociations are not easily 
dismissed, and present a real challenge for neo-cartesianism. 
In exploring this challenge, the thesis contributes to the case for a different philosophy of 
mind – a Higher Order Thought (HOT) approach. The notion of unconscious perception – it 
is contended - much more easily finds an accommodation in HOT theories, so this thesis 
contributes to existing arguments for that position. HOT theories also have an advantage in 
being receptive to reduction, in giving a developmental account of consciousness, and in 
being more open to the accommodation of empirical discoveries. In each respect, there is an 
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At the centre of this thesis and its arguments, we shall consider a variety of pathological and 
psychological conditions which we shall call, for brevity, dissociations. There are wide 
differences between them, making it hard to generalise, but there are also similarities. In each 
case, some preserved function is present – an ability to detect, or locate, or discriminate 
between stimuli, even though the subjects do not consciously recognise the stimuli. There is a 
dissociation between function and consciousness. The interpretation and treatment of these 
conditions by different philosophical traditions and schools is the issue explored by this 
thesis. That they exist is not in contention; how they are dealt with and described is. The first 
chapter of this thesis will be given to a description of the conditions. They are each of them, 
in their own way, deeply surprising and fascinating, and their discovery has often astonished 
experimenters. In the appropriate chapter we shall also consider another strange condition- 
synaesthesia – which, while not a dissociation nor a pathological condition, presents a further 
challenge to the target philosophers we wish to discuss. 
In the next chapter we will identify all of these conditions more fully, but for the 
purposes of introduction here, we will define dissociations uncontroversially as: some 
preserved function in the absence of acknowledged awareness. This description is borrowed 
from Weiskrantz (1999). We shall find that the full range of functions in each condition is 
impaired, and in none of the cases will we find a complete preservation of discriminative 
capacities, but enough discrimination remains to say that some functional ability to 
distinguish between stimuli and to make judgements is preserved – abilities normally 
ascribed to perception. 
Several of these dissociations will be referred to in the course of this study, but chief 
among these curious cases is the phenomenon of blindsight. (This is best introduced in 
Weiskrantz, 2009). A good deal of this present work will be about blindsight, but the case it 
makes will not be confined to it. To the interested lay observer, blindsight can be described as 
a case in which the function of perceptual discrimination is preserved (for example, a subject 
can distinguish between two stimuli,) all the while claiming still to be blind, claiming not to 
be able to see the stimuli concerned. We rule out the possibility, and associated counter-
claim, that they are being insincere. 
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We can refine this definition according to the audience interested in it, whether 
psychological, neuro-scientific, or philosophical. In the terms used by each discipline it is: 
• Some residual visual function in a field defect, in the absence of acknowledged 
awareness. This is a definition couched in psychological terms.  
• To a neuroscientist, it is defined as: visual processing by sub-cortical pathways, in the 
absence or lesion of the primary visual cortex (V1), specifically either via the superior 
colliculus, or the lateral geniculate nucleus. 
• A philosophical description might be inclined to characterise it as: perception, or at 
the very least, successful discrimination, or visual processing, all the while lacking 
consciousness. But of course, how it is characterised by different philosophers will be 
the point at issue. As we shall see, some philosophers would not accept this account. 
Other dissociations can be defined in similar ways, for example, the case of optic agnosia, as 
studied by Goodale and Milner (2005) can be rendered as: successful navigation and spatial 
adjustments guided by visual systems, but with a control of action unconscious to the subject, 
and accompanied by verbal reports to that effect. 
In another case -Marshall and Halligan’s study of visuo-spatial neglect (1998) - they 
report that their patient, PS, failed overtly to process information in the visual field 
corresponding to that part of the brain which had suffered a lesion, a feature which was not 
mitigated by her ability to move her head and eyes. And yet, she was nevertheless able to 
make successful discriminations concerning the un-experienced part of her visual field. This 
would again appear to be a case of successful discriminations without an acknowledgement 
or recognition of such.  
We will also include in this study, references to ‘split-brain cases’ which are the result 
of a commissurotomy to constrain the effect of epilepsy, an operation which severs the 
corpus callosum (which provides a communication link between the two hemispheres of the 
brain.) In these cases, and under certain experimental situations, it would appear that the 
subject is capable of making successful discriminations, without being aware of the 
accomplishment, on the basis of stimuli being processed in only one half of their brain. 
What is common to these dissociations is the claim that they involve successful 
discriminations – or visually guided behavioural responses, but without awareness. They 
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present the possibility that they can be styled as cases of unconscious perception, where the 
function of perception comes apart from the phenomenology.  
Some of these dissociations have been part of the academic landscape for some time. 
Blindsight first made the headlines in the psychological world in the late 60s and early 70s 
with the work of Weiskrantz and Nicholas Humphrey. The split-brain cases won a Nobel 
Prize for Sperry in the 1960s. However, evidence for these dissociations accumulates, and 
new cases and discoveries are being made all the time; how far they impact on philosophy, 
however, is very moot.  
Synaesthesia has only recently been taken more seriously by neurologists. New 
scanning techniques and devices, and experimental studies have brought respectability to the 
condition, and philosophers have begun to make room for what it implies for philosophical 
positions. We shall argue that synaesthesia creates difficulties for the unity thesis held by 
Chalmers and Bayne later in the thesis. 
How do these dissociations, with synaesthesia, impact on philosophy? I shall argue that they 
may require us to make changes to our conceptual repertoire, and radical changes to the way 
we think of human beings. I shall argue that they pose a challenge to certain philosophers and 




In philosophical thinking in this area there are many concepts at play – most obviously, 
consciousness. There are others: perception, qualia, what-it-is-like, awareness, and so on, but 
let us deal first with consciousness. In the course of this thesis, we shall most commonly 
understand this term to mean phenomenal consciousness, as this is the way in which it is used 
by our target philosophers. In this sense we understand it to mean the possession of mental 
qualitative properties, or qualia. At the relevant points, we shall want to use consciousness in 
this narrow sense. We shall, however, want to create room for the idea of unconscious 
perception at many points throughout. We can think of consciousness in this sense as 
‘awareness1’, such that successful acts of perception can be accomplished without awareness. 
 
1 Chalmers however, uses ‘awareness’ as a psychological or functional term, recognising that in everyday 




In this sense, we shall want to speak of awareness, or consciousness of stimuli. We shall 
further argue that this may also be accompanied by mental qualitative properties, though this 
will not be a notion shared by neo-cartesians. 
How these concepts are tied together has much to do with the general commitment of 
philosophers to a wider theory of mind. Our target philosophers may not share these 
definitions, and a large part of our task will be to make a case for our picture, with our study 
of dissociations. We shall find that the extent to which the dissociations create problems for 
these wider theories turns upon the definitions advanced. Some will claim that dissociations 
create no difficulties. Thus: the view of Jason Holt (2003): ‘Blindsight alters nothing in our 
conception of consciousness, nor does it call into question its ontological status’ (Holt, 2003, 
p.47). Diametrically opposite, and concluding a section on blindsight, Patricia Churchland 
(2000) claims: ‘from the point of view of philosophy, it is important to see that this is an 
instance where empirical discoveries put pressure on us to make conceptual revisions’ (pp 
227-8). Similarly, Dennett asks: ‘what is going on in blindsight? Is it visual perception 
without consciousness, when the functions of vision are all present, but all the good juice of 
consciousness has drained out?’ (Dennett, 1991, p.325).  
This study will ask whether the concepts we deploy in thinking about consciousness 
need to be revised in the light of recent empirical work on dissociations, and whether the 
Churchlands are right to think that blindsight (etc) should be conscripted as evidence for a 
wholesale conceptual revolution in the philosophy of mind.  
Neo Cartesianism 
The target selected as vulnerable to a reassessment of dissociations is the theories of mind in 
the philosophies of David Chalmers, Tim Bayne and others. Most of the positions targeted in 
this thesis can be described as neo-cartesian, insofar as they subscribe to certain positions 
which can be described as cartesian in character, with one major exception - they do not 
follow Descartes in predicating a substance dualism, but claim that, while there is but one 
substance in the world, that substance has a dualism of properties – both physical and mental. 
The mental properties in question, however, resist any reduction to the material. An entirely 
separate and non-reductive status is claimed for them and their relation to the physical world 
is variously described as emergent, or epiphenomenal. As we shall see, these properties are 
captured by the term ‘qualia’, or ‘raw feels’.  
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 In other respects, however, the views of these philosophers are similar enough to 
those of Descartes to merit the widely used term: neo-cartesian. To offer a few preliminary 
examples: they begin with a certain internalist approach to knowledge about the mind, and 
place a reliance on introspection. Descartes took his cogito argument to be self-evident; the 
neo-cartesians do not quite go as far as to claim incorrigible knowledge of the subjective 
realm, but they still regard the subject as the best authority for these inner states. 
 Within this family of views, however, there are many nuances. We shall find it 
convenient to attack Searle for his contribution to features of this position, but we 
acknowledge that he refuses to describe himself as a property dualist (Searle 1992, 2012). 
McGinn shares much of the position described, but argues that inspection can only yield a 
limited understanding of the mind-body problem (McGinn 1991). One of our targets in this 
thesis, Ian Phillips, is reluctant to take on any label. 
 Within the broad class of neo-cartesian philosophical views, however, there are some 
who are committed to a view which we shall take as the main target of this thesis. This is the 
view that perception is always conscious. For those philosophers, what it is to be conscious is 
identified with the possession of the non-reducible mental qualitative properties as described. 
David Chalmers’ 1996 book The Conscious Mind contains the clearest and most celebrated 
version of neo-cartesianism. His views are broadly shared by Tim Bayne, who co-authored a 
paper with Chalmers, and who shares an opposition to HOT theories. Bayne will be another 
target of this thesis. 
 It will be convenient, throughout this thesis, to refer to them as neo-cartesian, and to 
bracket them with other philosophers sharing or inspiring many of the views in that stable 
(Nagel 1974, Jackson 1982, Levine 1983), but our main target will be the view outlined 
above: that perception is always conscious. We shall argue that neo-cartesianism has insecure 
conceptual foundations, is poorly consonant with the empirical discoveries involved in the 
dissociations we shall discuss, and lacks the explanatory width of other competing 
philosophies of mind. It will argue that a conceptual reconsideration is prompted by a careful 
consideration of the dissociations, and once this is granted, the way is paved for a review of a 
wider philosophy of mind; one which has a greater explanatory width over neo-cartesianism. 
The way this will be argued is as follows. 
The first chapter of this thesis will serve to introduce the dissociations. They will be 
discussed in some detail, and some similarities between them will be drawn. It will be 
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necessary in later chapters to discuss some of them in further detail, but this introductory 
chapter will identify key elements. Even a sketch of the conditions may be enough to begin 
the case for conceptual revision, for they are often deeply surprising in their different ways. 
We may find that our conventional vocabulary fails to do justice to them, and the insights 
they present. 
In chapter 2 it will then turn to examine the philosophical concepts and arguments as 
pre-theoretical commitments of our target philosophers. I will argue that introspection does 
not provide an incorrigible foundation for the convictions of neo-cartesians. In this part of the 
exercise we shall follow the lead provided by Stalnaker, Schwitzgebel, Dennett and others. I 
will argue that concepts such as qualia and terms such as ‘what-it-is-like’ are problematic. 
The approach will be to put pressure on the central citadel of neo-cartesianism – the concepts 
in which their account is framed. It is not expected that this work will make a substantial 
contribution to the attack made by others on their definitions of consciousness and associated 
terms. However, positions taken by the neo-cartesians might recognise the empirical 
challenge implicit in any serious consideration of the dissociations, and it is here that we 
expect to make some contribution. I will argue that the neo-cartesian philosophers under 
study do not have a full appreciation of the potency of the challenge presented by the 
dissociations – and new developments and paradigms have come to put pressure on their way 
of handling them; if they have set them to one side in their work, new empirical findings 
suggest this might have been premature.  
In recent years, new scanning techniques and mechanisms have been developed, and 
used in many of the studies of the dissociations. To a degree much more fine-grained than 
ever before, it is now possible to investigate the neural underpinnings of perception, 
consciousness, and so on. In this, the dissociations are particularly useful, in that they allow 
the identification of specific areas of the brain responsible for aspects of mental functioning 
particularly in perception (see Lamme, 2001). Where one of the relevant areas of the brain is 
missing, or lesioned, otherwise malfunctioning, or where a more primitive processing 
pathway is triggered, bypassing those areas responsible for awareness, we find important 
aspects of perception may be preserved, without the usual awareness. In short, the 
dissociations seem to provide a case for saying that there is such a thing as unconscious 
perception, a position expressly denied by the neo-cartesians.  
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Many of these advances have been made since the publication of Chalmers’ seminal 
work in 1996. While we appreciate that empirical findings alone cannot dent a philosophical 
position; our case will be that scientific advance can give reason to re-think concepts. At the 
very least it can call into question the concepts scientists want to work with. This thesis will 
argue that positions within neo-cartesianism are built on conceptual foundations that do not 
sit comfortably with the empirical findings we shall discuss. It may be that these findings 
prompt a re-think of the concepts, and if this is the case, the door to quite different theories of 
mind is opened. 
The thesis will then turn, in chapter 3, to a close examination of the work of David 
Chalmers. We shall consider first his definition of the phenomenal, and how this locks out, by 
definition, a full consideration of the dissociations. For him, as for other philosophers in the 
neo-cartesian camp, there is a pre-theoretic assumption that perception is necessarily 
conscious. In the first part of Chalmers’ work therefore, the conditions are not given much 
shrift. Chalmers only considers blindsight as a problem for the structural coherence of the 
phenomenal with the psychological, which is a notion figuring later in his work. In this 
section, Chalmers argues for a close parallel between the phenomenal and psychological, 
which allows him to claim that consciousness is non-reducible, but his account is still 
naturalistic. He claims that this structural coherence constitutes ‘a central and systematic 
relationship, which ultimately can be cashed into a relationship between phenomenology and 
underlying physical processes’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.225). This principle can help us to make 
progress in understanding consciousness, as an ‘epistemic lever, allowing researchers to infer 
conclusions about experience from third-person data’, and as ‘a background principle in the 
search for physical correlates of consciousness’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.234).  
However, in an important section, he discounts blindsight as posing a difficulty for 
this parallel, or structural coherence. But, in the view of this work, more recent refinement of 
paradigms and empirical work has done much to weaken his objections to blindsight. We 
shall consider his claim that blindsight can simply be discounted as degraded but normal 
vision, his suggestion that we cannot really definitively say whether there is experience in 
blindsight, and other claims. If it turns out that, notwithstanding Chalmers’ arguments, in 
blindsight we have a case of awareness, which satisfies the demand for the control of 
behaviour and availability for report, (the psychological) but which does not involve 
consciousness as defined with no associated qualia, or which may not be described in terms 
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of ‘what-it-is-like’(the phenomenal) then Chalmers’ principle of structural coherence is in 
jeopardy. 
The next chapter (4) on Tim Bayne’s principle of the Unity of Consciousness begins 
with Bayne’s (and Chalmers’) claim that consciousness is necessarily unified. This claim is 
advanced as a constraint on other philosophies of mind, which, if conceded, specifically rules 
out consideration of higher order thought theories. They write in a joint paper in 2010: ‘The 
higher order thought thesis is incompatible with the unity thesis […] if the higher order 
though thesis is true, the unity thesis is false. And if the unity thesis is true, the higher order 
thought thesis is false.’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.533). If various disorders, or conditions can be 
shown to be a problem for the Unity Thesis, we can at the very least lift this constraint upon 
higher order thought theories. We may find that such theories could be an improvement on 
the way dissociations are handled. 
We shall argue that split brain cases present a problem for the unity principle, in that 
they provide evidence of failures of integration and unity. We shall also contend that 
synaesthesia presents cases of phenomenological ‘danglers’- a superfluity or a super-unity. 
Synaesthesia is a condition taken much more seriously in recent years. Evidence for the 
condition is now no longer exclusively reliant on the subjects’ testimony, but is backed up by 
brain scanning methods. On the question of the reality of that condition, we shall follow 
Blake et al. We shall argue such cases pose difficulties for the unity principle, but present 
further problems, even for a reductive account of the phenomenal states they involve. 
Chapter 5 deals with the work of Ian Phillips, who argued against blindsight as a case 
of unconscious perception during the early work on this thesis, picking up some themes 
introduced but not fully developed by Chalmers. Amongst other considerations, these include 
claim that light scatter within the retina, filtering into the sighted field, is responsible for the 
effect, returning us to the idea that blindsight is degraded but normal vision. We deal with 
Phillips’ claim that the successful discriminations within dissociations are not truly 
unconscious and are an effect of a degraded awareness coupled with a conservative response 
criterion; we shall deal with his question marks about whether the dissociations are truly 
cases of perception, using the definition presented by Tyler Burge (and endorsed by Phillips). 
I will argue that blindsight and the other dissociations survive these challenges to their status. 
His exchanges with Ned Block must be assessed.  
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Phillips is unwilling to be pigeon-holed as a partisan in the wider debate over 
consciousness, but his sympathies clearly lie with neo-cartesianism, as his exchanges with 
Block testify. He is robust in explaining the dissociations in ways that do not allow that they 
are a challenge for a neo-cartesian position. His take on the conditions is perhaps the most 
recent and the strongest challenge to the standard interpretation of them, and so this work 
must deal with his position. Throughout, we shall review the empirical evidence for the 
phenomena, against the claim that the experiments establishing them are, in different ways, 
flawed. In dealing with his arguments, however, we shall find that we will again raise 
questions about the conceptualisation of consciousness. We may find that Phillips is inclined 
to define ‘conscious’ and ‘perception’ in a highly restrictive way, making it hard to see what 
can qualify as ‘unconscious perception’.  
 In chapter 6, I will argue that empirical findings, and the change in concepts 
intimated, help prompt a case for a higher order thought theory of mind. Amongst other 
things, such a theory would have the added advantage, on this view, of offering a more 
thorough-going reductive account of mind. Higher order thought theory proceeds from the 
following assumptions. Phenomenal mental states are not necessarily conscious; some 
certainly are, but others form a class of mental states which are unconscious, but in which 
some discriminations amounting to perception are made. In arguing this, higher order thought 
theorists begin with a different pre-theoretic position on phenomenal concepts. They argue 
further that what makes a mental state conscious is its being accompanied by a higher order 
thought in ways outlined in this chapter. In this way, an account of conscious mental states 
can be given in terms of unconscious mental states. A reductive account might then be 
completed with the help of neurological advances.  The failures and preservations of mental 
functions involved in dissociations, and the identification of specific areas of the brain as 
responsible, provide additional and fine-grained reasons for giving an account of mental 
states in terms of brain states. 
We recognise throughout that evidence pointing to specific areas of the brain 
responsible for different functions will not slay the dualist. Discovering a real role for the 
pineal gland did not – could not – undo the commitment to mental substance of the Cartesian 
prepared to die in a ditch. The modern dualist takes a similar stance. In Chalmers’ case, (and 
in the accounts given by similarly minded philosophers such as Nagel) his pre-theoretic 
conceptual position is immune to the advances in neurological science. On their account, 
science, in being an objective discipline, has no route into the subjective character of 
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consciousness. Chalmers appears interested in the neurological evidence, but only as a means 
of establishing a theory of coherence between what he describes as the phenomenal, and the 
psychological. However, all that such a theory of coherence can do, in his view, is to 
establish how closely the phenomenal correlates with the neurological, or, to be more precise, 
the psychological evidence of the neurological.  
It is the argument of this thesis that the dissociations allow us to work towards a 
theory of mind that treats the neurological and psychological evidence not simply as evidence 
for correlation, but for a closer account which will allow that the phenomenal can be reduced 
to the physical. We shall also argue that a revision of concepts in the vicinity also allows us 
to give an account of the evolutionary development of consciousness in its widest sense, and 
its development in children. These are areas of consideration to which our target philosophers 
seem unable to contribute. For them, consciousness – understood as the possession of qualia - 
leaps into existence with no preliminary. It is an all-or-nothing matter, and there seems to be 






















The purpose of this section is to give a detailed introductory account of the conditions we 
shall discuss. Still further details of the experiments studying them may be given in the 
appropriate section of the chapters to follow, especially where features of the conditions and 
paradigms have a specific bearing on the argument being used. Here, however, we shall 
identify the dissociations, and advance some similarities between them. Some of the 
dissociations are the result of neurological dysfunctions, or the product of brain damage, or 
the by-product of operations to correct other problems; others apply to neuro-typical people, 
or can be artificially induced in subjects.  
Beyond this, however, how they are characterised and presented, is philosophically 
moot. This needs to be said, as the characterisation presented below is not without 
controversy.  
I argue that there is something common to all – namely that these are situations and 
conditions in which some function is separated or dissociated from consciousness. Thus, the 
function of perceiving can be detached from the conscious awareness of doing so: subjects 
can have perceptual sensitivity ie be demonstrably sensitive to their environment, without 
being consciously aware of this sensitivity. Some of these sensitivities extend to recognising 
a face, making choices concerning the emotional valence of that face, distinguishing between 
line drawings of animals, navigating a route past obstacles – all without awareness of that 
ability; in fact, in most cases, lacking any confidence in being able to do so. The controversy 
in this characterisation lies in the fact that some philosophers, as we shall see, are committed 
to defending the belief that ‘all seeing is conscious’ (Chalmers 1996 (p.222: ‘[..] where there 
is consciousness, there is awareness, and where there is (the right kind of) awareness, there is 
consciousness), Phillips, 2015, p.445) and that, if this is the case, the idea of unconscious 
perception is an oxymoron. Some therefore define terms to exclude the possibility of 
dissociation, and others do not accept that there is empirical evidence to confirm this as an 
interpretation of the conditions below (see O’Shaughnessy, 2002, p.415 et seq). Shelving this 





Perhaps the most famous of the dissociations we shall examine is ‘blindsight’. The condition 
owes its name to Larry Weiskrantz, who worked on it, and promoted its study from a 
beginning in the 1970s. The term was coined in a hurry, before a presentation, but its 
oxymoronic character has much in common with the term: ‘unconscious perception’. 
Weiskrantz first worked on a monkey, called Helen, who was used as a subject for the 
study of the primary visual cortex (V1 area) in vision. Helen was operated upon to remove 
the V1 area of her brain. This cortex is the most important point in the brain in which signals 
from the optic nerve are processed. Helen was rendered cortically blind by the operation; that 
is, she had her primary visual cortex removed by operation. For 19 months after the 
operation, she showed no visual capacity.  
However, over a period, Nicholas Humphreys, a graduate student of Weiskrantz, 
began to work with Helen, and found that, with time and persistence, Helen showed an ability 
to react accurately to moving targets, and, with some false starts, she could systematically 
anticipate and skirt obstacles in her path, and ultimately behaved indistinguishably from other 
monkeys. Despite being cortically blind, she was able to function surprisingly well2 
(Humphreys, 1974). 
Later in the 1970s, work shifted to two human subjects in Oxford. These were: DB, 
who, at the age of 33 underwent surgery to remove a tangle of abnormal blood vessels in his 
brain, in the right medial occipital lobe – a process which involved the removal of part of his 
V1 area – the primary visual cortex. This left him with a scotoma in his left visual field – an 
area in which he was blind. A part of his operation included the insertion of a metal clip to 
close off some blood vessels; this ruled out the possibility of conducting any further tests 
with an fMRI scanner, to establish the areas of his brain involved in processing his visual 
information.  
GY: At the age of 8, GY sustained a traumatic brain injury to his left medial occipital 
lobe, and which again caused damage, this time to the corresponding V1 area processing 
information from the right optic nerve, leaving him with a scotoma in his right visual field.  
 
2 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ek2LBqM7dk 
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Both GY and DB have been extensively studied, and it was found that a degree of visual 
functioning has been preserved in their blind fields – they were able to make successful 
discriminations concerning various stimuli presented to their blind fields, way above chance.  
Throughout, they protested that they could not see in that field, and were asked 
nevertheless to guess – at first in simple yes/no tests, and then in 2-alternative, forced choice 
(2afc) studies. Notwithstanding their protestations, their success rates in distinguishing 
between stimuli, and identifying features of stimuli, were 90-100%, where chance would be 
50%.  
A physiological explanation of blindsight starts with the observation that there are 
fully 10 different pathways from the retina to the brain – some by-passing the V1 primary 
processing area.  The primary visual cortex is the recipient of 85% of information, in normal 
circumstances, arriving from the lateral geniculate, but between 10 and 15% of information 
arrives at different locations, making use of a number of neural fibres greater than the whole 
of the auditory system. These ‘sub-cortical’ or ‘extra striate’ routes have pathways to areas 
responsible for processing things like: motion, colour, shape, edge and some of which encode 
faces, and other familiar objects. Physiological studies provide evidence for no fewer than 20 
different regions of the brain devoted to specific features of visual processing. Thus, seeing a 
cricket ball approach involves separate neurological processes, each of which is causally 
responsible for different things (the motion, the shape, the colour of the ball) each of which 
are then integrated, in the neuro-typical subject, into the complete item. The area known as 
V5 processes movement, V4 colour. Some features are processed faster than others. 
The cases provided by DB and GY suggest that the contribution of V1 may not be 
necessary for the retention or recovery of some low level visual function. The claim is that, 
ordinarily, the V1 area has a role in creating visual awareness. It is contended by some 
(Weiskrantz, 1997, Lamme, 2001) that visual awareness is the product of feedback from the 
rest of the visual cortex to the V1 area, but when inactive or altogether absent, the subjects 
retain some visual capacity, yet the subject has no awareness of it. 
(Weiskrantz reproduces Felleman and Van Essen’s representation of the various 
connections between the primary visual cortex, V1 area, and the rest of the identifiable parts 
of the local cortex – a set of interconnections and feed-back structures so complex that it is 




Since the first studies of DB and GY were conducted, other similarly affected subjects 
have been located and tested, with much the same results. The tasks set have moved on from 
simply asking subjects whether they are aware that an object is present in their blind field. 
Studies have looked into whether subjects can distinguish between horizontal and non-
horizontal gratings, whether a light stimulus is coloured, what colour it is, in what direction it 
is moving, and so on. Other studies have looked into whether a word shown to the blindfield 
can prime the disambiguation of other words. (Thus the word: ‘Water’ might prime the 
subject to one meaning of the word ‘Bank’, and suggest a river bank, which might otherwise 
have been read as a branch of a high street bank, such as HSBC or Barclays.) 
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In all such cases, when asked to guess what they may have been shown, in their blindfields 
subjects have shown a degree of success in discriminations well above chance. In some cases, 
well above 90% correct. (See Trevethan et al, 2007 for particularly good illustration of 
successful form discrimination in DB). 
Throughout, the response of subjects has always been to deny that they have any 
experience of the stimuli, and in the original trials, were forced to guess, ‘could not see the 
point’ and were astonished at their own results. 
 
Superblindsight (TN) 
Some opponents of the idea that blindsight can be regarded as unconscious perception have 
argued as follows: Blindsight does not count as unconscious perception, since, if perception 
involves access, and given that a thirsty blindsight patient (Marcel, 1986) would not reach for 
a glass of water in the blind field, it could not be considered that the blindsighted subject 
perceives the water.  
Other arguments have been brought against the idea that, in blindsight responses are 
unspontaneous and must be prompted. Block however, raises the possibility of 
superblindsight, in which the response is not prompted, but spontaneous. In his paper on 
concepts of consciousness, (Block, 1995) he writes: ‘A real blindsight patient can only guess 
when given a choice from a small set of alternatives (‘X’/’O’, horizontal/vertical etc). But 
suppose – interestingly, apparently contrary to fact – that a blindsight patient could be trained 
to prompt himself at will, guessing what is in the blind field without being told to guess’ 
(Block in: Chalmers, 2002, p.211). 
However, since Block wrote about his scepticism in finding a case of superblindsight, 
a case of bilateral damage to striate cortex has been investigated (de Gelder et al, 2008), in 
which a subject, TN, was found to retain sophisticated visuo-spatial skills in the absence of 
perceptual awareness. TN displayed quite a few of the more usual features of blindsight, 
including discrimination between rods presented horizontally and vertically to his blind field 
in forced choice tests, and a form of affective blindsight (see below) but the most interesting 
finding was that TN was able, unprompted, to navigate an obstacle course in a corridor 
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without colliding with randomly arranged boxes and chairs3. This case is as close to a case of 
superblindsight as has yet been found, since TN did not need to be prompted to make his 
decisions, nor was he made to choose between two available options.  
 
Emotional contagion in blind fields: ‘Affective Blindsight’. 
DB and GY have been the subjects of many dissociation tests, but another from 2009 is 
sufficiently different to feature here (Tamietto et al, 2009). This study was not simply 
confined to the movement of a light source, but tested for the retention of a capacity for 
emotional contagion. This latter term refers to our tendency to synchronise our facial 
expressions with those of others. On encountering a shocked/sad/happy/angry/fearful face, 
there is a tendency for us to assume the same expression. Pictures of people with such faces, 
or bodily expressions were presented to the blind fields of DB and GY, and contractions and 
relaxations of their corresponding facial muscles were measured through electromyography – 
specifically two muscles, one exclusively involved in frowning, (Corrugator Supercilili) and 
the other involved exclusively in smiling (Zygomaticus Major). The study found that stimuli 
in the blind field nevertheless triggered the expected facial expressions; in fact, interestingly, 
it did so more quickly than the same stimuli shown to the unimpaired visual fields. DB and 
GY were also asked, in a 2AFC task, to guess the ‘emotional valence’ of the pictures shown 
to their blind fields, and were able to ‘guess’ accurately well above chance – in other words 
to discriminate correctly. The anatomical explanation of this is the suggestion that extra-
striate areas, in particular, the amygdala, can still process the emotional content of the faces 
shown, possibly supplied by information via the superior colliculus, which remains intact 
after the destruction of v1 (Weiskrantz, 2009, p.10). It underscores the role of feedback to v1 
as the means by which we become consciously aware of stimuli. This phenomenon has a 
great deal in common with prosopagnosia below.  
 
Empirical developments in blindsight in recent years 
Some recent empirical research has overtaken some of the early dismissals of dissociations. 
With this we can quickly dismiss one line of objection raised against blindsight. As recently 





grounds of what was understood to be its limited nature. Thus: O’Shaughnessy: ‘Several 
considerations ought to make us hesitate before accepting (the importance of blindsight). The 
first concerns the relatively low-key power of blindsight. (It is) restricted to 80% correct 
guesses, mostly unspontaneously elicited, concerning a few phenomena, like lights and their 
orientation from us’ (O’Shaughnessy, 2000, p.417). And Holt: ‘If blindsight is a form of 
perception, it is a quite rudimentary form. Only in simple tasks do patients perform better 
than chance. They cannot perform higher order tasks, like perceiving relationships between 
simultaneous blind field stimuli’ (Holt, 2003, p.61). 
In a relatively short period of time, new experiments and cases have conclusively seen 
off this first response to the condition. Success rates in simple tasks reach higher figures than 
80% - in some cases, as much as 100%. Nor is the phenomenon confined to simple tasks. In 
his study of DB after some years had passed, Weiskrantz reports that in 2007, DB could 
identify low-contrast outline drawings of objects presented to his blind field, spontaneously, 
on first attempt with a success rate of 89% (25/28 items) (Trevethan et al, 2007). This success 
is worth some emphasis. His only failure was in not being able to distinguish between a horse 
and a stag, which, apart from its antlers was more or less identical. Furthermore, these 
drawings were presented with only 2% contrast, which made them very hard even for 
normally sighted people to see. Indeed, his blind field performance was significantly better 
than five normally-sighted control subjects.  
DB was also able to report the presence of low-contrast ‘Gabor’ gratings with 8% 
contrast presented to his blind field – a sensitivity which exceeded the same test presented to 
his sighted field, where he was able only to detect a contrast of 12% (Trevethan et al, 2007). 
In another experiment, it was established that shapes and reactions can be primed in the blind 
field.  
Many other discoveries have come to light in the last few years in a range of cases of 
dissociation, in which the processing of higher-order features is successfully accomplished, 
without conscious awareness4. Some of these developments will be explored more fully in 
later sections, but these recent empirical developments have a bearing on O’Shaughnessy’s 
and Holt’s claims above: that what is happening in these dissociative cases cannot be 
 
4 For example the unconscious processing of nude figures in the Jiang (2006) continuous flash study.  
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trivialised by claiming that it is only in simple tasks that the feature is found, or arguing that 
the discriminations in the tasks are rudimentary and do not involve higher order features. 
‘Numb-touch’ 
A case analogous to blindsight, but in a different sensory modality, was explored in France in 
1982. The details are in: Paillard, Michel and Stelmach (1983). A woman, MSt, suffered 
damage to her left side parietal area, with a number of sequelae, among which was tactile 
deficit on her right side, so severe that she might cut or burn herself without noticing. During 
a series of tests, she was blindfolded and asked to respond if she felt pressure on her 
deafferented right hand. At first, she gave no response, even to the strongest pressure. 
However, when the test was repeated in subsequent sessions, the subject was progressively 
able to point, using her left hand, (and still blindfolded) to the location on her right hand 
where the pressure was being applied. This success was accompanied by her considerable 
surprise, and she commented: ‘But I don’t understand that. You put something there. I don’t 
feel anything, and yet I go there with my finger. How does that happen?’ She could also 
detect some gross differences in the size of objects being palpated by the right hand. 
Interestingly, the condition is different from the blindsight cases in one key respect – she did 
not need to be prompted to obtain a response, and so the case is immune to the criticisms of 
the two-alternative forced choice requirement in the blindsight tests. 
 
Visual agnosia and ‘vision for action’. Milner and Goodale’s work with Dee 
Fletcher. 
The lead work done on visual agnosia was done by Milner and Goodale, (2005) who 
researched the case of DF, a young woman who suffered the consequences of carbon 
monoxide poisoning, while taking a shower in her house in Italy. At first it was imagined she 
was cortically blind, like many of the blindsight patients above, but with no spared areas in 
her visual field.  
Over time, she recovered some visual experience. She first experienced a vivid sensation of 
colour, but it became quickly obvious that she had lost an ability to recognise objects on the 
basis of their form alone. She had sustained some very regionally specific brain damage as a 
result of her hypoxia. In tests, she could be shown patterns of lines, even very faint in 
contrast, but could not tell if they were horizontal, vertical, or obliquely angled. She could not 
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identify objects from line drawings of them, nor could copy line drawings as given (see 
below). But she could draw objects from memory; thus it was established that her visual 
memory was unimpaired. The key finding in the studies of her was that she did not suffer at 
all from any motor disability. She had no problems at all in walking, picking things up, or 
angling her hands to receive or give things. In experiments where she was offered a pencil 
with either an horizontal or vertical orientation, she could not tell if it was one or the other, 
but she aligned her hand correctly to receive it.  
 
She could walk unassisted, along a forest path, strewn with rocks and tree roots, with no 
difficulty (Milner and Goodale, 2005, p.19). 
It was on the basis of these findings that Milner and Goodale, following work on 
primates done by Ungerlieder and Mishkin (1982), established that there are two separate, 
relatively independent visual processing systems. Both highways begin in the primary visual 
cortex V1, but then take different routes geographically: one along a ventral stream, ending at 
the bottom and sides of the hemispheres, in the inferior temporal region; the other takes a 
pathway higher in the cerebral cortex, ending in the posterior parietal cortex, along a so-
called dorsal stream. The two highways have some interconnections, but would appear to be 
functionally specific. The ventral stream is responsible for the processing of retinal signals 
for the purpose of forming a perceptual representation, and it is this route that was most 
affected by DF’s hypoxia. This stream creates a rich representation of the scene being 
perceived, but does not have any direct connection to the motor system. It is this stream that 
is involved in perceiving a football, but has no role in instructing the body to align itself in 
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such a way as to kick it into the goal. This function, which could be described as a more ‘on-
line’ function, is played out by the dorsal stream, and is responsible for ‘vision for action’. 
The evidence for this separation of visual processing would be stronger if a case where the 
dorsal stream were damaged, but not the ventral stream – the converse of DF’s case. In fact 
the discovery of just such a condition was made much earlier by Rudolph Balint in 1909. 
Balint’s subject was not agnosic like DF; he could recognise objects and people. He suffered 
though, from an inability to reach out and pick up objects. He would fumble and grope 
around, much like a blind man. He could still see the object of his attention, but he could not 
orient himself or his hand to pick it up.  
From our point of view, however, the important thing to acknowledge is the claim that 
conscious visual experience is a product of the ventral, not the dorsal stream. The dorsal 
stream is responsible for the processing of information to be used in the alignment of the 
hands and body in (say) returning a tennis serve. This conversion of visual information 
directly into action is done entirely without awareness. This remains intact in DF’s case; 
however, her processing in the ventral stream is compromised – she finds it hard to tell where 
one object ends and another begins, especially if they are of similar colour. She cannot say 
what shape a presented object has. So, in DF’s condition we have another case in which we 
have successful discrimination, (in the situations in which DF is orienting herself to pick up 
objects etc) but without any awareness that she is so doing. 
This is not to say that visual information processed by the ventral stream always 
reaches awareness. Milner and Goodale concede that at present, they have ‘no real idea what 
the critical difference is between neural activity that reaches awareness, and that which does 
not’ (Milner and Goodale, 2004, p.114). But they would seem to take the view that the 
ventral stream is responsible for unconscious perception of the kind that is at work in 
subliminal stimuli (shown for very brief periods, say 50 microseconds), and which is at work 
in prompting behaviour.  
Hemispheric neglect 
In hemispheric neglect, we find a condition occasioned by damage in a different area of the 
brain - subjects have all of them suffered compromise to the right hemisphere to the brain – 
either through a stroke, or external trauma. These subjects are, many of them, hemianopic – 
that is to say, blind in their left visual fields. Damage to the right hemisphere means that 
visual information, processed normally in their right hemisphere, is extinguished. Subjects 
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with the condition do not seem to realise that the left hand side of their world even exists – 
women might apply make-up to one side of their face, men might only shave the right side of 
their face. When drawing pictures, subjects leave the left side of clocks, cats, flowers 
incomplete. See fig 1 below. Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978) present a study in which subjects 
who know Milan well, are invited to imagine being in the cathedral square, facing the 
Duomo, and to describe what they would see. The subjects who know the square well, 
typically describe all the buildings and facades that lie to the right of their orientation, but 
omit those to their left. If they are then told to imagine they turn through 180 degrees and to 




There is a difference of opinion concerning whether the condition is a failure of attention, or 
a failure of the brain to represent space, but this may be a debate we can avoid commitment 
to, here. The condition is by no means rare (see the recent study in Guariglia et al, 2013) but 
let us focus on one study which is of particular interest to us. Marshall and Halligan (1988) 
reached the conclusion that stimuli in the neglected field, which are not therefore consciously 
seen, can still influence or prime responses. Their paper was the result of the study of a single 
patient, who was shown a series of line drawings featuring two pictures of a house, otherwise 
identical except that in some cases, smoke and flames are pictured as coming from the 
window of the second house on its left side (see below). The subject reported that the pictures 
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appeared identical throughout, since her neglect extinguished that part of the picture which 
featured the smoke and fire. When however, she was then asked which house she would 
prefer to live in, the subject always chose the house without the fire, though could not say 
why, and imagined she was guessing. This was the case, even though the subject was allowed 
free movement of her head and eyes, and so the effect was not a direct consequence of 
sensory loss in the left visual field. The subject simply failed to see the smoke on that side of 
the presented images. 
 
 
Other studies have explored the condition still further, specifically on the question of 
whether unseen words presented in the neglected field can act as a prime for tasks given to 
the field showing no neglect (Berti and Rizzolatti 1992). Subjects were shown pictures in 
their left, neglected field as primes for pictures (of fruit, or animals) in their right, which they 
then had to classify correctly. It was found that the subjects could classify correctly very 
much faster if they were primed with a prime that was cognate with the picture shown to the 
side showing no neglect.  
Berti and Rizzolatti conclude: ‘patients with neglect are able to process stimuli presented to 
their neglected field to a categorical level of representation even when they deny the stimulus 
presence in the affected field’.  
In his own review of dissociations, Weiskrantz describes the findings in this way: 
‘The subject may not “know” it, but some part of the brain does’ (Weiskrantz, 1997, p.26). 
There are clear similarities with the phenomenon of blindsight. This account, which ascribes 
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psychological predicates to parts of the brain, is a controversial way of describing the 
situation, and we will address this issue later. For now, we might say that some processing on 
one side of the brain becomes available to the other side of the brain, but without the 
accompanying awareness of the stimulus in question.  
Prosopagnosia 
The characteristic features of this condition are these: subjects have suffered brain injury to 
the inferior posterior temporal lobe, mainly in the right hemisphere, but retain the ability to 
see. Their injury however, means that they are no longer able to recognise people from their 
faces alone, even the faces of family members. They are able to recognise people from non-
visual clues, such as their voices. Their ability to see, and the ability to recognise people on 
the basis of their voices rules out blindness, or some form of intellectual impairment. Various 
studies have been conducted to see if such subjects nevertheless retain some form of 
preserved recognition. One used by Bauer (1984) made use of a test for galvanic skin 
response (not dissimilar to a lie detector test, in which a subject will involuntarily show some 
physiological response to stimuli related to a crime). Bauer worked with a subject LF, who 
was shown five faces for 90 seconds, accompanied by five names. For four of them, the name 
did not match the face; one of the five had the correct name attached. When LF was asked to 
choose which of the faces had the correct name, he chose at chance level (22%). However, 
when he was tested by using the machine measuring his skin conductance (rather than his 
verbal response) the responses as measured by the machine were 61% of trials – well above 
chance. Young and de Haan (‘Face Recognition and Awareness after Brain Injury’ in Milner 
and Rugg, 1992) conclude that ‘it is inadequate to think (that LF has lost) recognition 
mechanisms. Instead, at least some degree of recognition does take place; what LF has lost is 
awareness of recognition’.   
Young and de Haan worked on their own subject, PH, who seems to be doubly 
unfortunate – reporting: he is ‘profoundly impaired at recognising familiar faces. Most faces 
he simply says are unfamiliar. The only face we have noticed (from the hundreds he has been 
shown) being fairly consistently recognised is Mrs Thatcher’s.’ On formal tests, PH 
recognised 0/20 highly familiar faces, and was at chance in deciding whether the faces were 
familiar. In a forced-choice test in which he was asked to pick one of two simultaneously 
presented faces (one familiar, one unfamiliar) he was at chance in picking out the familiar. 
When, however, he was primed with names, in a parallel task, he was much more accurate 
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(118/128 correct). In this and other tasks, Young and de Haan establish that PH retains an 
ability covertly to recognise faces. They conclude that normally faces are stored away in 
recognition units in which the various features of faces are encoded, Even in prosopagnosia 
cases, this encoding persists. In the case of those with the condition, there is some impaired 
output from these units, and they remain disconnected from the other parts of the processing 
system. However, it is still possible, by unexpected indirect means, to access these units, and 
so some ‘covert’ recognition is preserved.  
 
Cerebral achromatopsia 
In this condition, subjects lose the perception of colour, - they will say that everything seems 
to them to be black, white or shades of grey, but yet studies indicate that they retain an 
‘implicit’ or ‘covert’ ability to discriminate between colours. GW Humphreys et al report on 
their subject HJA (‘Covert Processing in Different Visual Recognition Systems’ in Milner and 
Rugg 1992). HJA suffered a bilateral lesion in the occipital cortex, and in consequence, a 
complete loss of colour vision5. When asked to name the colour of Mondrian patches offered 
to him, HJA would say he was guessing, but typically, he was 40-50% correct, where chance 
would have yielded a result of 6.3%. In another, slightly different, forced-choice study, HJA 
was asked to match colour patches. He was given a patch, and asked to choose from a 
collection of 20 others, which was the sample that matched his own. With widely separated 
colours, HJA got scores of 60% correct, when chance would be 5%. 
HJA would sometimes claim that he was very confident of having got some tests 
right, but his confidence would have no bearing on whether he was right or not – there was 
no link between confidence and objective performance. As with blindsight, therefore, there 
would appear to be evidence of successful discrimination without awareness. Humphreys et 
al describe his case: ‘[In HJA] there is residual covert processing of colour, without colour 
identification […] he reports no conscious experience of colour’ (Milner and Rugg, 1992, pp. 
62-64). 
 
5 Coincidentally, he also was left with visual object agnosia, which we will not develop here, beyond 
saying that in his case, the agnosia was not accompanied with any covert recognition of objects. 
However, studying HJA’s condition allowed Humphreys et al to conclude that the areas of the brain 




Partially successful perception in post-commissurotomy patients. 
Sperry’s split-brain patient NG (Sperry, 1968) was shown images which one hemisphere 
alone (the right) could perceive (flashed briefly into the field of vision of the left eye). When 
asked if she saw images shown to the right hemisphere, she said ‘No, nothing’. When the 
experiment was repeated for the other, left hemisphere, and NG asked if she saw images 
shown to that hemisphere, she correctly reported the image. However, when shown images to 
the right hemisphere, and then asked to reach under a screen and pick out, with her left hand, 
the object shown, she palpates a number of objects, and then correctly identifies the one 
shown in the image. On the face of it, it would seem that the right hemisphere is capable of 
making discriminations but without awareness, or at least without awareness being available 
to the hemisphere that controls speech. 
The study went further. NG was flashed a picture of a nude woman to her right 
hemisphere. The effect is reported in Springer and Deutsch 2003: “NG’s face blushes a little, 
and she begins to giggle. She is asked what she saw. She says: ‘Nothing, just a flash of light’, 
and giggles again, covering her mouth with her hand. ‘Why are you laughing then?’, the 
investigator inquires. ‘Oh doctor, you have some machine!’ she replies” (Springer and 
Deutsch, 2003, p.36). In this case, it would seem her right hemisphere processed the image to 
a point where a response of a certain kind is made (her embarrassment), though this was non-
verbal, in view of the fact that the verbal centres of the brain are in the left hemisphere. The 
comment: ‘Oh doctor, you have some machine’ is a sign perhaps that the left hemisphere had 
registered the emotional and physiological responses triggered by the right hemisphere, and, 
in common with other cases, tried to make a verbal rationalisation of the situation, with 
incomplete information. 
A similar kind of dissociation has been recognised in the field of amnesia. Amnesic patients 
have been shown to have good retention of certain types of events, even though the patients 
themselves say of themselves that they have no memory of them as such. (See: 







Cases not involving brain damage. 
Lest it be thought that unconscious perception could only be the result of deficit, or the by-
product of trauma, we must acknowledge that there can be replicable cases of unconscious 
perception created in normal subjects. One of the advantages of being able to do so, is being 
able to side-step the worry that brain damage might also affect the cognitive processing 
underlying their reports, and so introducing uncertainties or biases to the paradigm. In his 
exchange with Phillips, Block (2015) adverts to Breitmeyer 2015 which is a review of 24 
different ways in which unconscious perception can be induced in normal subjects by various 
means of ‘blinding’ them to stimuli. Some of these ways involve presentations to subjects of 
visual stimuli over very short time periods6, and masked by other stimuli flashed to them. 
Other studies involve and exploit binocular rivalry. One example is styled ‘continuous flash 
suppression’ – a study in which a changing sequence of Mondrian colour patterns are 
presented to the perceptually dominant eye, while the perceptually subordinate eye is 
presented with the target stimulus of a word or picture. The sequence of changing colours 
suppresses conscious awareness of the target stimulus, for up to several seconds. When 
asked, subjects say they have no knowledge of what the stimulus is – they are just guessing – 
and there is no correlation between the confidence they have in their answers and what they 
have actually seen. They really are just guessing – but again, in their guesses, they are well 
above chance in giving the right answers.   
More recently, cases of blindsight can be induced in subjects by application of trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation such that, for example, they can perform fast corrective reaching 
movements without being aware of the presence of the visual signal that prompts their 
behaviour (see: Ro et al, 2004, Christensen et al, 2008).  
 
Early Vision 
Tyler Burge’s definition of perception is pivotal in a later chapter. He writes: ‘certain states in 
early vision (states in the first micro-seconds of visual processing) may count as perception 
by the individual, but fail to be conscious’ (Burge, 2010, p.375). I illustrate this with the 
following experience. One early summer morning, some years ago, I walked to the bottom of 
 
6 Ie well below the time necessary for the stimuli to become consciously represented – typically 
around 40 ms 
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my garden. As I approached an unkempt area, the following events unfolded quickly and in 
this order: I felt uneasy; I leapt sideways, and it was only then I became aware of the 50 cm 
snake sunning itself on the ground. (It was a grass snake, and retreated quickly to cover). 
Gray writes: ‘we become conscious of events only after we have had time to respond to them 
behaviourally, and often already have done so’ (Gray, 2004, p.90). Estimates of how much 
time it takes for visual processing to become something of which we are conscious vary, but 
a common estimate is about 250-300 ms. This is not a trivial length of time, and might be the 
difference between surviving and not surviving an encounter with a predator. Detecting that 
predator at an unconscious level bestows an evolutionary advantage, and waiting for a 
conscious appreciation of the danger would be a disadvantage. An unconscious perception of 
such challenges is thus hardly a surprise, and we must have similar experiences often, even if 
we do not notice the sequence of events so vividly.  
 
Perception under anaesthetic. 
A particularly striking example of unconscious perception is given by a finding that patients 
under general anaesthetic can respond to questions and can be primed by auditory stimuli. In 
1992, Jelicic et al reviewed several studies working on the presentation of auditory stimuli 
during anaesthesia, making the following finding: While no subject remembered any words 
or sounds played to them, it was clear they were successfully primed while under anaesthetic. 
Groups of colour words and fruit words were played to them, and after recovery, the primed 
group disproportionately responded to prompts asking them to name 4 colours, 4 fruits, with 
the colours and fruits suggested to them under anaesthetic. Jelicic et al conclude that there is 
therefore ‘convincing evidence’ of the retention of processing leading to the formation of an 
‘implicit memory’ under anaesthetic. Subjects were unaware of having been primed, and 
have no explicit memory after the fact; The subjects were unconscious, but at some level, 
perceived the tapes played; that is, they successfully processed auditory information and 
encoded it in working, or ‘implicit’ memory.  
 
Synaesthesia 
As acknowledged, synaethesia is not strictly speaking a case wherein function is separated 
from awareness. If blindsight and the other dissociations are cases of awareness without the 
31 
 
qualitative feel, synaesthesia would seem to be a case of awareness with too much qualitative 
feel. However, we must not rush to the conclusion that the condition thereby validates the 
view of qualia held by qualia-supporters. On examination, other issues present themselves, 
and synaesthesia may present problems for those who cleave to the idea that consciousness is 
unitary. We shall present this argument in the chapter dealing with Tim Bayne.  
Here are the basics of the condition: in otherwise normal individuals, experience in 
one sensory modality (sight, smell, hearing etc) reliably triggers the report of a sensation in 
another modality. In other words, sensory stimuli associated with one sense are accompanied, 
in appropriate circumstances, by qualitative ‘feels’ in another sense. It seems there are many 
different types of synaesthesia, that sensations in all modalities can elicit further sensations in 
all other modalities in different individuals, (thus: hearing/colour, touch/taste and so on) but 
some forms of synaesthesia are more common than others. Perhaps the most common version 
is ‘coloured-grapheme’ synaesthesia, in which letters are seen as coloured, but this would 
appear to be a case of two sensations in the same modality of vision. Another variant – 
colour/music, or colour/sound - is more clearly a case of triggered sensation in a different 
modality (a cross-modal variant). The condition is reported more commonly by women (on a 
ratio of 6:1), by people who are artistic, or left-handed, or musical (evidence suggests Liszt, 
Sibelius, and Messiaen had the condition). It can be brought on by brain injury, or epileptic or 
tumour-related seizures, but it may also, in other variants, be a condition which is inherited 
from birth. Indeed, some developmental theories have argued that everyone starts out as a 
synaesthete, in the first few weeks of life, and we learn to establish singular (and modally-
appropriate) sensational responses to stimuli as pathways are laid down in the brain’s 
structure.  
It might also be noted that synaesthetes do not consider the condition to be a curse; in 
fact, quite the opposite. The condition confers upon the subject certain abilities which are 
welcomed by the subject, and some of those abilities, as we shall see, help diagnose the 
condition. 
There are problems with generalising from the studies made of synaesthetes – we 
have noted already that there are different variants, however, within each variant there are 
idiosyncracies – different subjects have reported differences in vividness of experience, in the 
colours experienced with different words, or with musical notes, etc. There would appear to 
be differences in the location at which synaesthetic responses are generated. Many of the 
studies done on the condition collapse the different variants together, and there are obvious 
dangers in this. Some are classed as higher and lower synaesthetes, according to where they 
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report their concurrent experience as being (amongst other features), and some are classed 
differently to accommodate other features. It may be possible that no two subjects’ sets of 
synaesthetic experiences/associations are the same. For example, within the class of 
colour/grapheme subjects, any individual letter may invoke quite different colour experiences 
– for one it may be that the letter A is accompanied by the experience of redness; for another, 
it might be yellow. In Sean Day’s study (in Robertson and Sagiv, 2005, p.14) 43% of colour 
grapheme synaesthetes experience the letter A as red. 
This of course, is only a sketch of the condition, and further detail will be introduced 
in the relevant section later. We shall see what contribution it has to make to our thinking 
about consciousness – I shall argue that it impacts on the suggestion that consciousness is 
unitary – a spin-off claim from the neo-dualist position, but one which puts a constraint upon 
accepting the higher order thought theories for which we shall argue. 
 
What do these conditions have in common? 
Neurologically, synaesthesia may turn out to have more in common with the deficits we will 
study than is immediately obvious, but for now I shall set it aside, and concentrate on the 
dissociations which preceded it in this chapter. 
We should ask: what, if anything, is common to them? We can make an answer to this 
question on different levels; most simply, one common denominator is neurological. There 
has often been a trauma of some kind, and some parts of the brain usually responsible for 
processing information no longer function as before, and this has allowed, in the pathological 
cases, a study of the brain’s functions. Some of the techniques which have the effect of 
creating a blindsight effect in neuro-typical subjects also interrupt the functioning of relevant 
parts of the brain – for example, trans-cranial magnetic resonance can be used to disable 
temporarily the primary visual cortex.  
The neurological causes and the location of damaged neural tissue in these deficits will of 
course differ from condition to condition, but following Weiskrantz (1997, p.226) we can try 
to generalise:  
• the lesion causing the deficit affects a ‘major distribution point for a network capable 
of processing a variety of attributes and components’ (usually the primary processing 
area of the brain for the function affected) 
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• a sub-part of this network can still be stimulated over a less direct route 
• the normally important back-projection to the distribution region is now without 
effect because of the lesion  
• this lack of feedback leads to an inability to a lack of awareness typical of such 
conditions, and (which may amount to the same thing) 
• an output to what Weiskrantz calls the ‘commentary stage’ cannot be generated, by 
which we can understand as being an inability to report the features of the perception 
or discrimination. In consequence, the subject reports as ‘blind’ to the stimulus. 
 
This might already suggest the beginnings of some neurological account of how 
consciousness arises, but there are other conclusions which can be drawn. From the 
dissociations we learn, amongst other things, that there are discrete areas of the brain 
responsible for different features of visual perception. The area for processing colour (V4-
V8) for example is a different area from that processing motion (V5). The role of V1 – the 
primary visual cortex - is clearly important, since, when missing or damaged or interrupted in 
its function, consciousness is compromised. 
The impairment by lesion or stroke of one of these areas, or sub-systems, while 
preserving others, provides a means by which the brain may be studied at a fine-grained 
level.  
In passing, we should avoid thinking of this as a new kind of phrenology. In fact, 
Weiskrantz alerts us to the danger of thinking of these studies in those terms (Weiskrantz, 
1997, p.234), since there are many inter-linkages or projections – connecting and feedback 
mechanisms which proliferate in the brain, and subjects differ - identifying discrete areas 
responsible for, or associated with the performance of different functions in all humans, while 
not impossible, is difficult. (Indeed, this is why subjects with highly specific damage to areas 
are so useful in brain research). We should also recognise that the plasticity of the brain 
allows for the development of new connections and pathways, to replace those lost, or 
interrupted by localised damage, so the functional architecture in one subject may not be 
replicated exactly in another. 
There are further conclusions we can derive from the neurological study of dissociations. 
In many of the cases mentioned, there is a single dissociation between residual capacity and 
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acknowledged awareness, and these are useful insofar as they allow inferences about the 
hierarchy of control between different regions of the brain. This was the area of study, and 
conclusion, of Breitmeyer’s 2015 work on the various psychophysical ‘blinding’ methods. He 
claims to have identified that a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing can be 
established. This in turn can begin to identify the neural correlates of unconscious visual 
processing, and to distinguish these from the neural correlates of conscious visual processing. 
Double dissociations, such the case of Dee Fletcher’s visual agnosia, and its counterpart, 
optic ataxia, allow inferences to, or provide evidence of the independence of systems, or 
modules. In this case, the vision-for-action, and the vision-for-perception distinction.  
Thus, much can be learnt from the study of the dissociations, especially since many of the 
psychological studies of them can now be supported by modern imaging techniques. But the 
scientific study of dissociations, and all of the results above, does not necessarily make the 
target philosophers against whom this thesis is aimed, sit up and take notice.  
Some, such as Ian Phillips, remain committed to defending the view that all seeing is 
conscious, and will, as we shall see, reject the dissociations as cases of unconscious 
perception. He will contest them as being both unconscious and as cases in which genuine 
perception is involved. Others might define their terms in such a way that the dissociations 
cannot present a challenge – Chalmers and others define consciousness in terms of the 
possession of qualia, or awareness, or something that it is like to taste coffee, see the colour 
red, and so on, and as we shall see, this might mean that the dissociations create difficulties 
for a wider picture of mind (his ‘structural coherence’), but they do not impact on what they 
consider consciousness to be.  
However, if they are as we shall depict them, ie genuine cases of perception, or successful 
perceptive discriminations, in the absence of consciousness, the dissociations break apart 
what the neo-dualists would insist are linked by definition. To put it slightly differently, in 
these cases we seem to have situations in which successful discriminations are accomplished, 
but without the qualia of experience. 
In the course of this study, we shall make the case for taking the dissociations more 
seriously. We shall argue that our target philosophers have a conceptual framework which 
allows the conditions to be recognised, but in ways that do not question the contention that 
seeing is necessarily conscious (e.g. O’Shaunessey, 2002, p.416). Others are inclined to 
question the empirical evidence for dissociation (Chalmers, Phillips). If, however, we adopt a 
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different conceptual framework, it may be that we can embrace the dissociations as 
unexceptional examples of mental states of which we are not conscious, and at the same time, 
pave the way for a consideration of a higher order thought theory. This would have the 
additional advantage, on this view, of being more open to the evidence of neuroscience, and 































On Phenomenal Concepts  
 
Qualia, and ‘what-it-is-like’. 
The purpose of this section is to explore the phenomenal concepts at the centre of neo-
cartesianism, and their role in an anti-physicalist theory. It will identify them and how they 
are defined; we shall see how they appeal to our intuitions; we shall show how they feature in 
a non-reductive account of mind. It will then go on to identify some of the shortcomings 
involved in the concepts, arguing that, as such, they shunt the philosophical consideration of 
mind into a cul-de-sac, and provide no basis for any account of the evolutionary development 
of consciousness in humans or other animals. The chapter will largely be a prima facie case 
against the understanding of phenomenal concepts as adopted by the neo cartesians. As used 
by them, these concepts disallow a treatment of the dissociations as unconscious perception, 
so a critical examination of those concepts is preparatory to any new theory with unconscious 
perception at its centre.  
 
What are qualia; how are they defined and how is the concept of them 
acquired? 
To be discussed is the concept of a quale and specific examples of qualia. In the conception 
presented by the dualists, these concepts are the product of having an experience of a certain 
sort, and which refer to the phenomenal character of such experiences. As we shall see, such 
concepts refer to the specific phenomenal properties which are created by an experience. 
They are invoked expressly to allow a distinctive way of thinking about subjective states, and 
are supposedly available only to those who have had the relevant experiences. 
These will be our primary targets, though they belong to a wider family of terms 
which point at non-material phenomenal properties distinct from those that can be accessed 
or explained from a scientific perspective. Chalmers makes this clear: ‘[A number of 
alternative terms] include: “experience”, “qualia”, “phenomenology”, “phenomenal”, 
“subjective experience” and “what-it-is-like”’(Chalmers, 1996, p.6).It is important to note 
that Chalmers identifies them with consciousness from the start: ‘“To be conscious” […] is 
roughly synonymous with “to have qualia” (Chalmers, 1996, p.6). 
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Not all philosophers that use the terms, agree on what those terms should be confined 
to: for example, Dretske (1995) and Lycan (2001) think of qualia as being properties of 
objects external to us, while Chalmers thinks of them as characteristics of our experience. In 
this sense we can describe them as mental phenomenal properties. This account will restrict 
the discussion to that version which is central to the position taken by the non-reductive 
monists we have as our target – ie to a qualitative property or ‘feel’, or feature of experience. 
On this reading, a paradigmatic quale would be that felt quality of my experience which, in 
the presence of a certain scent, is what we may call Patchouli7. Similarly, Redness, the taste 
of Coffee, how Middle C on a Piano sounds, and the feel of Rabbit Fur would all be qualia.  
It is also clear that Chalmers is committed to a belief in the felt quality of thought (at 
least of some thoughts) – that for example, there is something it is like to think of the Eiffel 
Tower, or to believe that it is tall (Chalmers, 1996, p.10). In other words, there is a qualitative 
feel to propositional attitudes as well. We shall however, confine our discussion to the 
qualitative character of phenomenal mental states.  
However, before we look at these phenomenal concepts more closely, let us consider 
for a moment, what concepts are, and what role they play in the scheme of things. We can  
describe them as ‘mental representations’ or ‘[the] units of thought, the constituents of beliefs 
and theories’ (Carey, 2009, p.5). They are mental categorisations of the world and its 
contents, and they figure in the internal models we make in the form of thoughts and theories. 
Taking this last point further, it will also be helpful to think of them as the components of a 
Kuhnian paradigm (Kuhn, 1996) for which the theory provides the architecture. In his 
account of scientific paradigms and progress, Kuhn makes it clear that it is common for 
concepts to be theory-specific. Thus the notions of superlunary and sublunary forces and 
spheres were conceptual features peculiar to Aristotelean cosmology; the concept of 
corpuscles appertains to a Cartesian theory of light. Such concepts are the product of 
observation, or inference from observation. It is clear from this historical perspective that 
sometimes the wrong inference can be drawn from observations.  
At a different level, we should recognise that the concepts with which we apprehend 
the world are not fixed, but develop over time. Our concepts of number and agency become 
very much more sophisticated over time. Carey adds: ‘Many representational capacities arise 
 




from maturational processes. An example is stereoscopic representations of depth, which 
emerge in humans quite suddenly around six months of age’ (Carey, 2009, p.12). Our basic 
concepts are ones we work on, as we develop. They are rarely static. We refine our concepts 
of justice, and fairness as we encounter complex problem cases. We add to our conceptual 
resources as we master a natural language, and enrich ourselves with an expanded 
vocabulary. Equally, we may jettison conceptual commitments and representational models 
that fail us. On that point, and returning to the Kuhnian account of scientific progress, one of 
the casualties of a transfer from one paradigm to another are the concepts specific to the 
rejected paradigm. One of the reasons for the transfer is a growing dissatisfaction, for one 
reason or another, with the existing conceptual scheme (see Kuhn, 1996, pp52 et seq). This 
might be occasioned by new scientific discoveries, or experimentation. Sometimes, the 
process of conceptual change can be prompted by a growing awareness of inconsistency, or 
internal contradiction.  
Against this background, let us consider the theory with which we are currently 
concerned: neo-cartesianism. On this account, phenomenal concepts are concepts we can 
form as the result of an experience, and which refer to the felt character of that experience. 
Thus, when Frank Jackson’s Mary (Jackson, 1982) exits the room and encounters the tomato 
for the first time, she has a visual experience as of seeing something red, and, we are told, 
forms the phenomenal concept of Red. Such a concept (we again are told) refers to non-
material properties, distinct from any properties that can be accessed from a scientific 
perspective. Further, because Mary instantly knows what seeing red is like from her first 
exposure to it, the acquisition of the concept appears to be immediate. Mary comes to acquire 
it by reference to her inner experience, and nothing else would appear to be necessary. We 
can now make further progress in analysing them further, and in identifying what it is that the 
neo-cartesians appeal to, in positing them. 
 
‘What-it-is-like.’ 
At some point, early in any non-reductive monist’s discussion of phenomenal concepts such 
as qualia, the term: ‘what-it-is-like’ features. The phrase first gained currency in the seminal 
work by Nagel: ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ (Nagel, 1974). Since its appearance in this paper, 
it has been advanced as a way of further characterising experience, or phenomenal 
consciousness, or specifically explaining the notion of ‘qualia’.  
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Again, in a recent paper Chalmers and Bayne announce their own commitment to the 
idea: ‘[w]hen a state is phenomenally conscious, being in that state involves some sort of 
subjective experience. There is something it is like for me to see the red book’ (Chalmers, 
2010, p.503). Chalmers also makes the tie between qualia and the what-it-is-like formula 
explicit in Chalmers (1996): ‘In general, a phenomenal feature of mind is characterised by 
what it is like for a subject to have that feature’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.12).  
In this way, (neo-dualists would say) there is something it is like to be me, but nothing 
it is like to be a brick, or a thermostat, or a zombie, since such items lack, or are incapable of 
qualitative experience. But as noted above, the idea can go beyond qualitative experience to 
embrace thoughts, beliefs, desires, such that the broader aspect of consciousness can be 
construed in terms of what-it-is-like for me to have such inner goings-on. There is nothing it 
is like to be the automatic doors that open on my approach since these cannot be said to have 
the belief that I am approaching and need access.  
In his 1974 article, Nagel does not spend a lot of time on the specific meaning of the 
phrase, and only gives a short footnote on the question, saying: ‘[…] the analogical form of 
the English expression “what it is like” is misleading. It does not mean “what [in our 
experience] it resembles,” but rather “how it is for the subject himself”. This makes it 
reasonably clear that the term is not being used in any way other than pointing to the specific 
experience. Nagel wants to know: ‘what it is like for a bat to be a bat.’ And: ‘An organism 
has consciousness if there is something it is like to be that organism – something it is like for 
the organism’ (Nagel, 1974). In this sense, the term is not meant to be comparative. What it is 
like to smell a rose is not to be assimilated to, or differentiated from what it is like to smell a 
hyacinth.  
Nagel does not offer an account of what it actually is like, to have an experience, in 
other words; what it would be like for someone to have the experience. Little is offered by 
any of those who would use the phrase. Chalmers has an unconvincing attempt – he suggests 
that what is common to visual sensations, perceptions in different modalities, bodily 
sensations, mental images conjured up internally, and the felt quality of emotions is that they 
are all states united by the idea that there is something it is like to be in them (Chalmers, 
2010, p.5). This of course puts us no further forward; we are no closer to identifying the 
nature of ‘what-it-is-like’ by suggesting that several things have that character. We do not 
make much progress in closing in on the concept of loyalty by suggesting that x, y and z all 
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have that quality, and it is the one thing they have in common. Elsewhere, Chalmers has 
another attempt: while conceding, in a way rather instructively, that ‘It is often hard to pin 
down just what the qualitative feel of an occurrent thought is [...]’, he suggests that ‘When I 
think of a lion, there seems to be a whiff of leonine quality to my phenomenology’ 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.10). It is hard to say what progress this makes, if any.  
It is the view of this work that the term: ‘what-it-is-like’ does not help to define 
qualia. At best, it is an attempt to enlarge upon the term by synonymy; at worse, it is circular. 
Others reach stronger conclusions. Lycan describes the phrase as ‘worse than useless: it is 
positively pernicious and harmful, because nothing whatever is clarified or explained by 
reference to it’ (Lycan, 1996, p.77). He is equally scathing about ‘qualia’ insofar as these 
terms are used in a deplorably general way ‘as an umbrella term for whatever one finds 
puzzling about consciousness, subjectivity etc’ (ibid). 
 
How do our target philosophers arrive at the concepts?  
To what do the neo-cartesians appeal, in their account of the acquisition of these phenomenal 
concepts? As suggested briefly above, the answer to this question is firstly that they are 
arrived at by a process of introspection, and secondly, derived from the experiences they 
relate to.  
On the first point, Loar comments (in: ‘Transparent Experience and the Availability 
of Qualia’ in (ed) Smith 2003, p.77) that ‘all qualiaphiles think of qualia as introspectable’, 
that they are discoverable by that process, and that nothing else is needed or is indeed 
possible. It is contended that the felt character of a colour experience is revealed to us when 
we have an experience of it. Chalmers subscribes to this in the opening sections of The 
Conscious Mind. He prefers to use the term: ‘experience’, but it is evident that he thinks that 
we know about qualia by dint of personal experience.  
It might be argued that Russell himself bought into the characterisation: ‘So far as it 
concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know 
the colour perfectly and completely when I see it, and no further knowledge of it is even 
theoretically possible. Thus the sense data [...] are things with which I have acquaintance, 
things immediately known to me just as they are’ (Russell, 1912, p.25). The philosopher CI 
Lewis, who first coined the term in 1929, also took a similar view: 
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‘The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is 
purely subjective’ (‘Mind and the World Order’ 1929). 
As for the acquisition of the concepts, Chalmers in The Character of Consciousness, 
seems to adopt a Lockean account8 of concept formation – ie that experience alone is 
sufficient to establish a concept: ‘The most important phenomenal concepts are those we 
acquire directly from having experiences with that sort of phenomenal character. For 
example, when one first learns what it is like to experience an orgasm, one acquires a 
phenomenal concept of the experience of an orgasm’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.251). And later: ‘I 
look at a red apple and visually experience its colour. This experience instantiates a 
phenomenal quality R which we might call phenomenal redness. It is natural to say I am 
having a red experience, even though experiences are not red in the same sense that apples 
are red’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.254). 
In general philosophers who subscribe to the existence of qualia regard that existence 
as ‘just obvious’, and no further attention is given to it, until they encounter and want to deal 
with philosophers who are less convinced. But it is clear that our target philosophers consider 
that the mechanism for the acquisition of phenomenal concepts is personal experience, and 
they are knowable by introspection. Some neo-cartesians would also consider that this route 
is tied together with a sense of infallibilism. There is a long-standing tradition of philosophy 
that claims: I know all and only the contents of my mind infallibly and completely. (See Heil 
1988 for a review of this position.) 
 
Qualia as used in the attack on Physicalism 
As we noted earlier, phenomenal concepts on the neo-cartesian account are central to 
critiques of physicalism. Qualia, once conjured and characterised, feature in a variety of 
thought experiments designed to torpedo forms of physicalism, portrayed as theories 
incapable of accommodating them – arguments concerning inverted qualia, Chalmers’ 
absent-altogether qualia (zombies), Block’s Chinese Mind; Jackson’s Mary and the Black and 
White Room, are all conjured as thought experiments to defeat functionalism, or any other 
form of physicalism. These arguments are well-known, and limitations on space forbid their 
 
8 cf: Locke: ‘An Essay concerning Human Understanding’ Book 2 chp 1. 
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elaboration here, but involved in each is some version of qualia, or ‘what-it-is-like’. They are 
presented in Balog (2009) pp 8-9. 
The conclusions the arguments draw are: Colour qualia are to be thought of as 
fundamental, subjective, non-physical emergent properties, not to be identified as functional 
or physical properties. For there to be qualia, God had to do extra work to ensure that they 
come with the physics: ‘[...] once god had fixed all the A-facts (physics), in order to fix the 
B-facts (qualia inter alia), he had more work to do. The B-facts are something over-and-
above the A-facts’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.41). As Frank Jackson more succinctly asserts: 
‘Nothing you could tell of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose’ (Jackson, 1982). 
Further, qualia are fundamentally irreducible features – they emerge from the physics 
of the brain, in a process which is hard for the neo-cartesians to spell out, partly because of 
the problems of accounting for emergence, but also because to do so means crossing the 
subjective/objective divide – the so-called explanatory gap. Again, there is a great deal of 
literature here, the exploration of which is forbidden by our limitations on space. This work, 
however, seeks to grapple with these questions by looking at the problem at a more 
fundamental level, that is, by asking hard questions of these phenomenal concepts 
themselves, and it is to this that we now turn. 
 
 How do dualists account for the acquisition and retention of phenomenal 
concepts? 
In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein says one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment is 
that a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it (1958 p1). This might apply 
to a number of candidate terms, but in each case, we might make the point that errors can 
ensue when one lets language determine one’s ontology. Because there is a word in the 
language does not mean there is a something which that word singles out.  We might be 
especially careful when a term of art is in question, which is what ‘qualia’ is. 
One thing we might want to be sure is that there is indeed something in the world 
which the term singles out. Neo-cartesians, or qualia enthusiasts, should show that there are 
such things as qualia as defined, and the mere invocation of them is not sufficient to establish 
the term, let alone, with them, demolish the case for physicalism. Some philosophers argue 
that qualia, in the sense that they have been conjured by neo-cartesians, do not exist at all. 
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Dan Dennett tells a story of a concept that has got off to a bad start namely ‘fatigues’, in his 
book: Brainstorms (1978). Dennett cautions against the assumption that a term identifies 
something substantial, and that very often, conceptually speaking, people can get off on the 
wrong foot. In the case explored, we imagine an Amazonian tribe not previously exposed to 
advanced biology, which has come to think that tiredness is the possession of ‘fatigues’: the 
more tired, the more fatigues someone has. The word is embedded in the language of the 
tribe. The tribe has not been able to isolate a fatigue (unsurprisingly) and ask the visiting 
explorers if, with the advances of modern science they have discovered what nature fatigues 
have, what connection to they have to bodies, whether they have a location in time and space. 
Our response, says Dennett, is to point out that the tribe has got off to a bad start with 
forming the concept – fatigues are not good theoretical entities as a foundation in the tribe’s 
biology. The same may be true of qualia. In fact, Dennett does argue elsewhere (Dennett 
1994) that qualia should be ‘quined’ out of existence.  
However, we should allow the neo-cartesians to make their case for their 
understanding of the concepts. Let us remind ourselves of the main features of the neo-dualist 
argument which features phenomenal concepts of this kind.  
Firstly, the possession of qualia by a being, ie that being’s consciousness, is defined 
as being something it is like to be that being (Chalmers, 1996, p.4). We need to ask if 
anything is gained by such a definition. 
Secondly, on their account, we acquire phenomenal concepts simply by experience. 
Mary comes to know what it is like to see red by seeing a tomato for the first time. She 
acquires the concept of Red when she exits the black and white room. The process by which 
Mary comes to know the concept of what it is like to see red as the result of a process of 
introspection – the internal contemplation of her own inner experience. According to 
Chalmers, the redness in question is a property of her experience, not of the tomato. The 
claim is that we know about this more directly than we know about anything else (Chalmers, 
1996, p.xii-xiii). In other words, what we are forming a concept of, is the character of our 
experience. We shall ask if a neo-cartesian account of concept acquisition and retention is 
one that works. 
Thirdly, the experience of phenomena is identified with consciousness. What it is for 
me to be conscious is for me to have the experiences which take this phenomenal character. 
(“‘To be conscious’ is roughly synonymous with: ‘to have qualia’” (Chalmers, 1996, p.6). 
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We will ask what this implies for the wider theory of which the phenomenal concepts are a 
part. 
Qualia as ‘what-it-is-like’. 
We begin with the claim that phenomenal concepts can be defined in terms of ‘what-it-is-
like’. To recall: Chalmers writes: ‘a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel – 
these are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. To put it another way, a 
being is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state’ (Chalmers, 1996, 
p.4). We began this chapter with a few critical remarks about this phrase. It is time to press 
further. What are we saying when we define qualia in terms of ‘what it is like’? Are we 
saying anything useful; are we saying anything at all which can be of use in defining terms? 
On the first question – is the phrase at all ampliative? Several philosophers have had occasion 
to pronounce that no – there is nothing that this phrase adds to the discussion. Collectively 
they argue that ‘what-it-is-like’ is as ineffable as ‘qualia’. 
Nicholas Humphrey puts the problem well: ‘The difficulty is one which has haunted 
our discussion of sensation from early on – the difficulty of pinning down that elusive extra 
ingredient, the X factor. We have several times had occasion to stress that when S (has a 
sensation), S –even as the subject of it – does not entirely know “what it’s like” is like, or at 
any rate he certainly cannot say’ (Humphrey, 2006, p.80). 
Peter Hacker takes the same view, approaching the question from an ordinary 
language point of view (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.277 et seq). He asks: what could count 
as an answer to the question: ‘What IS it like to’ (have a sensation)?. Standard answers would 
be: ‘pleasurable’, ‘agonising’, ‘disturbing’, ‘delicious’, ‘overpowering’, ‘exquisite’. Not only 
are these the standard answers, but they are the only answers. And sometimes the answer is: 
‘nothing at all’ (this latter would be the case when seeing a lamppost, or a table, for example.) 
These characterisations however, do not yield a ‘specific feel’ to any qualitative experience. 
Hacker writes: what individuates the experiences are the things they are experiences of. As he 
puts it: ‘The experiences differ in so far as their objects differ’, and later: ‘pleasures are 
individuated by their objects’ (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, pp.274-5). 
Hacker concedes that the experience of hearing Beethoven’s 9th Symphony is 
different from smelling a rose, and that both are different from seeing a sunset, but to make 
the further claim that there is some unique distinctive feel to these is an altogether more 
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questionable claim. Just as Chalmers suggested there was a leonine ‘whiff’ to seeing a lion, 
he would have to be committed to saying there is some Germanic-Romantic ‘lilt’ to the 
sensation of hearing the 9th, or some Hesperrhodos ‘smack’ to the experience of smelling a 
rose, or a Columbian ‘tang’ to the taste of coffee, at which point it becomes obvious that we 
are no further forward in characterising qualia. 
Hacker also attacks an associated position taken by Chalmers, when he, Chalmers, 
asks (in sketching out the Hard Problem): ‘Why do conscious experiences have their specific 
character’ (..) ‘why is seeing red like this, rather than like that’? Hacker makes the point that 
these terms: ‘like this’ and ‘like that’ are used by Chalmers as ways of referring to the 
specific qualities experiences are alleged to have, attempting to eff the ineffable, to pin down 
the distinctive with indexical expressions. Invoking Wittgenstein, Hacker comments that this 
is confused.  
The content of experience. One would like to say ‘I see red thus’. ‘I hear the note you 
strike thus’, ‘I feel sorrow thus’ (…etc) One would like to people a world analogous 
to the physical one, with these thises and thuses. But this only makes sense where 
there is a picture of what is experienced, to which one can point as one makes these 
statements. (Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 1 §896) 
There is, as Hacker would contend, nothing to which the experiencer can point in these cases, 
and we are left with the suspicion that one vague and poorly established concept is being used 
to support another; perhaps both stand in need of independent justification; perhaps, on 
examination, neither is grounded convincingly.  
 A suspicion creeps into the picture. We might ask whether, in talking about ‘what-it-
is-like’ we are saying anything at all. It may be that invoking the description really adds 
nothing at all to further the definition. Ned Block was clear about this in his paper making the 
distinction between p-consciousness and a-consciousness (Block 1995). In attempting a 
definition of phenomenal consciousness: ‘Phenomenal consciousness is experience; what 
makes a state phenomenally conscious is that there is something it is like to be in that state. 
Let me acknowledge from the outset that I cannot define p-consciousness in any remotely 
non-circular way’ (repr in (ed) Chalmers, 2002, p.206). 
Let us now turn to the question whether phenomenal concepts can be fixed or 
acquired in the way described by the neo-cartesians. We need to answer two questions: Do 
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we form concepts with phenomena as the raw material? And: can we form concepts with 
phenomena as the raw material?  
 
Can qualia be understood as intrinsic features of experience? 
As we have noted, neo-cartesians think of qualia as appertaining to the qualitative character 
of the experience of, say, seeing the red tomato for the first time. The phenomenal concepts 
derived are ones formed as the result of an introspective examination of one’s experiences. 
They are the result of a contemplation of one’s experience. But is this a true picture of the 
process? We do have concepts of redness and birdsong, but are they the product of a 
contemplation of experience itself?  
According to neo-cartesians, qualia are to be understood as the qualitative character of 
a feature of experience, and not of objects themselves. Their claim is that experience has a 
specific qualitative character, and this is what is discoverable by a process of internal 
examination – the ‘feel’ associated with seeing green, or the taste of coffee, etc. Yet, we can 
ask – what actually is it that is attended to in the moment that Mary sees the tomato for the 
first time?   
Tye (1999) claims that there are several problems associated with the idea of 
phenomenal consciousness, some of which feature elsewhere in this work, in some form or 
other, but relevant here is the question of transparency. The problem has antecedence in 
Moore (1922) and Harman (1990). Tye invites us to focus on the character of our experience 
when considering (say) a blue patch and to try to become aware of the experience itself, 
rather than the patch itself. He concludes: ‘The task seems impossible; one’s awareness 
seems always to slip through the experience to the blueness [..] instantiated in the external 
object’ (Tye, 1999, p.30). 
  His counter-claim is that we do not find any intrinsic feature of the experience, from 
which we form our concepts. We ‘slip through the experience, and end up concentrating on 
what is outside again, on external features or properties.’ What this is identifying is the 
problem of transparency. Tye suggests it may be the sort of thing ‘GE Moore had in mind 
when he remarked that the sensation of blue is diaphanous’9 (Dennett makes similar points in 
 




Dennett, 1991). Tye again: ‘Introspection does not seem to reveal any further distinctive 
features of the experience over and above what one experiences [..]’. 
The simple point is that the concept of qualia as the neo-cartesians would have it – as 
applying to the intrinsic features of experience, is contestable. There may be no such thing as 
qualia as imagined in this way. It may be that we do not form the relevant concepts as the 
result of a contemplation of our phenomena. If, as Tye writes: ‘I cannot make myself aware 
of any features of my experience over and above, or apart from, what I am experiencing’ 
(Tye, 1995, p.31) then it is hard to see how concepts can be derived from the character of the 
experience itself. But let it pass – we should now turn to a different question: can 
phenomenal concepts be derived from an introspective contemplation of phenomena? 
 
Can introspection of experience give us a secure grip on phenomenal concepts? 
I first want to raise an epistemological point about the reliability of introspection. In recent 
years, a number of philosophers have put pressure on whether introspection can provide us 
with the concepts as described.  They question what neo-cartesians claim that introspection 
can deliver, and have begun to ask if we are especially authoritative about our inner mental 
states. In this category we find: Stalnaker (2008), Schwitzgebel (2011), Noe (2002), 
Kornblith (1998). We find that most people are poor introspectors of their own ongoing 
experience.  We make errors in judgement about our inner states, when we are not fully 
attentive, in conditions dependent on our mood and for other reasons. This may be 
particularly true of our emotional states. The neo-cartesian claim that we are secure in our 
internal knowledge, and that we cannot be wrong about our phenomenology (infallibilism) no 
longer goes unchallenged (Dennett 1991, and see also Noe 2002, and Heil 1988). 
Schwitzgebel (2011) mounts a particularly formidable attack on neo-cartesian claims 
for what introspection can deliver. In: ‘The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection’ (2011, chp7) 
he advances the view that ‘Most people are poor introspectors of their own on-going 
conscious experience’ (Schwitzgebel, 2011, p.118). He offers a number of everyday 
situations in which we claim to have a secure grasp of our inner phenomenology, only to find 
ourselves mistaken. Despite our confidence claim to know ourselves better than others, we 
find that any individual, and for a variety of reasons - inattention, self-deception, as well as 
pathological delusion, can be wrong or untrustworthy about his inner states. Introspection 
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may not be a reliable epistemological basis, and grounding for what-it-is-like, and 
phenomenal concepts. Yet, this is the starting point for the neo-cartesian. In the Introduction 
to The Conscious Mind, Chalmers claims: ‘We know about consciousness more directly than 
we know about anything else [..]’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.xiii). 
Our discussion remains focussed on whether the phenomenal concepts at the heart if 
the neo-cartesian argument are securely reached. Here we offer the view that: the neo-
cartesian grounds his argument in introspection; introspection does not deliver a secure 
epistemology and an insecure epistemology can be at best a poor ground for the kind of 
phenomenal concepts at issue. There is, however, an even more fundamental objection 
concerning the genesis of these phenomenal concepts, to which we now turn. 
 
Phenomenal concepts and the private language argument. 
In this section we will consider whether Chalmers’ account of the genesis of phenomenal 
concepts is immune to an argument inspired by Wittgenstein’s private language argument. 
Let us first re-state and examine his position. The argument is laid out fully in his later work 
(Chalmers 2010), but some features make an appearance in Chalmers 1996. 
Phenomenal concepts are advanced as concepts derived from experience, with which 
we frame our beliefs about phenomena. He writes: ‘When one believes that one is having a 
red experience, one deploys a phenomenal concept of a red experience. The most important 
phenomenal concepts are those that we acquire from having experiences with that sort of 
phenomenal character’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.251). We may suppose that phenomenal redness, 
where that term refers to the concept involved and generated by red-seeing, is one such 
phenomenal concept, as is the general term: ‘qualia’ insofar as it operates as a concept.  
In Chalmers’ account, ‘the reference of expressions such as ‘phenomenal redness’ is 
fixed via a relation to certain paradigmatic red things in the external world that are ostended 
in learning the public-language term ‘red’. (..) the phenomenal concept involved here is 
relational in that it has its reference fixed by a relation to external objects’ (Chalmers, 2010, 
p.255). As Balog puts it: according to this view, ‘we can apply phenomenal concepts directly 
to the phenomenal states we are currently aware of, without the mediation of any functional, 
representational, behavioural, or physical definition, or physical criteria’ (Balog, 2009, p 11). 
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Several consequences emerge: recall that one of the functionalism-defeating arguments used 
by Chalmers is the possibility that two individuals could undetectably have an inverted 
spectrum in their experience – imagine the situation in which we both encounter the same 
cricket ball, we both describe it as red, but in considering it, I have the phenomenal property 
of my experience is of red, yet my inverted twin has an experience with the phenomenal 
property of green. How can this be accommodated in Chalmers’ concept fixing story?  
Chalmers puts it thus: The phenomenal concept is fixed by relation to the external 
object, but ‘The property that is referred to need not be relational, however […] there are 
counterfactual worlds in which red experiences are never caused by red things’ (Chalmers, 
2010, p.255). The property invoked in me and my inverted twin might be different, as it is not 
fixed by the object in the way our concept of red is.  
Our question is: can the phenomenal concept of red be fixed independently and 
irrespective of the property invoked? What problems are associated with this picture? 
Chalmers exposes the flank himself. If a concept is to be fixed independently of the 
qualitative property invoked, a private language may be required. The qualitative property 
becomes a kind of ‘beetle in a box’.  
He compares the example of Mary and her inverted twin: ‘When Mary has a red 
experience for the first time, she learns something different from what is learned by her 
inverted twin, who has green experiences where Mary has red’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.206). She 
has a concept of this quality – call it “R” that is distinct from the corresponding concept – call 
it “G” in the inverted counterpart. He goes on: ‘My qualitative concept “R” plays little direct 
role in communicative practices. In that way, he acknowledges, it resembles Wittgenstein’s 
‘beetle in a box’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.206). 
  He concedes: ‘Of course, the view I have set out here is just the sort of view that 
Wittgenstein directed his “private language” argument against. The nature of the private 
language argument is contested, so in response I can say only that I have seen no 
reconstruction of it that provides a strong case against the view I have laid out’ (Chalmers, 
1996, fn 13 p.206, and 2010 p.273). 
One powerful question which Chalmers must deal with is – how can such concepts be 
fixed, if they are so irrelevant, and float so free of the usual processes of sensation-naming. In 
Chalmers 2010, p.272 he discusses the process by which phenomenal concepts are fixed.   
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He criticises those constructions of the private language argument that have, at their centre, 
the belief that concept possession requires ‘a strong sort of “repeatability”’, and ‘an 
exceptionally strong sort at that, requiring the recognisability of correct repeated application’ 
(Chalmers, 2010, p.273).  
He argues that this kind of reading of the private language argument sets too high a bar for 
concept formation – he gives an account of concept formation thus:  
• The lifetime of a direct phenomenal concept is limited to the lifetime of the 
experience that constitutes it. (Though it may persist of there is a sufficiently vivid 
memory of it). 
• The concepts in question are predicable of any number of entities during their limited 
lifetimes, and these predications can be true or false. 
• This sort of predicability, with assessibility for truth or falsehood, seems sufficient for 
concepthood. Clarifying: ‘Merely the “hypothetical repeatability” involved in present 
predicability of the concept to actual and hypothetical cases, is required for concept 
possession’ (Chalmers, 2010, pp.272-273). 
On the face of it, this points to a process of concept-fixing which sets the bar way too low. To 
begin with, it seems insupportably rapid. Right at the beginning of the chapter in Chalmers 
2010, he writes: ‘When one first learns what is it like to experience an orgasm, one acquires a 
phenomenal concept of the experience of an orgasm’. He seems to be suggesting a single 
experience is sufficient to fix a concept. He rejects the idea that concepthood requires 
persistence (Chalmers, 2010, p.272). All that is sufficient is for the qualitative properties to 
be present to the mind. Concept fixing is a product of the special non-physical nature of 
qualia themselves (Balog 2009, p12). 
A further point is this: he does not spell out why he takes the view that the private language 
argument has no bearing on his position, so let us give a reading of it that creates difficulty 
for him. 
Chalmers asks: what justifies phenomenal judgements (in which phenomenal concepts are 
deployed)? (Chalmers, 1996, p.196). He gives the response: ‘I think the answer to this is 
clear: it is having the experiences that justifies the beliefs’. He concedes that having the 
experience may not be the only factor relevant, but he writes approvingly of a ‘first person 
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warrant’ for our beliefs about experiences (Chalmers, 1996, p.197). This would line up with 
other commitments the neo-cartesian would make. 
However, we can ask whether the process of fixing a phenomenal concept, and 
justifying phenomenal judgements using them can be as ‘first person’ as he claims. 
The private language argument in Wittgenstein’s 1953 Philosophical Investigations 
(paragraphs 258 et seq) gives an account of how the meaning of terms or concepts becomes 
established, and the role of experience in this. In brief, Wittgenstein argues that a private 
language is incoherent. What is a private language in this regard? It is a language, the subject 
matter of which is exclusively the subjective experience of the speaker. It is private in the 
radical sense that it cannot, even in principle, be shared by another person. Wittgenstein was 
opposing the position that Descartes, Locke and other philosophers took in this respect. 
The neo-cartesian understanding of qualia is that they are essentially private and, as 
Dennett puts it, according to tradition, there are no ways we can say to each other, ‘no matter 
how eloquent one is, and no matter how co-operative one’s audience is, exactly what way one 
is currently seeing, tasting etc. [..] Qualia are ineffable – in fact the paradigm cases of 
ineffable items’ (D Dennett: ‘Quining Qualia’). In short: how can the concept of qualia be 
grounded given that the neo-cartesian must start from his or her own case, trying to attach a 
name to an intrinsically unshareable feature of experience, with no way of communicating the 
qualitative nature of that experience? The kinds of item that Chalmers is advancing here, 
concepts of which he is trying to fix, would seem to be paradigmatic examples of the 
unshareably private experiences against which Wittgenstein pitched his argument. The 
intrinsically unshareable character of experience as described by Chalmers is essential if it is 
to be possible for Mary to have the inner experience of Red when looking at a tomato, and for 
her inverted twin undetectably to have the experience of Green when doing the same. 
Chalmers posits this, and also requires that there be a process of fixing the phenomenal 
concepts to the phenomenal character of the experience.  
The central claims of Wittgenstein’s argument are that merely associating a name 
with an inner sensation does not suffice to endow the sign with a use, that there is no private 
equivalent of public ostensive definition, and that there is no such thing as a rule of use which 
is in principle incommunicable to anyone else. Something of this argument is spelt out below. 
Associating a name with the inner sensation is only going to work if the ‘process 
brings it about that I remember the connection right in future. But in the present case I have 
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no criterion of correctness’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, para 258). Impressing a connection (between 
sign and sensation) upon myself is insufficient to establish it for future reference. It might 
seem right, but it is only a semblance of right. We cannot do what we might do with external 
objects – ostensively define it by pointing to it, since it is internal, and has no public aspect. 
Might one use one’s memory to confirm the association? No – for we cannot be certain that 
this process produces a memory which is actually correct, and known to be correct 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, para 265). Justification in using the sign consists in appealing to 
something independent. The rule for the use of the concept is not established by association 
or appeal to memory. 
I cannot give myself the meaning of a word in this way, in just the way that I cannot 
give myself money. I can transfer the money from one pocket to another, and write myself a 
receipt, but none of this ceremony has the practical consequence of a gift (Wittgenstein 1953 
para 268). In just the same way, I cannot arrive at private definitions of words, insofar as I do 
not learn a rule for use in this way.  
Over subsequent paragraphs (272- 278), Wittgenstein addresses exactly the kind of 
phenomenal concept that Chalmers has in mind – one derived from the intrinsically 
unshareable private experience of blueness. He adds the thought - - when one considers the 
blueness of the sky, ‘the idea never crosses your mind that this impression of colour belongs 
only to you’. A private language built upon such notions is a fiction since genuine acts of 
naming, or concept forming take place in complex social settings, governed by conventions, 
which fix the subsequent use of that term. A private ceremony cannot do this, and an 
intrinsically unshareable experience, such as the one posited by Chalmers, would act like the 
beetle in the box (Wittgenstein, 1953, para 293), in not being able to feature in any kind of 
language game, and thus could not fix a concept.  
Even supposing our putative private concept former could fix a concept such as this, 
they would be in the position of the customer who walked into a confectioners, and asked the 
shopkeeper: ‘I want a bag of sweets that taste just like this’ (pointing to their mouth).  
On this view of this thesis then, Chalmers’ account struggles to meet the challenge of 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Of course, if it is indeed impossible to arrive at a 
private language, then any further comments about Chalmers’ account is strictly unnecessary, 
but let us nevertheless add other criticism of his suggestions for how phenomenal concepts 
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are fixed. Recall that he argued that they do not require persistence, and can be fixed by a 
single experience alone. 
This is not easy to maintain. Concept formation and fixing, as any parent knows, is 
grounded in a far longer process of repetition and correction, extension and boundary-
limitation. Sometimes, the process can be accelerated, - once ‘red’ has been grasped, ‘yellow’ 
might be grounded more quickly - but I submit the claim that no phenomenal concept can be 
established on the basis of one experience alone, no matter how vivid that experience (which 
is what seems to be claimed by Chalmers). No phenomenal concept may be established 
without the correction and boundary-limitation involved in a community’s policing of the use 
of the concept, that requires repeated testing to confirm the truth and falsity of its application. 
As we saw above, it is not simply repeatability (buying multiple copies of the morning 
newspaper) that fixes the concept; the morning newspaper must be checked against the BBC 
news, the internet, and other sources. And no phenomenal concept can be established without 
some prior stage-setting in which it can be determined that a specific definiendum is what we 
are directing our definiens at. Fixing ‘Red’ as a concept requires the determination that it is 
the colour of an item at which I am directing my attention. Further, if there is a temptation to 
think there is a ‘wow-factor’ when Mary leaves her study in the black and white room and 
sees the tomato for the first time, it can be claimed that Mary’s task in acquiring the concept 
of ‘Red’ would be made far easier by the fact that she already has the concept of ‘coloured 
item’ from her hours of study in that room.  
At this point we acknowledge that there are other accounts of phenomenal concepts 
which do not need to invoke phenomenal consciousness itself. This line of enquiry has 
become known as the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Variations on this are offered by Loar, 
Tye and Carruthers, but exploration of these would take this thesis too far from its original 
focus, but we can offer the beginnings of solution, borrowing on a point made by Chalmers 
himself. He offers the view that the phenomenal is in a relation of structural coherence with 
the psychological (1996). Our psychological concepts characterise mental states functionally, 
and phenomenal concepts characterise the phenomenal aspects of mental states. It seems at 
least plausible that our acquisition of phenomenal concepts is on the model of our acquisition 
of psychological concepts. This lines up with another Wittgensteinian philosopher’s position 
– that of P Strawson (1959) who wrote: ‘One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself 
only if one can ascribe states of consciousness to others’ (p100). We can easily imagine that 
concepts are acquired and fixed by the same token, such that it is on the basis of having 
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attributed states of consciousness to others, having learnt and applied the relevant concepts, 
that we can attribute states to ourselves, and thereby securing our own concepts. This would 
be a process subject to public referencing, and meet the Wittgensteinian requirement.  
Other philosophers have taken a different approach to this question (Papineau 2011, 
Prinz and Pris 2013). Papineau claims that one way of circumventing the problems posed for 
phenomenal concepts by the private language argument is to argue that we have a ‘shelf-
supply’ of  potential concepts for types of experience, [and that when] we first have a new 
kind of experience, we take a potential experience concept from the appropriate shelf, and 
lock it onto the type of experience at hand’ (Papineau, 2011, p.9). For example, when I am 
confronted with a horse, I might take a potential animal species concept from the shelf and 
use it to form a concept that is locked onto the species: horse. He continues: ‘My ability to 
refer to horses does not involve rules of any kind’. This would appear to be a form of 
nativism as far as the origin of concepts is concerned. That in itself raises many questions. 
 Prinz and Pris counter this move, claiming that there is no such ‘shelf-supply’ of 
phenomenal categories for potential phenomenal concepts. In any event, the application of a 
rule would still be a necessary part of the process of fixing the concept. Mary would need 
some sort of rule correctly to apply the shelf-supply concept, if one such did exist, to the new 
experience. Prinz and Pris claim that ‘the role of the rule is played by the “ready-made 
concepts” (or “shelf-supply” of categories for potential concepts) (Prinz and Pris, 2013, p.13). 
So that, on this view, Papineau’s ability to refer to horses without involving any rules, is 
false.  
So, to conclude this section – can concepts of blueness, of qualia, which have built 
into them the kind of privacy which allows the inverted spectrum condition, be fixed? This 
thesis takes the view that there is much that is problematic about the neo-cartesian strategy. It 
is not easy to say what exactly we are trying to define, given the ineffability of qualia, and 
our suggestion that nothing is added to the target by adding the locution ‘what-it-is-like’. On 
this view, the private language argument has a lot more purchase on the process of defining 
phenomenal concepts than Chalmers allows, or can allow. For him and neo-cartesianism 
generally, the experience must be self-evident to the experiencer and the experiencer can 
easily form a concept on the basis of his own experience. We argue that the kind of privacy 
which allows inverted qualia possibilities is the very privacy that the private language 
argument tilted at. Chalmers recognises the problem posed by the argument, but does not 
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meet it. Our claim is that, at the very least, phenomenal concepts are not well grounded. 
Some are confident in taking the conclusion further.  
 
The identification of possession-of-qualia with consciousness. 
Finally we turn to the consequences of identifying consciousness with the possession of 
qualia, linking the two concepts together. As we have hinted already, this has the effect of 
confirming the neo-cartesian in his non-reductive position. On this account, mental 
qualitative properties cannot occur unconsciously by definition - there is nothing it is like to 
be a driver of a car on a long journey, zoned out for a while, or a sleepwalker, while 
sleepwalking, or someone with blindsight when stimuli are shown in her blind field. The neo-
cartesian observes that it is interesting that blindsight patients can respond appropriately to 
visual inputs, but this does not deflect them from their position concerning consciousness. 
Perception always occurs consciously; the concept of qualia has tied into it, the idea that it is 
something of which we are consciously aware.  
But then, what account can we give to the behaviour of the sleepwalker, or the 
blindsight patient? Can we really deny that the sleepwalker has genuine qualitative states? 
Sleepwalkers and blindseers are capable of really quite sophisticated discriminations: 
performing actions without conscious control, negotiating obstacles, and so on. The same is 
true of the drivers who fall into an autonomic mode when driving long distances.  
It may be that, if we abandon the pre-theoretic commitment to the idea of identifying 
consciousness with the possession of qualia, and uncouple the two, a more compelling 
account of the dissociations becomes possible. This might be reason enough to proceed, but if 
at the same time, our new conceptual infrastructure gives better purchase to a more reductive 
account of mind, on this view this would be progress. This argument will feature and be 
developed in later chapters.  
There is a final feature of the conceptualisation of consciousness and relevant items in 
the field. According to Chalmers, to be conscious is to have qualia, or phenomenology. This 
is, in a sense, an all-or-nothing question. If you have qualia, there is something it is like to be 
that creature, and not if not. Chalmers deduces that certain lower forms of life have a 
phenomenology in virtue of their perceptual psychology, but at some point it will ‘wink out’ 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.295). Dogs, mice are assumed to be conscious: ‘it is entirely plausible 
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that there is something it is like to be a mouse’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.294). But in these 
concessions, there is not much sense of gradation – it is still down to the possession of 
phenomenology. You either have it, or you don’t. Despite Chalmers’ descent into the phylo-
genetic scale all the way to thermostats, (Chalmers, 1996, p.295) what is lacking in the 
conceptual story is any sense of developmental increase.  
This point brings us back to the Kuhnian points made at the outset of this chapter. If a 
conceptual scheme is static in this sense, it lacks an ability to explain how consciousness has 
developed. As we shall see, Chalmers allows that there is a close coherence or 
correspondence between the phenomenological and the psychological. In the realm of the 
psychological, there can be increments in the perceptual discriminations and psychology of 
evolving animals, and it is possible that these will correspond to an increasingly rich 
phenomenal manifold. But there is no explicit causal link between the two. It may be that 
there are ways of conceptualising the picture in such a way as to allow a developmental 
account of consciousness that in turn allows us to tell a story of the growth of consciousness 
over evolutionary time. It will be the contention of this thesis that just such a 
conceptualisation exists, and for the reasons advanced is to be preferred over the neo-
cartesian account.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this section was to establish a prima facie case against qualia, the attendant 
term ‘what-it-is-like’, the way they are conceived, and what role they play in the non-
reductive aspect of non-reductive monism. We have seen that dualists think of them as being 
a ‘just obvious’ feature of our consciousness, built upon an incontrovertible ability to 
introspect and identify them.  
It is clear that the dualists form their phenomenal concepts in a Lockean way, by dint 
of experience – when Mary exits the black and white room, she has a ‘wow’ moment and 
forms the phenomenal concept ‘Red’ when she sees the tomato. Having taken the step of 
introducing qualia as a defining feature of consciousness, which is itself something over and 
above the physical features of the world, dualists must then resort to exotic accounts of how 
the (non-reductive) qualitative features of experience are generated (emergence, 




We have argued that qualia as a concept is not grounded well by introspection and 
that this term, along with ‘what-it-is-like’, is at the very least poorly formed. There is a 
tendency for dualists to define the one in terms of the other, when both stand in need of 
justification. We have argued that the private language argument poses a significant 
challenge to a dualist phenomenal concept strategy. Finally, we argue that the pre-theoretic 
identification of consciousness with the possession of qualia is at the heart of the dualist 
position, but we do not have to be committed to this. Other conceptual foundations are 
available; ones that can provide the possibility of an account of experience in reductive terms, 
avoiding the problems adverted to above. The same conceptual foundation may allow us to 
give a better account of the development of consciousness over time, or the differences in 
phenomenal sophistication between different species today. In the next chapters we shall 
consider how our target philosophers handle the dissociations we have introduced. It is the 
contention of this work that the dissociations will help to prise open the dualist view of 





























The implications of dissociations for Chalmers and the neo-Cartesian 
position. 
 
In this chapter we shall look at the foundational conception at the heart of Chalmers’s work in 
The Conscious Mind - the concept of phenomenal consciousness. We shall argue that as he 
establishes and builds upon this foundation, he subscribes to more than one aspect of what 
can be described as a ‘neo-Cartesian position’. We argue that phenomenal consciousness as 
he understands it, rules out by definition, the possibility of consciousness lacking qualitative 
properties. As we shall see, there are steps in Chalmers’ argument. The first introduces a 
stipulative understanding of experience as necessarily conscious. If perception as we 
ordinarily understand it is experience, this would mean that there can be no such thing as 
unconscious experience. The second step in Chalmers’ position is more empirical, in which 
he argues for a coherence between the phenomenal concepts he advances, and corresponding 
psychological terms. 
We shall argue for a different stipulation or pre-theoretical conceptualisation against 
the first step, and present more empirical argments against the second. We shall claim that the 
stipulation as advanced puts obstacles in the way of work towards naturalistic theories which 
ground consciousness in states of the brain. We shall argue that the dissociations that are the 
centrepiece of this work are more of a problem for Chalmers’ position than he is ready to 
concede. Were he more ready properly to accommodate the dissociations, it might occasion a 
re-think of the conceptual foundations in his work.  
This then is the line of advance:  
i) We shall develop and examine Chalmers’s understanding of phenomenal 
consciousness, within the family of neo-Cartesian positions, and what that concept 
commits him to. 
ii) We shall argue that that this leads him to a blind alley as far as any naturalistic 
explanation is possible, and indicate the inadequacy of the position in dealing with 
the empirical evidence that dissociation provides. 
iii) We shall identify the advantages that a different conception might have in 
accommodating the empirical evidence, and in making progress towards a more 




Neo Cartesianism in Chalmers 
Firstly, however, some comments on the neo-Cartesianism in his work. Philosophers in this 
tradition differ to the extent to which they can be described as such. In doing so, they present 
more superstructure above the waterline to be aimed at. Chalmers sometimes swings close to 
positions that are more easily attacked, but he is for the most part very careful. As we set out 
his position, we shall make it clear what target he presents. 
It is possible for philosophers uncontroversially to agree on some of the basics: 
mentality is comprised of the phenomenal – perceptions, sensations, proprioception - and the 
intentional, or propositional attitudes – beliefs, desires. It has become a commonplace to 
think that the latter can be held unconsciously, until we call them to mind.  Nevertheless, our 
behaviour can be shaped by them. Non-occurrent beliefs can play a part in our causal nexus. 
But let us set them apart for the moment; it is the phenomenal that interests us here.  
According to the conception presented by Chalmers, phenomenal consciousness has a 
qualitative character which is essential to its nature. All that I perceive and sense has such a 
qualitative character.  
Supporting this is an appeal to the character of our epistemic access to phenomenal 
consciousness – to what Chalmers argues is more intimately known than anything else. While 
this is not a claim for an infallible access through introspection to the phenomenal, there is a 
clear appeal to our intuitions. The claim of infallibility would be more true to the original 
Cartesian argument based on what is self-evident, but it is not a target presented by Chalmers.  
Chalmers’ position also has the consequence of making any reductive explanation of 
consciousness more difficult. Attaching an essential qualitative character to my sensory states 
raises the question of why they should be like this, and why they should have any such 
character at all – the so-called ‘hard problem.’ In the event that there are sensory states that 
do not have such a qualitative character, if we find examples of successful sensory 
discriminations of the same fundamental kind as we find in standard cases but stripped of 
their qualitative overlay, we may find that process more amenable to a reductive account. 
How can Chalmers’ position be described as neo-Cartesian? The term clusters several 
philosophers who might be said to owe their inspiration to assumptions found in Descartes’ 
60 
 
work, but they by no means subscribe to the same assumptions as each other, and none of 
them buy into the substance dualism of the Meditations.  
Having said that, there is a number of contentions which Descartes makes, which find 
echoes in the works of recent philosophers. The first is this. Descartes, in a reply to Arnaud 
said: ‘As to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, insofar as it is a thinking thing, of 
which it is not aware; this seems to me to be self-evident’ (Cottingham et al, 1985, p.171). 
One reading of this is that Descartes seems to be committed to the view that all mental states 
are conscious.  
Some philosophers writing recently, have come close to this position. Galen Strawson 
(1994) for example, argues that all our occurrent, experiential phenomena are necessarily 
conscious. Our other mental states are ones of which we are necessarily aware. Chalmers 
does not offer quite the same target, although there are hints that he is tempted to take a 
similar line. As determined above, one of our tasks will be to identify exactly where 
Chalmers stands on this question. 
The other positions borrowed from Descartes might include doctrines about our 
epistemic access to consciousness – the claims, for example, that it is through introspection 
that we arrive at knowledge of our mental states; or that we cannot be wrong in the 
judgements we make (if I think I am in pain, then I am). Again, different philosophers are 
divided over the extent to which we should cleave to such doctrines. As we have already 
indicated, in the case of Chalmers, his commitment to the first is implicit – he begins The 
Conscious Mind with the line: ‘There is nothing we know about more directly than 
consciousness’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.3), and it may be claimed that the appeal to ‘what-it-is-
like’ talk is an appeal to subjective experience and what we know of our own case from 
within. Most philosophers though, even the usual suspects here, have tended to recoil from a 
full endorsement of the doctrine of infallibility. 
The final doctrine of Cartesianism is the claim that mind is not reducible to physics. 
On one, very common, reading of Descartes, mind is composed of a substance entirely 
different to material things10. Most neo-Cartesians do not propose a substance dualism; most 
subscribe to some form of monism, but hold to some form of non-reduction – explanatory, 
ontological. Expanding on the first, they hold that there is an explanatory gap (Levine 1983) 
 
10 Revisionist philosophers include Seager (1999, p.12), Strawson (2006). Here is Seager: ‘I am 
sometimes tempted to doubt that Descartes was really a Cartesian Dualist’.  
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between functional, or physical accounts of mental phenomena and consciousness. Chalmers 
builds his case on the failure of logical supervenience. ‘Conscious experience is almost 
unique in its failure to supervene logically [on the physical]’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.71). That 
‘consciousness accompanies given physical processes is a further fact, not explainable simply 
by telling the story about the physical facts’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.107). Nevertheless, while 
Chalmers builds his case on the ‘irreducibility of consciousness’ he still regards his position 
as a naturalistic one. Let us turn now to the specific claims made in Chalmers’ work.  
The Conscious Mind. 
In his seminal 1996 book The Conscious Mind, Chalmers has three broad projects.  
1. Firstly, he establishes and defines his understanding of phenomenal consciousness, in 
a section in which he then goes on to conclude that that consciousness is irreducible to 
the physical – arguing that it fails to supervene logically upon the physical. He 
famously introduces the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness: why should there be any 
phenomenal properties at all, accompanying neural processing; why are sensations 
like this rather than like that.  
2. Secondly, he proposes a working framework that could act as the foundation for a 
science of consciousness – as a way of working towards a solution of the easy 
problems of consciousness, such as: ‘How does the brain integrate information?’ or 
‘How does the brain process information about its environment?’ It is clear however 
that this will not have traction on the hard problem as defined. 
3. Thirdly, he offers some thoughts on how consciousness might be explained: 
controversially arguing for the idea that experience should perhaps be included as a 
fundamental feature in our ontology – that our ontology needs to be expanded to 
include experience alongside mass, spin etc as fundamental features of the world. This 
leads him to propose panprotopsychism as a possibility. This is a product of the 
constraints on theories of mind and consciousness introduced by his definition of 
phenomenal consciousness and the failure of experience, as he has it, to supervene 
logically upon the physical.  
This anatomy more or less coincides with Chalmers’ own contents description, spelt out in 
the Introduction (Chalmers, 1996, p. xv). 
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This chapter will not look in detail at 3. Instead it will develop the first and second 
themes. If it can be shown that Chalmers’ project in those themes is flawed, or otherwise 
faces difficulties with the possibility of unconscious perception, or unconscious mental 
qualitative states, in the dissociations we are examining we may want to shift our pre-
theoretic commitment to a different picture. We may then find that the constraints leading to 
3 will be lifted, and we can, as planned, offer alternative theories of consciousness rather than 
resort to panprotopsychism, especially in the event this involves a costly counter-intuitive 
expansion of ontology.  
Phenomenal Consciousness 
Let us look carefully at the first claim, and in particular, the understanding that Chalmers and 
others in a similar stable have of ‘phenomenal consciousness’. We should remark first of all 
that there is much conceptual competition between philosophers in this vicinity. Terms used 
by philosophers and other interested parties are often used in strikingly different ways by 
others. As careful as they are individually, there is, as Platchias  notes, ‘terminological chaos 
in this area. “Awareness” for instance, a key term […], is used in different contexts to mean 
different things’ (Platchias, 2011, p.66). We shall need to proceed with care.  
‘Consciousness’, ‘experience’, ‘awareness’, ‘phenomenal quality’ and other terms are all in 
the mix, and distinctions and differentiations may need to be drawn.  
 
Although Chalmers is at pains to make careful distinctions between the phenomenal 
and the psychological, he does add to the terminological mix by leaning towards regarding 
perception as a psychological term, when most other philosophers would regard it as having a 
phenomenal flavour. In an instructive section (Chalmers, 1996 p18) he weighs up the 
arguments. If we regard ‘perception’ as a phenomenal term, ‘the possibility of subliminal 
perception counts against this construal, though some would argue that it only qualifies as 
perception in a weakened sense of the term’ (loc cit). He argues, correspondingly, for 
adopting ‘sensation’ as the correct term in this vicinity on the grounds that ‘unconscious 
perception’ makes more sense than ‘unconscious sensation’.  
A couple of points must be made. Firstly, for all the care Chalmers is taking, it is 
possible he is looking for a term involving mental qualitative properties, of which it would be 
more obviously oxymoronic to prefix the term: ‘unconscious’. This is the true position, 
regardless of whether we prefer ‘perception’ over ‘sensation’ or vice versa: his view is that 
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mental qualitative properties do not and perhaps cannot occur unconsciously. Throughout this 
thesis we shall ourselves prefer the term ‘perception’ over ‘sensation’ to refer to states 
involving phenomenal properties, as this is the more common usage.  
Bracketing ‘perception’ as a psychological term allows him here and elsewhere to 
accept that blindsight is a case of ‘subliminal perception’ (Chalmers 2010, pp 94 and 503), 
but we must remember that this is not to concede anything to the argument here. 
Chalmers makes it clear he links consciousness with mental qualitative properties 
when he begins his work with the following definition: ‘[..] a mental state is conscious if it 
has qualitative feel – an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also 
known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. The problem of explaining these 
phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness. This is the really hard 
part of the mind-body problem’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.4). 
The existence of qualia as defined, and the commitment that phenomenal 
consciousness is to be understood as having this qualitative character, is a controversial 
position. It is shared broadly among neo-cartesian philosophers, but is not confined to those 
of a non-reductive persuasion. CI Lewis, first coined ‘qualia’ as a term in 1929: ‘There are 
recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences, [...] I 
call these "qualia." [...] The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible 
error because it is purely subjective’ (Lewis 1929). 
In a similar vein is John Searle: ‘Every conscious state has a certain qualitative feel to it, and 
you can see this if you consider examples. The experience of tasting beer is very different from 
hearing Beethoven’s 9th Symphony, and both of those have a different qualitative character from 
smelling a rose, or seeing a sunset’ (Searle, 2010, p.39).  
Frank Jackson, in announcing himself a ‘qualia freak’ in ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ (Jackson 
1982), says: ‘I think there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially [...] which no amount 
of purely physical information includes. Tell me everything physical there is to tell [...] and you won’t 
have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy (etc)’.  Jackson 
goes further, to claim: ‘Nothing you could tell of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose’ and that 
this is sufficient to establish the falsity of Physicalism. Other philosophers have also borrowed the 
term, or its synonyms, for example Robert Kirk in ‘Raw Feeling’ in 1994 (see especially pp 2-5)  
Qualia feature in a variety of arguments and thought experiments designed to torpedo forms 
of physicalism and functionalism. See for example, Jackson’s Mary and the Black and White Room, 
Block’s Chinese Mind. The common feature to these arguments is the point that while physics can tell 
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us much about the process of seeing or experiencing, there are other facts concerning the qualitative 
character of experience that physics cannot capture. Therefore, a purely physical account is 
incomplete. 
The concept of phenomenal consciousness, however, is closely identified with another term: 
‘what-it-is-like’. This term was first popularised by Nagel11 (1974), and taken up by several 
philosophers as a way of amplifying the concept.  Thus Chalmers: ‘We can say that a being is 
conscious if there is something it is like to be that being […] similarly, a mental state is conscious if 
there is something it is like to be in that mental state’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.4). 
As we explore the idea, we must ask the following connected questions: what is meant by 
‘what it is like’, is the phrase illuminating, and what, if anything, does the phrase do to explicate the 
idea of phenomenal consciousness?  
 
What is meant by: ‘What-it-is-like.’ 
Interestingly and as we have noted, Nagel does not spend a lot of time on the specific meaning of the 
phrase, and only gives a short footnote on the question, saying: ‘[..] the analogical form of the English 
expression “what it is like” is misleading. It does not mean “what (in our experience) it resembles,” 
but rather “how it is for the subject himself”. This makes it reasonably clear that the term is not being 
used in any comparative way. Nagel is quite clear: he wants to know: ‘what it is like for a bat to be a 
bat.’ And: ‘An organism has consciousness if there is something it is like to be that organism – 
something it is like for the organism’. The point, perhaps, of using the notion is to make an appeal to 
the perspectival or first-person aspect of consciousness. This is in keeping with a neo-Cartesian 
inclination to introspection as a way of pinning down their understanding of phenomenal 
consciousness. It also draws attention to the qualitative character of experience.  
 
Is ‘What-it-is-like’ illuminating? 
Concerning the second question, whether the term succeeds in characterising, or elaborating upon 
qualia, we can offer the following thought. If there was a hope that the phrase might point to 
something particular, it would need some elaboration, but Nagel does not offer an account of what it 
actually is like to have an experience. In fact, little is offered by any of those who would use the 
phrase. Chalmers makes the following attempt: he suggests that what is common to visual sensations, 
 
11 Though he concedes he was not the first to use it. He attributes, in Nagel 1986 (p.15), first use to 
Timothy Sprigge.  
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perceptions in different modalities, bodily sensations, mental images conjured up internally, and the 
felt quality of emotions is that they are all states united by the idea that there is something it is like to 
be in them (Chalmers, 2010, p.5).  We have already observed that this does not seem to take us further 
forward. As we have recorded, Chalmers has another attempt: while conceding, in a way rather 
instructively, that ‘It is often hard to pin down just what the qualitative feel of an occurrent thought is 
[...]’, he suggests that ‘When I think of a lion, there seems to be a whiff of leonine quality to my 
phenomenology’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.10). It is hard to say what this pins down; indeed, it looks very 
circular. Chalmers suggests that the character of a thought about a lion is ‘subtly different from what 
it is like to think of the Eiffel tower’. It is not certain what the nature of this difference could be. As I 
summon the image of the Tower, and then summon a lion, either on its own, or as part of the image of 
the Tower, I can detect no qualitative change in the thoughts. 
We can make the following additional comments, concerning whether the phrase is 
illuminating. As we note above, Nagel always intended that his phrase not be understood to involve 
comparison; he was not asking what is it like for me to be a bat, or for a librarian to be a carpenter. He 
was asking: what is it like for a bat to be a bat, or a human being to be a human being. But to repeat 
the term adds nothing to whatever is being specified. If we eliminate the repeated term we are then 
left with: ‘what is it like to be a human being?’ – a question no more interesting than an enquiry into 
the attitudinal features of the life of a human being, and can be answered by reference to them. Such a 
question has a reply in acquainting ourselves with the biographical details of the human being in 
question. Nagel claims that there is something ‘precise that it is like [for us] to be us’ and that ‘while 
we do not possess the vocabulary to describe it adequately, its subjective character is highly specific’ 
(Nagel 1974 in Chalmers, 2002, p.221), but his locution does nothing to identify this specific 
character. 
A still more critical contribution comes from William Lycan (1996) who writes to condemn 
the use of the phrase by others, but his comments apply quite as much to Chalmers. Lycan observes 
that there is a tendency for the neo-cartesian tradition to use the term in a way to lump together many 
different phenomena and issues indiscriminately together (Lycan, p.70). ‘What it is like’ is now 
ambiguous between phenomenal character (that is, a quale in the strictest sense) and the conscious 
experience of such a quale, and perhaps also what one knows, introspectively, in virtue of having such 
an experience. These different uses of the term are to be found in The Conscious Mind: thus, 
Chalmers writes (Chalmers, 1996, p.10) ‘The qualitative feel of an occurrent thought [is cashed in as] 
there is something it is like to be having such thoughts’. This equates the phrase with qualitative feel, 
or phenomenal character. However, in a later section (Chalmers, 1996, p.103-104) in which Chalmers 
discusses Jackson’s Mary, Chalmers defends the argument that Mary gains knowledge of a new fact 
when she comes to know what it is like to see red for the first time. This is to use the phrase in a way 
to refer to what one comes to know by having the experience of a quale for the first time. Lycan is 
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inclined to think that equivocation between the different uses of the term is ‘deplorable’, and that 
‘nothing is clarified or explained by reference to it’ (Lycan, 1996, fn 3, p.176). He goes on to urge 
that both psychologists and philosophers should separate questions about qualia from questions about 
awareness and introspective consciousness, as this leads to confusion in research about consciousness. 
In a more recent contribution Jonathan Farrell (2018) also argues that ‘What-it-is-like’ talk is 
at least unclear. It is moreover not technical in the sense that it introduces a specifically philosophical 
meaning, either by indicating that the words used in the locution are being used in a different or more 
precise way, or given meaning by some non-explicit way, such as ostension. Farrell concludes that we 
should not accept that talk of this kind sheds any light upon the object of our investigation: 
consciousness. Our view, which does not conflict with what Farrell concludes, is that What-it-is-like 
talk has its appeal precisely because it is not technical, and is easily understood by those in the trade 
and those who are not. It makes an appeal to a shared experience – it is perhaps like a masonic 
handshake – you are part of the club if you accept its meaning. 
Taken together with previous comments made in chapter 2, these attacks on the central 
concepts at the heart of neo-cartesianism should make us wonder whether ‘what it is like’ talk adds 
anything useful to the discussion. 
 
What does ‘what-it-is-like’ add to the concept of phenomenal consciousness? 
The attacks above recognise that the notion of phenomenal consciousness and qualia and their 
reliance on what-it-is-like as a characterisation have a number of critics; the comments hint at the 
problem of a settled unimpeachable notion of phenomenal consciousness.  
To begin with, there would appear to be a circularity in definition; a point admitted by Block, 
in his contribution to the Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Guttenberg, 1994, p.210-211): 
‘[Concerning phenomenal consciousness] there is no non-circular definition to be offered; the best 
that can be done is the offering of synonyms, examples, and one or another type of pointing to the 
phenomenon. For example, I used as synonyms ‘subjective experience’ and ‘what it is like to be us’. 
In explaining phenomenal consciousness, one can also appeal to conscious properties or qualities eg 
the way things seem to us or immediate phenomenological qualities. Or one can appeal to examples, 
the way things look or sound, the way pain feels, and more generally the experiential properties of 
sensations, feelings, and perceptual experiences.’12  
 
12 This article is worth quoting a little more extensively: in a later section, (p 216) he argues for an 
equivocal usage of the terms in this vicinity: ‘Am I saying that the word ‘conscious’ is ambiguous? I 
don’t think that the different concepts of consciousness I have mentioned indicate a straightforward 
ambiguity […] I would rather say that ‘conscious’ (together with ‘aware’, ‘experience’, and other 
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It will be noted that one of the synonyms here is ‘subjective experience’. So making it clear 
that tied together with the concept of phenomenal consciousness is subjectivity, with an implication of 
objective inaccessibility and privileged subjective access. Indeed, across the several definitional 
accounts we can see a subjective or perspectival aspect being built together with the notion of 
phenomenal consciousness; consciousness is locked together with the qualitative properties of 
experience, such that such properties are essentially conscious, and we know this by virtue of our 
immediate introspective access.  
 
The implications of the concept as constructed. 
As we have seen, these features are all part of a piece, used in an interdefinitional way. They are 
locked-together characteristics of mental states that appeal to what intuitively seems obvious, a 
subjective, how-it-feels nature, known by introspection. The recourse to phenomenal qualities, or 
qualia, or to say we are the possessors of mental states with a specific qualitative nature, are all 
unhelpful in taking the analysis further. It may be argued that this strategy is actively misleading, 
since reference to qualities or properties would seem to give the mental states in question an intrinsic 
nature. This commits us to a way of thinking about qualia which makes them a something 
experienced, or a characteristic of that experience, rather than a feature of a something which is itself 
experienced. 
It becomes clear that the concepts constructed here carry within them important 
commitments. This is firstly that qualitative character is a property essential to phenomenal 
consciousness. Secondly (or rather, what amounts to much the same thing) that consciousness is 
locked into first order verbs of perception as noted by Platchias (2012, p.71), such that all qualitative, 
sensory states are understood as being conscious. There cannot be states with qualitative character in 
the sense intended that lack consciousness. Apart from anything else, this has important consequences 
for the way in which the kind of dissociations we are interested in, are to be understood.  
Of course, the concept as constructed then allows Chalmers to proceed with his arguments 
against reduction. Phenomenal consciousness defined in this way, becomes the centre of the hard 
problem. It allows him to argue that consciousness does not supervene upon the physical. He bases 
one argument, for example, on the logical possibility of phenomenal zombies, that is, creatures that 
 
words similarly used) should be ambiguous.’ He clarifies this, saying that ‘consciousness’ is a cluster 
concept, like religion. And that the various types of consciousness he would identify (access-
consciousness, self consciousness etc) are indeed so different from one another that a failure to 
differentiate can lead to serious confusion. It might be claimed that one response to this multiplication 
of concepts is to suggest that there is one fundamental kind of consciousness, and that these are all 
wrinkles in that one fundamental kind. 
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are physically and functionally identical to human counterparts, but lack a qualitative character to 
their experience or a sense of what-it-is-like. The very conceivability of such postulated creatures is 
sufficient to undermine the case for reduction. Chalmers argues that a reductive account based on 
functionalism fails to capture the character of what-it-is-like, since a zombie is, by definition, a 
functional equivalent of me, but lacking internal qualitative states, or phenomenology. His claim is 
that a reductive account requires that consciousness be logically supervenient upon the physical facts. 
The conceivability of zombies (he claims) shows that consciousness is at most naturally supervenient 
upon the physical facts, but not logically supervenient.  
The main thrust of the argument is on Chalmers 1996 p.38: ‘If B-Properties supervene 
logically on A-Properties, then once God (hypothetically) creates a world with certain A-Facts, the B-
Facts come along for free as an automatic consequence. If B-Properties merely supervene naturally on 
A-Properties, however, then after making sure of the A-Facts, God has to do more work to in order to 
make sure of the B-Facts: he has to make sure there is a law relating the A-Facts and the B-Facts.’  
As noted, his argument is that the conceivability of zombies shows that the qualitative 
properties of consciousness do not supervene logically upon the physical facts. At most, they are 
naturally supervenient upon the physical facts. God has to do more work to make sure that certain B-
facts of consciousness (the what-it-is-like character) come along with the A-facts of my physical 
constitution. Physicalism would require that A-facts alone would be sufficient to account for all the 
properties; that it does not demonstrates that physicalism is insufficient. 
As we commented above, a second argument is built upon Mary emerging from the black and 
white room, possessed of all the physical facts about colour experience, and who nevertheless learns 
something new when she encounters the tomato for the first time – what-it-is-like to see red for the 
first time. Physicalism (the possession of all the physical facts) is incomplete – it might be sufficient 
for Mary to recognise the redness for what it is, and to provide a neurological account of what 
happens inside her as she sees it for the first time, but it fails to furnish us with an account of what 
happens when Mary emerges from the room after her confinement – ie the qualitative character of her 
experience - what-it-is-like to see red – the specific quality of experience that is differentiable from 
(say) the greenness of the tomato’s stalk.  
It is unnecessary to go on – the arguments are well-known. Much ink has been spilt in trying 
to rebut these arguments, but much of their appeal comes from a conceptual foundation which we see 
as flawed. The adoption of a different conceptual foundation might make the debate around them 
unnecessary.  
In each of the arguments as presented, however, we need only note the pre-theoretical 
understanding of phenomenal consciousness. The key thing about this understanding is that, if the 
notion of what-it-is-like is locked into the concept of conscious mental states from the beginning, by 
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definition, there cannot be any cases of unconscious qualitative states. Rosenthal makes the same 
point: ‘[according to the Cartesian conception] the idea that a mental state could have a sensory 
character and yet not be conscious is simply unintelligible. For it may seem that the very idea of a 
nonconscious state with sensory qualities is, in effect, a contradiction in terms’ (Rosenthal, 2005, 
p.33). 
Accordingly, the various candidate exemplars of unconscious states with qualitative character 
such as we find in blindsight, the dissociations herein, etc receive no debate in the first section of 
Chalmers book. They make no appearance because of the way mental states are defined. The 
dissociations present no challenge to Chalmers’ viewpoint because of the way that viewpoint is 
conceptually constructed. However, it should now be clear that this way of looking at mental states 
and phenomenal consciousness is stipulative and pre-theoretical. There are of course, compelling 
reasons to adopt it – there are appeals to what is considered obvious, intuitive and common sense, and 
there is recourse to our epistemic access to mental states – ie introspection. But there are arguments to 
be made against these motivations. The next section will explore these. 
 
Criticisms of Chalmers’ conception of phenomenal consciousness. 
In order to make the case for a reconsideration of this concept, we should first of all consider its 
weaknesses. We can make a quick and rather cheap point to counter any argument built on what is 
considered obvious. It was once thought incontrovertibly obvious that the sun went round the earth, 
but this did not secure the truth of the proposition. The curvature of space-time by gravity is not 
obvious, but this does not make it any less true. These may be empirical matters, but they make the 
point that an appeal to the obvious (as Chalmers does, on p. xiii), is an appeal to intuitions, and as 
such needs careful examination. The argument from introspection needs more attention, as it is largely 
from this that the point above proceeds.  
Rosenthal sets the scene: ‘Most of our knowledge of mind derives from introspection […] 
This close fit may tempt some to hold that introspection is a privileged source of knowledge that is 
somehow immune from error’ (Rosenthal, 2005, p.43). As we have noted, Chalmers hints that this is 
his position when he says we know about consciousness more intimately and directly than anything 
else. However, this view today is not uncritically absorbed.  
It is now a commonplace to argue that we do not have authoritative access, via introspection, 
to propositional attitudes; we do not necessarily reach definitive judgements about our desires and 
feelings via introspective means. Freud and Schopenhauer have both made the point that we have 
motivations of which we are unconscious, and to which we do not have direct access. We may easily 
not know we are depressed; not know we need to talk about something. We may easily not be aware 
70 
 
we are anxious, or angry. Other propositional attitudes might be suppressed, others unconsciously 
held. 
As for qualitative experiences, perceptions, Shoemaker comments: ‘[…] Cartesian views 
about our access to our own minds, including claims about infallibility and self-intimation have fallen 
out of favour’ (in Guttenberg, 1998, p.396), and it may not be necessary to make too many further 
comments here.  
In experimental situations studying phenomena such as change blindness, inattention 
blindness etc, there is real doubt whether introspection delivers in a reliable way and whether this 
therefore can sustain the kind of concept construction at the heart of the neo-Cartesian project. There 
is a further point, which can be briefly made, which is to argue that with all introspective judgements, 
there is a problem of criteria of correctness. We have already launched a Wittgenstein-inspired 
criticism of concepts built upon such judgements, and the impossibility of private rule-following, 
which need not be repeated. 
Our view is confident in endorsing the broad externalist position taken by this tradition, and 
Schwitzgebel’s conclusion: ‘I see no reason to accept […] introspective foundationalism. Indeed I 
suspect that the opposite is nearer the truth: our judgements about the world tend to drive our 
judgements about our experience. Properly so since the former are more secure’ (Schwitzgebel, 2011, 
p.137). 
Let us summarise: there is a clear sense in which Chalmers and others adopt their conception 
on the strength of what seems intuitively obvious and indubitable, and known by introspection. These 
grounds, however, are not compelling, and the motivation for accepting the position has to be set 
alongside those for an alternative conception. 
 
Explanatory inadequacy I: The ‘absence of analysis’. 
In one of the arguments he makes rejecting the possibility of reduction, Chalmers maintains that any 
functionalist account fails to provide further analysis of what is essential to consciousness. He claims 
that functionalism must be rejected on grounds of inadequacy. The section is worth quoting at length.  
For consciousness to be entailed by a set of physical facts, one would need some kind of 
analysis of the notion of consciousness – the kind of analysis whose satisfaction physical 
facts. [Functional analyses] simply miss what it means to be a conscious experience. 
Although conscious states may play various causal roles, they are not defined by their causal 
roles. Rather what makes them conscious is that they have a certain phenomenal feel, and this 
feel is not something that can be functionally defined away. […] 
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[According to functionalism] all we have to do to explain consciousness is to explain our 
ability to make certain reports, or to perform certain sorts of discrimination […] But on the 
face of it, it is entirely conceivable that one could explain all these things without explaining 
the experience that accompanies the report or the discrimination. […] 
[In dealing with questions such as: ‘Do mice have beliefs?’ answers] depend on how we draw 
the boundaries in concepts […] But compare: Does a mouse have conscious experience? Does 
a virus? These are not matters for stipulation. Either there is something it is like to be a mouse 
or there is not (Chalmers, 1996, pp.104-105). 
 
 
In this section we can see all the elements of the criticism we have levelled so far. According to the 
text, what it is for something to be conscious is for it have phenomenal feel, and what we are to 
understand by phenomenal feel is that there is something it is like (to be conscious). The target 
concept is circularly defined, and wrapped up in the concept of consciousness of a mental state is our 
being introspectively aware of it. We can only know what it is like by reference to our own case, a 
situation which has led to defenders of this position saying: (In reference to Louis Armstrong’s reply 
to the question: What is jazz?) ‘If you gotta ask, you ain’t ever gonna know’. Third person approaches 
to consciousness ‘miss the point’ or ‘change the subject’, or ‘define away the problem’.  
But note that, in contradistinction to the title of the section given by Chalmers, it is this approach 
which fails to provide analysis. We are not allowed, by this definition, to make any progress in 
analysing further. Consciousness is primitive, is what it is, and there is nothing further to be added. 
Chalmers’ analysis extends to what he defines as the psychological categories only.  
But note: ‘Does a mouse have conscious experience? Does a virus? These are not matters for 
stipulation’. This makes the question an empirical one, and is not decided by prior definition. As we 
have argued here, however, the way consciousness is construed in The Conscious Mind is decided by 
prior definition.  
 
It may be argued that a more productive analysis is possible in the event that Chalmers’s 
conception of consciousness is jettisoned. There are two powerful reasons why. The first is this. 
Recall that the concept of phenomenal consciousness deployed by Chalmers involves the commitment 
to the idea that the qualitative character of experience is essentially conscious. Now, in addition to the 
various dissociations explored, there are other, well-grounded cases of sleep-walking and automatism 
in the literature. In such cases the people concerned show very complex behaviour, such as eating a 
snack, or driving a car, all asleep, or at least lacking awareness of their activity. This neo-Cartesian 
view is to deny them sensory states, but what reason could we possibly have to deny that that the 
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sleepwalkers are genuinely in qualitative states? We lack any convincing account of their behaviour, 
and cannot explain why or how they navigate their environment successfully. 
We might for example refer to the case of Kenneth Parks, who, in 1987, made Canadian legal 
history when he drove 23 km while asleep, and not only killed his mother-in-law, but also sustained 
serious knife wounds to his hands. He is one of a number of cases of automatism which have made 
legal precedent (see June Callwood: The Sleepwalker 1990). Again, Parks would have made 
discriminations which had a qualitative character during his 23km drive, and yet, as the account has it, 
he was completely unaware of them. It is not clear what account Chalmers can make in these 
situations, other than to put them down as cases in which some phenomenal consciousness is present, 
or as being under-determined. The better account however, would say that sensory properties are 
registered without awareness, and these properties played a role in determining behaviour.  
To work with another example, and considering the case of the long distance driver who 
comes back into the moment, after 40 miles of driving, in which all kinds of motor functions, sensory 
registrations, judgements, and discriminations, have taken place, but to which she has had no access 
during those 40 miles. Chalmers takes the view that the qualitative properties of our mental states are 
accompanied by a subjective feel, and adds that this can also be expressed as: ‘what it is like to be a 
cognitive agent’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.6). In the case of the driver, some of her mental states are 
qualitative: during her period ‘off-line’ she may have had a mental state associated with the visual 
information of an indicator light flashing ahead. She will have manoeuvred appropriately. On this 
view, the driver acted appropriately to visual information without there being an associated ‘feel’. She 
acted as an agent, but without there being anything-it-was-like in the sense of a qualitative feel.  
It might be claimed that in these two examples of automatism, Chalmers could deny that 
qualitative properties explain the behaviour of the subjects, and that an adequate explanation can be 
found in an account using representational states. In reply we might argue with Platchias (2011, p 80) 
that ‘mental qualitative properties are the properties in virtue of which we distinguish between 
sensations’. Both Parks and the long-distance driver engage in a rich sensory interaction with their 
environment, involving the successful discrimination between the colour of traffic lights, for example. 
Without some qualitative properties to make the necessary distinctions between such sensations, we 
lack any convincing or realistic explanation of their behaviour. More is involved in the account of 
their behaviour than successful sensory registration. It requires at least discrimination between colours 
and this suggests the subjects are in genuine qualitative states. We shall make similar points 
concerning Chalmers’ philosophical zombies later.  
The second sense in which the neo-Cartesian conception is explanatorily impoverished is 
given in a short, provocative paragraph in Rosenthal (Rosenthal, 2005, p.40). Thus: ‘[W]e typically 
come to make more fine-grained discriminations as we master more subtle concepts pertaining to 
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various distinct sensory qualities. Experiences from wine-tasting to hearing music illustrate this 
process vividly. […] If consciousness is intrinsic to sensory states, the relevance of concepts remains 
mysterious. The neo-Cartesian [denies] that sensory differences exist when we are unaware of them. 
But it will be even more difficult to explain how learning new concepts can actually cause sensory 
qualities to arise that previously did not exist’.  
In anticipation of a later section, in which we shall look at this in more detail, let us try to say 
how this indicates a weakness in the Chalmers account. In short, it struggles to provide a convincing 
account of learning, or the development of consciousness. Recall what the neo-Cartesian is committed 
to: there are no unconscious sensory differences; all qualitative sensory states are conscious. All the 
features of an experience are already present to us: there is nothing in an experience that is not already 
present. How then do we develop the richness of experience that we enjoy as an adult compared to 
when we were very much younger? How have we developed the richness of our conscious experience 
over evolutionary time, from a point thousands of years ago, when, we can imagine, we were at the 
level of sophistication the higher apes are now.  
Chalmers must be committed to the view that the learning of new concepts is alone sufficient 
for the creation of new sensory qualities, since these cannot occur unconsciously. According to this 
thinking, the acquisition of new concepts results in our sensory states coming to have properties or 
qualities they did not previously have. But this expects a great deal from the learning of new concepts: 
it is hard to see how learning a new concept can create a new qualitative property of an existing 
perception.  
There is, on the other hand, a different account - as we come to learn further conceptual 
discriminations in various sensory experiences, we come to be conscious of further properties latent in 
our experience. Rosenthal gives us the relevant examples. Studying musical theory and appreciation 
gives us conceptual distinctions such as the difference between augmented/diminished chords, 
major/minor chords, suspensions, syncopation, harmonic progression and so on. The study of wine 
and the acquisition of conceptual discriminations such as ‘full-bodied’, ‘tannin-rich’ and sensory 
descriptors such as ‘tobacco’, ‘leathery’ and so on add to our conceptual resources concerning wine-
tasting. The claim then is, that armed with these additions to our conceptual toolkit, our perceptual 
qualities are enhanced – and we can identify and amplify qualities already latent in the experience. 
This is true in adult life, but also in early language learning. We were once unconscious of the smoky 
quality of Shiraz, but armed with more sophisticated conceptual resources, we become aware of it. 
This seems a more plausible account than suggesting that the addition of a new concept 
singlehandedly generates a new sensory quality. We shall develop this argument in the concluding 
chapter, but Chalmers’ model would seem to be explanatorily inferior to Rosenthal’s in this respect. 
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The more plausible account to give here is to argue that new concepts make us more aware of the 
sensory qualities already immanent in the mental states.  
 
Explanatory inadequacy II 
Chalmers’ neo-Cartesian conception has another major shortcoming in its contribution to the 
understanding of Mind; this is in its treatment of many of the dissociated cases we have looked at. It is 
instructive that he does not make clear reference to dissociations in the first half of his book. There is 
only one brief reference to subliminal perception (Chalmers, 1996, p.18). This is perhaps 
unsurprising, since, if the model rules out unconscious perception by definition, there would not be a 
reason to consider it. However, as we have trailed, our argument will be that the dissociations make a 
difficulty for his conception, that Chalmers’ view of phenomenal consciousness rules out a fuller 
consideration of the dissociations. 
In developing this, we need to take some care in identifying the target presented. On one 
view, the answer lies in Chalmers’ distinction between phenomenal and psychological mental terms. 
He accepts that terms like perception, sensation, awareness have a dual life – they can be understood 
as phenomenal, and also as psychological terms. It is his view that perception, understood as a 
psychological term, indicates the processes in which cognitive systems are sensitive to environmental 
stimulations. But the term can also be understood purely phenomenally. ‘Perception’, taken as a 
phenomenal term, involving conscious experience of what is perceived, has, against it, ‘the possibility 
of subliminal perception’ but this is quickly qualified: ‘but some would argue that this qualifies as 
perception only in the weakened sense of the term’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.18). 
For the moment, let us go on. Chalmers suggests that the phenomenal component implied in 
these terms can be stronger in some than in others. It is stronger in ‘sensation’ than ‘perception’ – ‘as 
witnessed by the fact that the idea of unconscious perception seems to make more sense than 
unconscious sensation’. He suggests reserving ‘perception’ as the psychological counterpart to the 
phenomenal term: ‘sensation’.  
Out of all this qualification, it becomes clear that, on this understanding of perception, where 
‘perception’ is understood as a phenomenal term, the idea of unconscious perception is an oxymoron. 
Where, however, it is understood as a psychological term, the idea of unconscious perception is given 
a hearing, but as we shall see, objections are dismissed.  
So, apart from the very brief reference to subliminal perception, there is no consideration of 
blindsight or other dissociations in this first part of the book. It is our view that the reason for this is 
because his definition of phenomenal consciousness is yoked together with qualitative character. The 
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dissociations do not feature in this section, since the very idea of sensory registration with qualitative 
character cannot happen unconsciously. 
But then we can ask: What account can Chalmers’ neo-Cartesian conception give of these 
cases – cases for which a great deal of empirical support and evidence has now accumulated? There 
would appear to be no reason why we cannot shift the burden of explanation. If the response is to 
deny the phenomenon, he would be open to the same criticism neo-Cartesians often make of their 
opponents. This seems to be the kind of response Chalmers wants to make, however; in dismissing 
subliminal perception as perception in a weakened sense, and in his suggestion that one reason to 
explain the successes in discrimination in blindsight is on the grounds that they are the product of a 
weak sort of conscious experience (Chalmers, 1996, p.227). In the brief discussion of Helen and a 
possible candidate filling the super-blindsight bill, (Chalmers, 1996, p.228) he again accounts for their 
performative success by saying: ‘there is reason to believe that phenomenal consciousness is actually 
present.’ Both comments suggest he is quick to discount the cases, and the brevity with which they are 
dealt is instructive. 
Secondly, can the neo-Cartesian conception allow us to make progress on a more 
comprehensive account of the workings of the mind? Chalmers clearly wants to be able to contribute 
to further understanding on the (easier) questions already identified:  he sets up a research programme 
in the second section of the book to do so, and remains predisposed to physicalism. 
(‘Temperamentally, I am strongly inclined toward materialist reductive explanation’ (Chalmers, 1996, 
p. xiv).) We might therefore anticipate that he would endorse any conceptual reconfiguration to 
permit a more reductive approach. Many of the dissociations are neurologically and psychologically 
investigable: specific areas of the brain have been compromised by strokes, surgery or other damage, 
and can be identified, and linked with functions. If we can avoid conceptual stipulations which might 
commit us to regarding ‘the qualitative character of phenomenal consciousness’ as pleonastic, if we 
allow that there can be mental qualitative properties outside consciousness, then we have a class of 
mental states that are outside consciousness, and amenable to a more reductive account. This in turn 
can begin to make sense of those studies of the various neuronal processes which comprise the 
components of an experience. In a very important sense we have got off to a bad start with the 
conceptual foundations as they stand, in The Conscious Mind, and only by finding new foundations 
can we work towards a better connection with empirical findings in neuroscience. It is to this different 






An alternative conception of consciousness. 
What might a non-Cartesian re-conception look like? This section will identify the main features of 
such a re-conception and leave a fuller exposition until a later chapter. 
Chalmers and others begin with a pre-theoretical stipulative definition, which owes something 
to common usage, but which yokes together mental states with consciousness. In such an account, 
‘conscious’ would seem to be characteristic intrinsic to the state in question, a characteristic which the 
neo-Cartesians universally attempt to amplify with locutions such as ‘qualitative feel’, or ‘what-it-is-
like’. Side-stepping this, we might uncouple consciousness from mental states, specifying each notion 
independently. This may be a different stipulation, departing from common usage, but it is one that 
can be defended. 
Following Rosenthal, and Platchias and others, there is an alternative starting position defined 
as follows: ‘[on this conception, by contrast to the Cartesian conception above] consciousness is not 
essential to mental states, and thus consciousness may well be an extrinsic characteristic of whatever 
mental states have it’ (Rosenthal, 2005, p.33) or, to put it differently, ‘mental qualitative properties 
are not invariably conscious; they may occur unconsciously and so are not essentially conscious’ 
(Platchias, 2012, p.64). 
On such a reading, a mental state can be sensory, such as a perception, or it can be a 
propositional attitude, such as a belief, or a desire. What makes either of these conscious, is some 
higher order mental state: a thought or perhaps the process of attending to the lower order state, but in 
any event, something construed independently of the original mental state itself. In other words, a 
conscious mental state is simply a mental state we are conscious of, in virtue of the Higher Order 
Thought. Rosenthal argues that the content of the higher order thought in question must be, roughly, 
that one is in that very state.  
As this thesis contends, if we construe mental states, even sensory states, in this sense, we can 
allow that they can occur unconsciously. Mental states possessing the so-called qualitative character, 
or qualia, can occur unconsciously. This sunders consciousness as a necessary feature from sensory 
states, and it is able to accommodate the mounting empirical evidence connected with the 
dissociations we are here studying.  
So the first advantage to this new conception is that it does not deny the phenomenon. It 
properly understands blindsight and the other dissociations as strange cases of experience, though not 
of the usual kind. The second gain from the reconception is that it lends hope to those who seek a 
reductive analysis of consciousness. As we have seen, and as Rosenthal puts it (Rosenthal, 2005, 
p.47) ‘if mental states are all conscious, no informative, or nontrivial explanation of consciousness is 
possible’. Consciousness on the neo-cartesian model is presented as basic, and no further definition, 
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beyond a circular appeal to ill-formed notions such as ‘what it is like’ is possible. Philosophers who 
resist this notion of consciousness, and who might seek a more reductive explanatory account have a 
potentially productive line of enquiry. One of the intuitions to which the neo-Cartesian approach 
appeals is the perceived difficulty in reducing consciousness directly to physical states. On this Higher 
Order Thought model, the claim is that consciousness can be reduced, in the first instance, to mental 
items, rather than directly to brute matter. A conscious mental state is simply a mental state of which 
we are conscious. As Seager puts it: ‘Mental states which do not intrinsically involve consciousness 
can be seen as closer to the natural world’ (Seager, 1999, p.61). This kind of reduction helps to bridge 
the explanatory gap, by introducing intermediate mental structures which can be linked on the one 
side to our intuitions about consciousness, and on the other, eventually, to the physical world, with 
relative ease.  
On one side of this attempt to bridge the gap, a putative reductive account can begin to locate 
unconscious mental states such as those in blindsight, in the processing of signals in the V4/V8 areas 
of the brain. It can explain the orientation of DF’s hand for the purposes of posting letters etc as the 
result of processing, in the dorsal stream, of signals received, and so on. None of this is mysterious, 
and the results of these empirical studies can be given their due weight. Much of the scientific study 
of consciousness is framed in talk of ‘the neural correlates of consciousness’, which is a formula 
designed to satisfy everyone, since it allows that consciousness is only correlated to brain activity, and 
cannot be reduced to it. With the re-conception here offered, we can begin to replace this phrase with 
a search for ‘the neural realisers (producers, generators or some such) of mental states’, but this is the 
work of neuroscience, and is, as yet, far from completion. 
On the other side of the gap, there is also work to be done. There are several versions of the 
Higher Order claim, suggesting variously that it is in virtue of a Higher Order Thought, or Higher 
Order Perception, that a mental state is conscious. Other versions might speak of attention paid or 
devoted to a lower order mental state that brings it into consciousness. This section will not attempt to 
decide between them, but merely acknowledge that what they share is all that this part of the thesis 
requires – a recognition of the shortcomings in the neo-Cartesian approach, and a common acceptance 
that the dissociations are better explained by the HOT model. 
There is a third advantage to this step. Chalmers advances the possibility of zombies as part of 
his argument against reduction in The Conscious Mind (p.94 et seq). The point is to defeat functional 
explanations of consciousness by imagining a situation in which a functional copy of myself could 
exist but which has no internal phenomenology. And so therefore a functional account fails, since it 
cannot capture the ‘what-it-is-like’ aspect of experience. Much has been said about the question of 
whether such zombies are possible, whether conceiving such a situation can imply their possibility, 
and so on, but it is worth commenting that the higher order approach need not fear zombies, and one 
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of Chalmers’ broadsides against reduction goes wide of the mark in this case. The Higher Order 
approach is quite happy to embrace, indeed makes its case on the idea that there are all kinds of 
unconscious mental states, and cognitive processes existing beneath our conscious mental states. It 
contends that only a fraction of our mental lives, at any one time, is subject to the ‘what-it-is-like’ test. 
Of course, it may be Chalmers can find other complaints against the Higher Order approach, but the 
possibility of zombies would seem to have no traction. For this form of physicalism, the possibility of 
zombies is not fatal. 
Finally, there is a fourth recommendation to the conception considered. It will have a more 
convincing story to tell about the evolution of consciousness. We have already hinted at a similar 
point in the section concerning learning above. We may imagine that, at some point in our 
evolutionary history, hominids lacked the sophistication of the conscious awareness we have today. 
To use the phrase we have been keen to caution against, there would not have been much that it was 
like to be one of the earlier hominid variants. This is to move backwards from such developments as 
wine tasting, and music appreciation, to more fundamental sensory states, and propositional attitudes, 
to understanding signals and evaluating a situation for its dangers. (Let us be careful; there will 
always have been an evolutionary and selective advantage to feeling pain, and pain is something our 
early ancestors and other animals undoubtedly felt and feel. As a sensory state, it is arguably the best 
candidate for one of which we are necessarily aware. As such, pain creates particular difficulties for 
the Higher Order position).  
However, pain aside, we have argued that the process of acquiring new concepts is what 
generates new conscious sensory qualities. Following Platchias (2012, p.84), the Chalmers position is 
to claim that learning new concepts results in sensory states having qualitative properties they did not 
previously have. The argument is that this is asking a lot of the acquisition of new concepts alone. We 
have yet to make a full case for the HOT alternative, but to anticipate it: on this model, any new 
concepts yield new experiential properties in virtue of making us conscious of such properties already 
inherent in our sensory states. (But which were, to that point, still unconscious). This brings us closer 
to the spirit of Kant’s synthesis in making the creation of new sensory qualities in the evolution of 
consciousness dependent on bringing together concepts and (hitherto unconscious) experience. 
Several writers tie together the acquisition of language with the development of consciousness (Jaynes 
(1976), Humphrey (1992), McPhail (1998), who work on the assumption that language gives voice to 
unconscious sensations, or states previously held, and to which concepts come to be attached, as a 
way in which our consciousness is enlarged, over evolutionary time.  
Let us make this point more vivid by comparing two approaches. Firstly, that taken by 
Feinberg and Mallett (2017). This work is a largely scientific attempt to locate the origins of 
consciousness, and coincidentally to address some philosophical problems, such as the ‘hard 
79 
 
problem13’. It starts out with an endorsement of Chalmers’ view on qualia, and what-it-is-like, and 
finds appeal in Searle’s emergentism. Such a view seems to be wedded to a neo-Cartesian view of 
phenomenal consciousness – they are led to pitch the beginnings of consciousness at a point in Earth’s 
history over half a billion years ago, describing arthropod trilobites in the Cambrian ocean as 
conscious. They are inclined to resist Chalmers’ view that experience is fundamental (see Feinberg 
and Mallett, 2017, p.10) and everywhere, but by endorsing the neo-Cartesian picture, they 
nevertheless conclude that it is widespread, much more so than previously suspected. (Feinberg and 
Mallett, 2017, p.206). Revealingly, and undoubtedly as a product of the same commitment, they find 
themselves troubled by the idea of ‘partial consciousness’. ‘At first we thought the idea of partial 
consciousness sounds absurd, like being “half pregnant”’. (Feinberg and Mallett, p.285 fn 43)14 (Also 
revealingly, they dismiss the dissociations which are the primary subject of this thesis in a short 
paragraph on p.207: ‘The problem with [this kind of objection] is that the types that have been 
detected in humans and monkeys are so weak and incomplete that they effectively amount to 
inattention. [They] cannot be distinguished from a degraded type of consciousness’.) 
Let us compare this position with that taken by Julian Jaynes and Nicholas Humphrey. 
Jaynes, writing in 1976 and before the development of Higher Order Thought theories, nevertheless 
has a view of consciousness which is more dynamic and developmental than the neo-cartesian picture 
above. It has concepts at its centre, and links consciousness to learning and words.  Jaynes gives an 
account of consciousness as a far more recent phenomenon, and finds a literary record of its 
development in the Iliad, as the earliest written poem. He observes: ‘There is, in general, no 
consciousness in the Iliad […] no words for consciousness or mental acts. The words in the Iliad that 
in a later age, come to mean mental things (thumos, psyche, etor, kradie) have different meanings, all 
of them more concrete.’ There is no concept for will, or word for it. Jaynes draws the conclusion that 
‘Iliadic men have no free will of their own, and certainly no notion of free will’ (Jaynes, 1976, p.69-
70) The evidence is: ‘Iliadic men did not have subjectivity as do we, he had no awareness of his 
awareness of the world, no internal mind-space to introspect upon’ (Jaynes, 1976, p.75 my emphasis). 
 
13 It would, however, fail to satisfy Chalmers or Searle that the problems (the explanatory gap, the 
case against reduction etc) are solved. Their basic claim is that, these problems are dissolved by an 
approach that ‘integrates the neurobiological, the neuro-evolutionary and the neuro-philosophical 
domains.’ See p.226-7. By some magic in the way these levels are integrated, problems like those 
associated with qualia can be dealt with. They are analysed as ‘the result of a unique, multifactorial 
neurobiological substrate and recursive interactions between higher and lower neuro-hierarchical 
levels.’ (p.225). But they are ‘related closely to the features of auto- and allo-ontological 
irreducibility. (..) If our scientific explanation of (these) irreducibilities is correct, then these two 
features could bring qualia into the realm of science.’ Sic. 
14 They persuade themselves, that it must exist, however, since ‘there is a period between a (human) 




He holds that the relationship between language and consciousness is complex, but: ‘The 
central assertion of this view […] is that each new stage of words literally created new perceptions 
and attentions, and such new perceptions and attentions resulted in important cultural changes which 
are reflected in the archaeological record’ (Jaynes, 1976, p.132). A final quote: ‘Let no-one think that 
these are just word changes. Word changes are concept changes, and concept changes are behaviour 
changes’ (Jaynes, 1976, p.292). 
From these quotes, it is clear that Jaynes situates the development of consciousness as we 
know it in parallel with conceptual changes and the emergence of linguistic sophistication. The Iliad 
records some of these changes. It is an old text, but the oral version of the written text, is surely much 
older. We can perhaps see in it the beginnings of a consciousness of existing mental states, an 
awareness of our awareness. In it is a record of how the addition of new words – concepts – reflects 
and assists the sophistication of consciousness. The evidence might be dismissed as circumstantial, 
but as an account, it has a sense of development rather more than the view that the same 
consciousness, defined as the possession of qualia, is unchangingly present over time.  
Jaynes’ view finds some support in Humphrey (1998), in which Humphrey likens the imagery 
in the cave paintings at Lascaux (made 30,000 years ago) to highly naturalistic pictures of animals 
drawn by Nadia, an autistic girl from Nottingham. The similarities are indeed striking, and Humphrey 
suggests that the similarity might tell us something about the minds of the cave artists – that they had 
‘pre-modern’ minds perhaps limited in the same way Nadia is, by undeveloped language, and other 
cognitive impoverishments. On this basis, he argues, we can imagine that ‘language was absent in the 
general population of human beings living in Europe 30,000 years ago’, and that they perhaps saw the 
world in the way that Nadia did. The naturalistic style died out over time, and so did Nadia’s interest 
in drawing in the same way, when she began to acquire a modicum of language. Humphrey admits 
that the similarities hardly ‘add up to a solid deductive argument’ but there may be something in the 
way in which the acquisition of concepts enhances our experience and representation of it, and it is 
certainly sits more comfortably with the Higher Order Thought understanding of consciousness as 
mental states we are, or become, conscious of. The cave artists saw the world in a certain way, before 
language; they had mental states of which their consciousness could be said to be limited, in much the 
way an autistic girl might be described. On the acquisition of improved conceptual tools, they saw 
(and represented) the world differently.  
This again may not be conclusive, but it is illuminating insofar as in it we can see some of the 
shortcomings of the neo-Cartesian position as it relates to language and concept learning, and the 





The first section of Chalmers’ book establishes his understanding of phenomenal consciousness, 
which is then used to conclude that that consciousness is irreducible to the physical. We 
conclude that a conception in which qualitative character is an integral feature of 
consciousness is an obstacle to analysis, and cannot acknowledge dissociations and other 
empirical phenomena as evidence of unconscious qualitative states. Chalmers’ conceptual 
starting point might sit with common intuitions but is nevertheless stipulative. The 
dissociations present, as yet, no direct challenge to Chalmers, but this position only obtains 
because of the conceptual foundations with which he begins.  
However, a different conceptual starting point is in a position to take such phenomena 
more seriously. At the beginning of this chapter it was noted that blindsight features later in 
The Conscious Mind, as a possible difficulty for his claim that consciousness and cognition 
















The challenge of dissociations for Chalmers’ structural coherence 
In the midsection of The Conscious Mind, Chalmers turns his attention to a science of 
consciousness. The consequence of his approach in the first section, was to suggest that 
consciousness may not be reductively explained, or rendered in terms of something more 
basic. The hard problem is an insoluble barrier to this. But according to his line of thinking, 
this should not deter us from finding an answer to the easy (easier) problems of 
consciousness: making use of subjective reports of experience, and finding neural correlates 
of consciousness etc. He concedes that, although consciousness does not supervene logically 
upon the physical, it may nevertheless be imagined that it supervenes naturally. In this event, 
this relationship may be underwritten by psychophysical laws which are ‘on a par with the 
laws of physics as part of the basic furniture of the universe’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.213). 
The most that Chalmers will allow is a systematic relation between the 
phenomenology and the psychology of the mind, which are bound together by many lawful 
relations. The relationship is spelt out:  
‘Awareness is the psychological correlate of consciousness, roughly explicable as a 
state wherein some information is directly accessible and available for the deliberate 
control of behaviour and for verbal report. […] Where there is consciousness, there is 
awareness. My visual experience […] is accompanied by a functional perception’. But 
the arrow goes both ways. ‘With awareness appropriately defined [as involving direct 
access with some reportable content directing behaviour] there is a corresponding 
conscious experience’ (Chalmers, 1996, pp.220-2). 
This is elevated into a principle: the ‘principle of structural coherence’. This principle 
underlies the science of consciousness as Chalmers sees it, and is the working assumption 
behind the resolution of the easy problems. ‘This is a central and systematic relation between 
phenomenology and psychology, and ultimately can be cashed out into a relation between 
phenomenology and underlying physical processes’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.225). 
Awareness, as a category, receives further development wherein ‘accessibility’, and 
‘availability for control of behaviour’, and: ‘for verbal report’ are given more attention. It is 
clear the availability for control and for verbal report are third person litmus tests for the 
presence and extent of awareness. They are again stipulative, and up for debate, and there are 
reasons for being careful here. For example, we should not want to rule out the accreditation 
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of consciousness to creatures without language, or pre-linguistic children. It is on this basis 
that Chalmers is ready to shift his account to speak of ‘reportability’ and ‘accessibility for 
verbal report’ rather than any criterion more demanding. The reason for doing so is to ‘refine 
the notion so as to deal with problem cases’, but the point we might want to make here is that 
the notion may be refined so as to side-step problem cases too, if they turn out to be too 
inconvenient. Note however that there is a limit here: ‘refinement can only go so far, as we 
lack an experience meter with which to confirm and refine these hypotheses empirically’ 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.226). 
There would appear to be no compulsion to accept Chalmers’ criteria as he defines 
them, and when assessing for awareness, a case may be made for adding other tests, such as 
success in sensory discrimination, neurological support (where this is available), and the 
explanatory power of the account15. We do not have to limit ourselves to the tests that 
Chalmers imposes. It is true, there is the possibility of error (as recognised early in The 
Conscious Mind: ‘We can coherently imagine a situation in which phenomenal property P 
occurs without a psychological property and vice versa’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.23)). But we 
should not be too worried about this as falsifiability is an important test of scientific 
postulates and the construction of theories. What we do not want to do is to rule out 
candidates by a prior definition which is too narrow.  
 
Chalmers on Blindsight. 
With this in mind, let us now turn to Chalmers’ position on blindsight. He admits that his 
coherence principle may be put in difficulty if the claims for it are upheld. On the face of it, it 
would be a case of where the phenomenal and the psychological come apart; a case in which 
one might be said to be aware, but lack the experience as Chalmers defines it. Indeed any 
case of unconscious experience, or unconscious mental qualitative states (such as we might 
 
15 We may consider for a moment, what such additional criteria would bring to the table. Chalmers 
might object that neurological evidence could certainly be advanced as support for claims about 
awareness, where this is construed as a psychological term; but it cannot be used as evidence for the 
presence of mental qualitative states. There are several ways of expressing this point, but according to 
Chalmers, no amount of fine-grained neurological evidence (eg areas v4-8 firing) explains the what-
it-is-like subjective aspect of seeing a yellow banana. We can establish a regular correlation, but not a 
causal explanatory link. However, we can make an argument to the best explanation well enough. If a 
neurological area fires invariably when a yellow banana is experienced, then the best explanation for a 
neurological event of that kind, is the experience itself, and the argument that the experience just is 
the neurological event is stronger.  
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find in numb-touch, or DF’s visual form agnosia) would pull the two apart so a way to deal 
with them needs to be found. Not only do they challenge the coherence principle, but it also 
presents difficulties for the concepts which he claims are combined by the principle.  
We might make this a little clearer. In The Conscious Mind ch 6, in which the 
discussion of blindsight figures, Chalmers is arguing for a systematic relationship between 
phenomenal consciousness as he understands it, and the psychological manifestations of it on 
the other (and ultimately the physical processes that underpin the psychological). Phenomenal 
consciousness is irreducible, but naturally supervenient upon the physical, in what he expects 
to be a regular, law-like relationship. Establishing such relationships, he contends, would 
allow a science of consciousness to be developed. While there is a limit to what we can 
know, on a third person basis, about consciousness, the coherence between the phenomenal 
and the psychological would constitute an epistemic lever, leading from knowledge about 
physical processes to knowledge about experience (Chalmers, 1996, p.237).  
All of this is something which a naturalist about mind would have some sympathy 
with, and it does not seem as if a critic should have enthusiasm for dismantling the principle 
of coherence between the phenomenal and the psychological here. But it is important to 
remind ourselves the wider picture being promoted by Chalmers. He is promoting a principle 
bridging the phenomenal with the psychological, with the phenomenal seen as otherwise 
unfathomable. The position favoured is one which ultimately sees no need for a bridge, as 
such, between the phenomenal world with a fundamentally irreducible character, and 
psychology and ultimately a science of physical processes. We shall argue that the 
dissociations make a case for a closer relationship between these than the metaphor of a 
bridge would contend.  
But let us return to Chalmers’ treatment of the conditions.  He makes only a brief 
reference to blindsight and similar dissociations, and the case he makes against them can be 
summarised as follows.  
A. Firstly, he makes the point that blindsight may not be what those interested in it, claim 
for it: ‘it is not obvious that there is no experience in these cases […] perhaps there is 
faint experience’. Again: ‘It is possible that blindsight subjects have a weak sort of 
experience, [which corresponds to] a weak sort of awareness’. He returns to this 
theme in a discussion of Block’s p-conscious/a-conscious distinction: [In cases of 
superblindsight] ‘there is reason to believe that phenomenal consciousness is actually 
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present’. These are claims that experience is after all present in blindsight. The main 
thrust of them is to contend that the dissociations somehow involve degraded forms 
of experience. These are empirical questions which it ought to be possible to resolve. 
B. Blindsight cases are ‘far from being standard cases of awareness’. Subjects with the 
condition seem to lack the usual sorts of access to the information at hand: ‘their 
access is curiously indirect – not straightforwardly available for verbal report, and the 
deliberate control of behaviour. [Information] is only made available by unusual 
methods such as prompting or forced choice.’ So the condition is one which does not 
meet the criteria of awareness he has set up for judgement: information is not directly 
available for global control, that is, for a range of different behaviours. 
C. Thirdly, ‘the description of the situation is somewhat underdetermined, given our lack 
of access to the facts of the matter.’ In other words, there is a number of 
interpretations which can be put on the cases, and nothing definitive can be said, since 
we do not have ways of pursuing the matter further. 
D. Such cases can never ‘damage the principle of coherence; they can only bolster and 
refine it’ since ‘any conclusions about the presence or absence of consciousness in 
these cases are drawn precisely on functional grounds. […] the evidence for unusual 
states of consciousness usually relies entirely on evidence for unusual states of 
awareness’. This is a claim that the empirical investigation of dissociations cannot 
establish that conscious experience dissociates from awareness – the principle of 
coherence would therefore be immune to any evidence accrued. But it goes further – 
the empirical study of dissociations (whatever is found) will always have the effect of 
supporting the position taken by Chalmers (All references: Chalmers, 1996, pp.227-
8). 
To evaluate the case here, we need to go further into the blindsight cases (and other 
dissociations). We shall look at each claim in turn.  
 
A. The claim that there is experience, in Blindsight. 
In a sense, this is a claim that Blindsight is in a sense not real, and this must be dealt with 
first. Has blindsight been over-described – might the effect be caused by a badly degraded 
form of perception in which there is perhaps some experience? (This is a line of attack which 
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would have to embrace a collection of dissociation cases, necessarily different in each case). 
For blindsight, one way of interpreting this claim is as follows: 
i) It may be that islands of striate tissue somehow survive in the cortices of DB, GY 
and others, and we cannot be sure of the precise extent of damage until a full 
autopsy is possible (as far as I am aware, the 2 most studied cases are still alive). 
It is not clear, given the surprising plasticity of the brain over time, that 
neighbouring tissue could not take on some of the role of striate cortex, and be a 
means by which some normal function could be responsible for the effect. 
ii) There is a claim that light scatter within the retina could also produce a blindsight 
response. Recall that the blind field is not total in DB and GY, and light, bouncing 
around within the retina could hit light receptor cells that feed normally operating 
areas of V1, and so some kind of shadowy image is created, allowing high success 
rates of discrimination. 
iii) Blindsight may be challenged on grounds that response bias has crept into the 
study, and that therefore, the reports of the subjects themselves are problematic.  
Similar objections can be made against other dissociations, (similar in the sense that they 
question the ‘reality’ of the phenomenon,) but the grounds for thinking so, in each case 
may be ad hoc, and there may be no one single defeating objection. For the most part, the 
claim will be that there is some experience in each of the cases, which defeats the idea of 
dissociation.  
However, here we will focus on blindsight as the primary, and most comprehensively 
studied and vigorously defended example; if the reality of this case, and its description as 
a form of unconscious perception can be defended, there is no need to pursue others. 
  
i) Blindsight as the result of degraded but normal vision? 
To explore this, we will borrow and reflect upon the following papers and debates: the 
collection of papers written by and in reply to: ‘Is blindsight an effect of scattered light, 
spared cortex, and near threshold vision?’ (Campion, Latto and Smith, 1983). This pre-dates 
The Conscious Mind, but it explores the claim made by Chalmers in more detail, and may in 
any case have been part of his reasoning in writing what he does. It makes a clear case for 
rejecting blindsight as a dissociation in the relevant sense. 
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Campion et al argue (p.446) that: ‘We cannot prove that blindsight as defined as non-
striate16 vision, does not exist, but parsimony should lead us to reject it on the present 
evidence’, claiming that the experimental identification of blindsight is more simply 
accounted for by other means. They argue that not enough work has been done to eliminate 
the possibility that what has been interpreted as blindsight might just as likely have been 
produced by spared islands of striate cortex: that is, not lesioned by whatever accident befell 
the subjects in the first instance. Equally, it might be that ‘near threshold vision’ might be 
responsible, that success in the tests is explained by peripheral vision at the edge of an 
inaccurately defined scotoma, or that light scattering or spill-over within the retina and then 
reaching unimpaired parts of the visual process as a whole might be involved. In other words, 
nothing particularly special is happening in blindsight, except some form of degraded but 
otherwise normal visual function. 
To say that the paper stirred up the debate around blindsight would be an understatement. 
The peer reviews and commentaries included in the paper are extensive and many. Let us try 
and separate out the light scatter question and deal first with their point about degraded 
vision, that is, the idea hinted at by Chalmers, that there is still experience in the cases.  
Campion et al make a number of claims, but we might firstly acknowledge their general 
position regarding the scientific investigation of blindsight. They begin with a very general 
point: ‘there is no way of verifying the fidelity of the report of personal experiences’ 
(Campion et al, p.425). And: ‘From the theoretical point of view, the unconscious aspect of 
blindsight is […] trivial, and from the practical point of view it is impossible to treat 
scientifically’ (Campion et al, p.427). This is odd, since, if true, the rest of their paper is 
unnecessary. We shall return to these claims as the first part of our rebuttal. Campion et al go 
on to argue that the effect in blindsight might be accounted for by the product of degraded 
striate mechanisms by reference to comments made by the patients themselves, suggesting 
some form of experience.  
 
16 Striate vision is neuro-typical – visual signals are processed in the primary visual cortex (V1) before 
being referred out to other areas responsible for processing the colour (V4-8) or the movement (V5), 
or the shape of the object perceived. The role of V1 is not clear, and it might be that the conscious 
registration of stimuli is mediated by feedback from secondary sources to V1, rather than having been 
referred there in the first instance. Either way, in cases of Blindsight, the V1 area has been lost (either 
surgically removed or damaged), and this has the effect of inducing cortical blindness. But there are 
many neural pathways (up to 15) by which information reaches these areas, without first having been 
registered in striate cortex V1, so non-striate vision is understood here as being successful visual 
experience of a (unconscious) kind, without the involvement of striate cortex. 
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At this point we can make an important distinction. There are some subjects who 
report no experience whatsoever. Subsequent researchers have called this condition Type 1 
blindsight. Then there is a claim that some subjects do have some kind of experience 
accompanying their successful discriminations. These have been bracketed off as Type 2 
blindsight.  
Weiskrantz’ most famous and most studied subject, DB falls into the first category. 
Weiskrantz deals with the question of whether blindsight can be degraded normal vision in 
Weiskrantz (2009 p.208 et seq) by focussing on this strongest case. DB’s response was 
always emphatic: systematically, throughout all the studies done on DB, for all stimuli shown 
to his blind field, he reported: ‘Nothing there; all guesswork’, (and yet scored successful 
performances between 90 and 100%).  
To pursue the matter further, DB was asked to compare the periphery of his intact 
field, and to say whether stimuli therein at all resembled those in his impaired field. 
Weiskrantz records: ‘The answer was always quite firmly negative, and he remarked: “No, 
even way out there in that part of my field, I see”. This suggests DB was quite capable of 
acknowledging experience in the intact but peripheral field, and its absence in the blind field. 
Indeed, at no stage does DB report any sensation accompanying the stimuli in his 
blindfield. He is quite emphatic that what is happening to him is not like the kind of 
experiences we would imagine someone with degraded but normal vision would have, and 
there are further experimental conclusions which support the claim that blindsight in DB’s 
case is real. 
Campion et al concede this, but say of DB: while ‘his most common response was 
that he saw nothing at all, if pressed, he might say that he perhaps had a feeling that the 
stimulus was either pointing this or that way, or was ‘smooth’ (the O) or ‘jagged’ (the X)’ 
(Campion et al, p.435, their emphasis). It may be argued that this amounts to an experience, 
but he was highly reluctant to think of it as such, and has the hallmarks of something like an 
intuition. Indeed, on the occasions DB had such intuitions, Weiskrantz noted that they were 
sometimes distracting, and misled him into making choices. In one paradigm, testing for 
DB’s ability to detect rapidly moving stimuli, DB reported ‘seeing’ some peculiar waves. 
Weiskrantz adjusted the experiment, changing the luminance contrast of the stimulus, so as to 
eliminate the ‘feelings’, or intuitions. DB’s discrimination ability remained as high as before. 
Type 1 cases then would appear to be (on the basis of the subjects’ own reports) the least 
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easily dismissed as some sort of degraded striate vision - they would appear to be genuine 
cases.  
It may be complained that we cannot rule out the survival of some small parts of 
striate cortex, - at the point of writing, we still lack a case of demonstrable blindsight, and 
with an autopsy showing complete destruction of the striate cortex, and complete 
preservation of extrastriate connections. In the case of DB, we are limited by the 
circumstances of his injury. The correction of his neurological problem (which created his 
blindsight in the first place) necessitated the insertion of metal clips which has subsequently 
meant that the extent of the destruction of his striate cortex could not be confirmed by 
modern MRI scanning.  
But we need not rest the case on DB’s condition alone. A further study of TN and 
affective blindsight in his case adds to the argument here. TN was tested for affective 
blindsight in Andino et al, 2008. It was established that TN has total cortical blindness, and 
describes his visual experience as complete darkness. He was unable to detect strong sunlight 
coming through his window on a clear and bright day. Nevertheless, he was significantly 
above chance in discriminating between angry/happy, sad/happy and fearful/happy faces in 
tests for his affective blindsight. In TN’s case it has been possible to confirm by MRI scan the 
absence of both his left and right visual cortices, and also identify, using an EEG, some of the 
higher brain areas correlating to the processing of facial images. These correspond to the 
same areas active in visual processing in non-blindsighted people.  
We can argue, therefore, that there is some neurological support for the condition, 
although a neo-cartesian would argue that this confirms only that there are quite specific 
neural correlates of consciousness.  
Let us turn to type 2 cases. 
 
Type 2 Blindsight cases. 
Here, on the face of it, the evidence is more helpful for Campion et al’s (and, of course, 
Chalmers’) case. In some cases of blindsight, the subject offers a commentary suggesting a 
limited, or degraded form of awareness alongside their successful discriminations in their 
blindfields. These comments are typically something like ‘seeing a black object moving 
across a black background’, or a ‘feeling’ that something was presented.  
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Similarly, in another study (Richards 1973 collected in the Campion paper) three 
subjects ‘did report occasional visual sensations such as a “pin-prick”, a “prickling”, or 
“gunfire at a distance”’ (Richards p.436)17. In Campion et al’s own study, they record that a 
subject NG felt that his blindfield stimuli were similar to “a car’s headlights passing behind 
me at night” (Campion et al, p.440).  
This kind of response find some support in later studies, in work by Stoerig and Barth 
(2001) who looked into the ‘feelings’ which Weiskrantz’ patient GY described when studied, 
to see if they were perhaps perceptual in some diminished way. GY had described his case as 
being ‘similar to that of a normally sighted man, who, with his eyes shut against sunlight, can 
perceive the direction of motion of a hand waved in front of him’ (originally in Beckers and 
Zeki, 1995). (GY commented: ‘You are kind of aware that something has happened, but you don’t 
quite see it’ (Weiskrantz, 1997, p.145). He goes on: ‘I mean; I can’t describe something I don’t 
understand myself’.) Stoerig and Barth conclude that GY’s vision is degraded and his 
experiences are basically visual in nature.  
Chalmers might say that all these comments are an endorsement of his claim that; 
‘Blindsight patients have a weak sort of [phenomenal] experience, in which case one might 
also want to say they have a weak sort of awareness’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.227). In which case, 
blindsight studies confirm his position, that the phenomenon is ‘compatible with the 
coherence between consciousness and awareness’ as Chalmers would define them. Of course, 
Chalmers does not provide a case for his argument that blindsight patients have a weak kind 
of experience, (or specify exactly what he means with the term: ‘weakened experience’) so 
we can attack only those philosophers and other investigators that do. 
It is to this that we now turn. There are powerful counters to this conclusion, and to the case 
made largely by Campion et al and others. 
 
Resisting the idea that Blindsight is degraded vision. 
Let us deal first with the stance that Campion et al take on the philosophy at the centre of the 
blindsight issue. Their caution against subjects’ subjective reports, their claims (Campion et 
 




al p.425, quoting Corso 1967, p.9) that ‘there is no way of verifying the fidelity of the report 
of personal experience’, and that the scientific investigation of blindsight is impossible, 
would seem to be partly methodological, and partly an over-enthusiastic endorsement of the 
explanatory gap. The comments sit oddly with the rest of the paper, which does deal with 
subjective reports, and indeed the case above is largely made on the basis of the reports made 
by subjects. To make a rather obvious point: they may not cleave to an equivocal position on 
the subjects’ reports, while also making strong claims about what the subjects say of their 
experience. 
There is an additional point that, if we cannot rely on subjects’ reports, we are left 
with no ability to define the extent and location of scotoma. We shall give it no further 
attention, except to say that it takes an unwarrantedly sceptical view of the first-person 
accounts of subjects, when others, even Chalmers, would concede that the best authority for 
the inner states of subjects are the subjects themselves. 
In what follows, we shall argue that Blindsight is more than degraded vision. There 
are several routes to follow. We shall first consider a paradigm offered by Weiskrantz, to rule 
out the interpretation. In Weiskrantz (1999) he describes a study in which he compared DB’s 
blindsight performance in his blind field, with a part of DB’s sighted field, - an area that was 
poor in quality, and produced very fuzzy images – a spared amblyopic crescent in the left 
half-field. He establishes that: ‘Measured visual acuity (properly: discriminative capacity) 
was in fact poorer in that region of the half field than it was in the scotoma’. In Weiskrantz’ 
own words: ‘The intact field seems to be biased towards object identification, and the 
blindsight field towards stimulus identification, and it is hard to explain this on a simple 
degradation basis’ (Weiskrantz, 1999, p.40). This is worth some emphasis. When comparing 
the performance of the intact field with that of the blind field, as measured by forced choice 
guessing, the intact field was better at discriminating visual shape (a triangle over a square, 
say), but there were conditions when the blind field was better at detecting a stimulus (say a 
light shone very briefly). The idea that blindsight is perhaps some sort of degraded vision 
might explain the success in many paradigms, but it is a stretch to think it can explain a better 
performance in stimulus detection in the blind field over the sighted field. 
 
A second route invites us to turn to the reports made by Type 2 blindsight cases. The 
question we need to explore here is whether the kind of experience is of the kind which 
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would support Chalmers’ position. Do the comments that subjects make actually support the 
view that there is experience in these cases?  Kentridge (2015) observes that one route 
available is a broad definition: ‘One approach to answering this question is simply to assert 
that any phenomenal experience elicited by a visual stimulus will be, by definition, a visual 
experience.’ Adopting this rule would appear to settle the matter by definition. A report of an 
experience of any kind, even a vague feeling, such as we find in cases of Type 2, would 
diminish the challenge which blindsight poses to Chalmers’ coherence thesis. 
Most investigators do not take this line, but Overgaard and Grunbaum (2011) come 
close: ‘A visual process is one in which a subject at some level reacts to something visual. 
[…] It should follow that if there is any kind of preserved conscious experience in blindsight 
subjects caused by visual stimuli […] those experiences should be conceived of as visual. 
Even in the case that a subject has experiences usually associated with tactile or other kind of 
perception’ (Overgaard and Grunbaum, 2011). They do concede: ‘we have not argued that 
perception in the absence of conscious experience cannot, as a matter of principle take place. 
It remains an empirical question […]’, so there is no principled road-block to the question, 
and one we can explore.  
However, our preferred standard here is, at the very least, that the kind of experience 
elicited shares the same modality as the modality in which the stimulus was received, or we 
would be faced with an odd situation when considering synaesthesia. A colour-sound 
synaesthete might, on seeing the colour blue, have a concomitant experience of F#; If we 
followed Kentridge’s let-out for the blindsight-sceptic, the phenomenal experience of F#, 
elicited by the colour blue would be, by the definition given, a visual experience. But how 
could hearing F# be a visual experience?  
Our position then is this: for it to be the case that there is, in blindsight, some 
experience, consistent with the idea that it is a case of degraded vision, the experience in 
question must be visual in character. The same is true mutatis mutandis of other dissociations 
involving other senses. With this in mind, let us revisit the reports of the subjects.  
Helpfully for Chalmers’ position, Brogaard claims ‘there is a growing consensus that 
Type 2 blindsight is a kind of veridical visual experience’ (Brogaard, 2014) on grounds that 
subjects ‘typically report that they are aware of ‘something’ or have the feeling that 
‘something is happening’ but deny being directly aware of the external object that triggered 
the experience.’ In this respect, type 2 blindsight might provide a reason for Chalmers’ block 
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to succeed – Brogaard argues ‘type 2 blindsight subjects […] have a form of residual 
awareness that is positively correlated with their residual visual abilities’. The reports of 
subjects seem to tie together their perceptual success with some awareness – not properly 
visual, not standard, not easily describable, but perhaps sufficient for Chalmers to claim that 
there is weak experience. Can this be made to stand up? 
We might note first that many of the reports speak of additional experience, insofar as 
they do, in non-visual modalities – ‘gunfire’, ‘prickling’, ‘feeling’, or a ‘feeling of knowing’. 
In these cases it is clearly harder to sustain the view that some visual experience is involved. 
Even in the cases where some visual imagery seems to be involved: ‘a hand moved across my 
face while my eyes were closed’ – these sound more like metaphors, attempts to capture 
something not easily expressible, something not easily ascribed to any sensory modality. In 
fact, we could easily read the reports as suggesting that the subjects are unwilling to describe 
their experiences as being visual experiences. We might be more convinced that there was 
experience in these cases if the subjects were prone to describe some of their other, entirely 
normal, experiences as being accompanied by gunfire, or shadows. We might then be 
inclined to think of their case as one not unlike synaesthesia, and then to imagine that their 
blindsight gunfire is of a piece with intact-field gunfire. But of course, they do not report this. 
 
Fiona Macpherson has also addressed the question of whether Type 2 blindsight is a 
case in which some kind of degraded experience is present in subjects, and dealing with much 
of Brogaard’s position. (Macpherson 2015) Ultimately, Macpherson concludes that the 
available evidence comes down against the degraded-experience argument, but the route she 
takes provides us with another line of reasoning.  
She proceeds from preliminaries in which she discusses candidate structural features 
of perceptual experiences. She advances several, but begins with one she advances as being 
held by many philosophers:  
 ‘Necessarily, perceptual experiences are conscious’ (Macpherson, 2015, p.105). 
It would be legitimate to suppose that that the philosophers she has in mind are neo-cartesian, 
and indeed this does look like the position we are attacking. She does argue that it is 
extraordinarily difficult to establish the existence of structural features of experience, but this 
is one that must be endorsed by Chalmers. Her article mostly explores the question whether 
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colour is a structural feature of visual experience, and how this fits with the neo-cartesian 
assumption that consciousness is necessarily locked into perceptual experience. However, 
picking up Macpherson’s line of thinking, I want to advance a further structural feature of 
experience. This is:  
A perceptual experience of movement necessarily involves a perceptual experience of 
a thing moving.  
We can agree with Macpherson that the neo-cartesians set up the contention that type 2 
blindsight is a situation where ‘limited consciousness of the stimulus in the blindfield exists’. 
The neo-cartesians would also argue that ‘A subject might report having some form of 
consciousness of the left to right movement [of a stimulus] but deny having consciousness of 
anything else.’  
The neo-cartesian case would seem to be reliant on the kind of reports included in 
Zeki and fftyche (1998) – examples include: 
Patient 1, who ‘declared he could distinguish no object, … but knew that something had 
moved through his blind field’.  
Patient 2 reported: ‘The ‘moving something’ had neither form nor colour. It gave him the 
impression of a shadow.’ 
Patient 3: ‘The ‘moving things’ have no distinct shape, and the nearest approach to colour 
that can be attributed to them is shadowy-grey’ 
In each of these cases it is clear that movement is being reported. GY gives other examples, 
in which he describes his experience as being ‘aware of ‘something moving’, but it appears as 
‘black on black’, or, as ‘similar to a normally sighted man who, with his eyes shut against 
sunlight, might perceive the direction of the motion of a hand waved in front of him’. While 
such reports include ‘shadow’ and ‘hand’ as things which might be considered as things 
which move in GY’s blind field, in full context, these comments do look like metaphors for 
movement as such, rather than a thing moving.  
The question this thesis raises is this: the neo-cartesian case would seem to be built 
upon the following argument: 
Necessarily, perceptual experiences are conscious. 
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In the case of blindsight, the subject is conscious of movement, but not of the thing 
being moved. (We should surely want to say of the subject that if s/he was conscious 
of movement and of the thing being moved, this would hardly count as a case of 
blindsight at all.) 
Subjects’ reports seem to confirm the idea that movement (and movement alone) is 
experienced. 
Therefore, the blindsight subject is conscious of a fraction of what is normally 
experienced by an ordinarily sighted person; s/he has a degraded experience. 
This is the conclusion that neo-cartesians are driven to by the assumption of their first 
premise. We can however proceed from a different preliminary structure of experience, and 
arrive at quite different conclusions: 
The qualitative character of experience of movement necessarily involves the 
qualitative character of experiencing a thing moving – they are inseparable. 
In strange blindsight cases, the subject acknowledges the registration of some 
movement, but it is not possible for the subject to have the conscious experience of 
movement without the experience of the thing that is doing the moving.  
The blindsight performances in reporting movement are not therefore the result of 
degraded experience in the way required by the neo-cartesians; reports made by 
subjects are metaphorical and not meant to be taken reports of qualitative character. 
What account should we then give of the subjects? In blindsight subjects, in the absence of 
V1 striate cortex, no conscious experience of their processing of movement in other visual 
processing areas is possible. This processing is nevertheless happening (in V5 or the Middle 
Temporal), and is somehow made available to areas of the brain accessible when choice-
guessing is forced upon the subject. It never becomes conscious in the absence of V1, and 
this accounts for the subjects’ reports of blindness throughout. Something must be happening 
to produce the ‘black on black’ responses, but the explanation is best left to an account of 
neurological function rather than the result of degraded experience necessarily conscious, as 
no differentiation within this is possible.  
There is a further possibility: ie that the neuro-anatomical basis of Type2 may be 
different to that in pure, or Type1 blindsight, and so the question of degraded awareness (ie 
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experience, for Chalmers) in the condition (one way or the other) may be orthogonal to the 
issue under discussion. Type2 could be the result of some differentiation in neural damage, 
compared to Type1. Type2 blindsight (or Riddoch’s syndrome: Brogaard 2015, Zeki and 
fftyche 1998) on this reading might yet be another provocative example of the kind of 
dissociations we are concerned with, and one which gives us a more fine-grained insight into 
the neurological basis of aspects of consciousness. It may be that certain connections in GY, 
and GR’s cases are preserved, that have been lost in DB, connections which may (or may not) 
be responsible for the black-on-black reports given by GY. 
Other studies have borne out a view of this kind. Azzopardi and Cowey (1998) used a 
signal-detection treatment of a study on GY to reach a conclusion that his blindsight is 
qualitatively distinct from near-threshold vision. ‘Our results explain why patients with 
blindsight are apparently more “aware” of moving stimuli than of static stimuli. […] they 
also imply that blindsight is unlike normal vision near threshold.” Their results would seem 
to support the view that there is a second visual system at work in blindsight – a conclusion 
reached by many of the correspondents with Campion et al (Puccetti, Bridgeman, Pasik and 
Pasik in the Campion et al paper) 
We should be careful not to over-generalise - there is no escaping the fact that what 
blindsight subjects report does appear to be highly variable. All kinds of factors may be 
involved in this, and it is at least possible that the subjects are influenced by the expectations 
of experimenters, and what the subjects themselves may already have heard about their 
condition. However, the claim that there is a weak kind of conscious experience of the kind 
needed by Chalmers, is not borne out by the reports as given. Forced metaphors and quasi -
visual imagery do not endorse the claim that there is conscious experience involved in the 
condition. Indeed, over several paradigms, GY withdrew his first intimation of awareness of 
movement. In 1980, he described his condition as being one in which he had a visual 
experience; in 1994, he described it as ‘just having a feeling’. Finally conceding in 1998: ‘a 
shadow (moving) is the nearest I can get to putting it into words so that people can 
understand’. When the definition of ‘qualia’ was given to him in Persaud and Lau (2008), and 
he was then asked if he ever had qualia of moving stimuli in his blind field, GY was 




A final, and potent point. There is, in GY’s case, an argument for saying that his type 
2 blindsight is superimposed on an underlying type 1. GY gave his comments when being 
tested with fast moving stimuli. When he was tested for his awareness of more slowly 
moving stimuli, he this time reported seeing nothing at all, (during a 2AFC test concerning 
the movement of a light pen). He was still nevertheless above chance (90-100%) in his 
guesswork (Weiskrantz, 1997, p.64). In another paradigm, he hinted at some awareness when 
being asked to detect Gabor patches. When Weiskrantz diminished the contrast used in the 
patches shown, GY’s responses became consistent with the reports given in Type 1 blindsight 
cases. Weiskrantz was clearly determined to arrange his paradigms so as to eliminate any 
stray experience, and was inclined to rule out experimental results where there was any 
suggestion of it in his subjects.  
 
What is our local conclusion here? We have explored the suggestion that there is 
experience in blindsight, along the lines of the claim in Chalmers (The Conscious Mind 
p.227), and that the effect is somehow the result of spared islands of striate cortex. But on the 
basis of the subjects’ reports, we conclude that neither type1 nor type2 blindsight count as 
involving experience in the sense that Chalmers needs to preserve his principle of structural 
coherence. But the claim that blindsight provides a lock-down case against that principle is 
not yet out of the woods, and we need to deal with other claims which undercut its potency 
ii) Awareness, and success in discrimination - an artifact of light scatter? 
There is a further sense in which there may be experience in blindsight, in the sense meant by 
Chalmers. That is, if there is found to be ‘light scatter’ in the retina during testing. This would 
also account for the success in discriminations in subjects. Light scatter in this sense is stray 
light from stimuli shown to the blindfield, finding its way to parts of the retina that 
correspond to the unimpaired parts of the visual field. Such light scatter could then account 
for the ‘feeling’ that something had moved or a stimulus had been presented, and create a 
degraded awareness on the strength of some experience.  
Campion et al argue that none of the scientific investigations into blindsight provided 
adequate controls for light scatter, and they explicitly make the claim that it is ‘clearly 
inadequate to rely upon subjects’ subjective reports’ (Campion et al, p.437). They argue that 
it is not enough to perform procedures in which the intact field is flooded with light (to 
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overwhelm the scattered light effect, without ‘the accompanying psychophysics to 
demonstrate that such procedures are effective.’  
They make use of a series of experiments conducted with three subjects. Two of their 
subjects, NG and BW gave descriptions of their experiences which seemed to suggest some 
limited form of awareness. NG was the candidate who had described his awareness 
accompanying the stimulus as being similar to ‘a car’s headlights passing behind me at 
night’, while BW described his experience accompanying the stimulus as ‘a sort of halo of 
light’. A third subject was dismissed as not really showing any signs of blindsight awareness 
or success in discrimination. Before the specific experiment testing for a light scatter effect, 
however, NG died, leaving only one subject. It is hard to build too much of a case on one 
subject, and there are obvious risks in drawing too many conclusions. However, their general 
point is that experimental procedures should have been taken to control for the possibility. 
One test to establish the possibility of light scatter, even in normally sighted people was 
to make use of the blind spot, where the optic nerve leaves the retina in all cases. If stimuli 
presented to the blind spot can be detected, in a similar way to blindsight cases, then the case 
for thinking that light scatter is responsible in blindsight cases becomes stronger (See 
Campion et al, 1983, p.443). They manage to get some good results with the test – with a test 
of 30 presentations to the blind spot, the subjects scored 100% correctly on the question of 
whether a stimulus was shown or not. (The target presented was one of sufficient size to 
create the effect - 1° 40´ of arc, but fell to chance if the target stimulus was only 1°of arc). 
However, there are problems with drawing too many conclusions from this test. Firstly, 
the blindspot is very much smaller than the scotomas with which blindsight subjects present, 
so that the possibility of light scatter into a good field, is greater - a fact admitted by Campion 
et al. Put plainly, if the diameter of the blindspot is tiny (which it is: 5°x7°) then light spill-
over into a visually functional field has but a short distance to travel, and is a more likely 
effect. Campion et al themselves concede this: ‘one cannot extrapolate directly from this 
paradigm to a patient with a scotoma since the blind spot covers a much smaller area, and so 
light scatter would be more significant’. More importantly, showing that there is a light 
scatter effect with the blind spot does not establish that this is the effect which creates the 
experience and hence awareness in blindsight (if that is what the subjects’ reports attest to). 
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Nevertheless, their conclusions are arguably over-reaching: although they argue ‘’we 
cannot show that all blindsight is attributable to light scatter’, ‘we have shown the extent to 
which light scatter could be responsible for “blindsight” within the paradigms described’. 
 
Resisting light scatter as a cause of awareness and perceptual success. 
Barbur and Ruddock (peer reviewers in the Campion et al paper, p.448) were critical of 
Campion et al’s light scatter tests. Campion et al had claimed that their patient BW could 
derive information about the orientation of a stimulus from scattered light. Barbur and 
Ruddock’s patient , G, could do no such thing. There were other differences, too, and this led 
Barbur and Ruddock to claim that ‘the fact that there is so much variability between 
“blindsight” in different subjects is an indicator that it cannot be attributed to a single factor 
such as light scatter’ (Campion et al, p.449).  
Weiskrantz (2008) also makes the following defence, using his patient, DB. On the 
question of awareness, he says of DB, that he was punctilious, and always reported any 
spread of light into the good field, and in tests to identify the blind field. Could he, DB, ever 
‘see’ the targets? ‘No’, he replied, ‘That would have been cheating myself’. 
On the issue of perceptual success as a result of light scatter, Weiskrantz also did a 
test putting results from blindfield alongside those from the natural blindspot.(Weiskrantz and 
Warrington in: Campion et al p.466). In this study, DB was shown a target stimulus of 0.5° of 
arc in four different places in his scotoma, together with the same stimulus shown to his 
natural blindspot. The results were well above chance in the scotoma, ranging between 77%- 
97%, and at chance in the blindspot (43%). Further, using DB’s reports, in him there is a 
genuine case of complete lack of awareness, accompanied by perceptual success in the 
scotoma, where none exists in the natural blindspot. The blindspot result tends to rule out 
light scatter as a possible artefact in creating the perceptual success. 
We might make two further observations. One from Weiskrantz himself: in more 
complex tests conducted with Warrington (cited in Campion et al, p.465), DB was able to 
make discriminations between sine-wave gratings presented at different angles to his blind 
field, (and actually to a surprising level of acuity). The results, as Weiszkrantz suggests: 
‘make any interpretation in terms of diffusion or stray light quite impossible.’ It is hard to see 
how light from such stimuli could stray over into sighted fields, together with information 
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concerning the target’s eccentricity. We can add to this argument. In Weiskrantz (2009), he 
records a re-test of DB’s blindsight after some 17 years of absence. In the re-test, DB was 
able to make some impressive shape-recognition discriminations – very low contrast, outline 
drawings of animals were shown to his blindfield, and he was able to identify them with 89% 
accuracy18. (Trevethan et al, 2007). DB was given no information concerning the category 
from which these drawings were taken. It is very hard to see how this result can be accounted 
for by the light-scatter theory. Complete images would have to be scattered, intact, around the 
retina for this to work.19  
Finally light scatter cannot be the explicans of other forms of unconscious perception. 
In De Gelder et al (2002) we found that GY’s and DB’s forced-choice guesses of the 
emotional valence (fear/happy) of projected faces to the blind field was 87% correct. Slightly 
differently, Marcel (1998) was able to establish that subjects could be primed by pictures and 
words shown to their blind field, which then influenced their semantic interpretation of 
ambiguous words shown to their sighted field. These results are extremely hard to explain by 
the light scatter theory; complex shapes (pictures, words) are being projected, and for a 
successful discrimination, the shapes, faces in their entirety would have to make their way to 
the sighted field within the retina, and this fails to persuade.  
Conclusion 
We began with the suggestion that some experience accompanies the perceptual success in 
blindsight, and this accounts for some of the subjects’ reports of awareness and their success 
in discriminations. The claim we are exploring here is that this awareness and success can be 
accounted for by light scatter into and within the retina during testing, reaching those parts of 
the retina corresponding to the sighted field. We acknowledge that this might also account for 
the reports given by subjects, attesting to some form of experience. However, we have found 
that the light scatter effect can be experimentally ruled out, and the effects persist. We have 
found that more sophisticated versions of blindsight success cannot be accounted for by light 
scatter, since such scatter would necessarily be diffuse, and it does not seem credible to think 
that whole and complex images could make such a transition to the sighted field. 
 
18 This represented three incorrect guesses out of 28. His response of ‘horse’ when an antlered deer 
was presented was regarded as wrong, even though there are obvious similarities in shape.  
19 Curiously, when the same images were shown to his sighted field, and to 5 control subjects with no 




iii) Blindsight and Response Bias  
In addressing this question, we intrude upon a very live discussion which we will need to 
give more attention in a later section. At this point we can offer an outline of the issue, and 
some preliminary points. To put the point simply, the claim is, in the experimental paradigms 
investigating blindsight, safeguards have not been taken to eliminate response bias which 
might have crept into the study. It is suggested that the reports of the subjects may be mis-
representing the situation, and subjects may be under-reporting awareness, or influenced by 
what they know the researchers are looking for.  
Here is some of the detail of the issue, raised in the first instance by the Campion paper, 
and then followed up by Ian Phillips. Blindsight (and with the necessary changes, the other 
conditions in question here) can be understood as a dissociation between a function 
established as a product of a high success rate in discrimination tasks, and any 
acknowledgement of the conscious awareness of a stimulus given. The latter is typically 
established by the subject’s response to the question: ‘Did you see the stimulus?’(answer y/n) 
The former is often (though not always) established by a forced choice, or forced guess -was 
the stimulus coloured (or not), was it angled to the horizontal (or not), was the face happy (or 
not), in what is known as a 2 alternative forced choice test (2afc). Only those responses 
scoring ‘no’ with the first question are followed up with the 2afc question after. As we have 
already noted, the success rate in the second part of the test can be high (>90%), even though 
subjects began by saying ‘no’ to the first question. Where this is the case, we have a case of 
dissociation.  
In this kind of paradigm, (it is claimed) a subject’s judgements are the product of her 
perceptual sensitivity and her response criterion (signal detection theory Green and Swets 
1966). In other words, whether a subject responds ‘yes’ on any given trial is a function not 
only of whether a subject is sensitive to a signal, but also her readiness and confidence in 
admitting it, a variable threshold which must be crossed in order for the subject to be 
confident of saying ‘yes’.  
The principal question here is known as the ‘criterion problem’ (Megan Peters et al, 
2017) – just because a subject says she did not see a stimulus, or have confidence of seeing it, 
‘does not mean she has zero subjective experience of it. It may be that her experience fell 
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beneath some (potentially very) arbitrary threshold for reporting “seen”. All experiments that 
ask participants to rate stimulus visibility […] are potentially prey to this problem.’ 
The criterion adopted by the subject may vary over the course of an experimental 
paradigm, according to a number of factors – the subject may become tired (some 
experiments require hundreds of responses) or they may be influenced by experimental 
instruction, or the expectations of investigators. They may be naturally under-confident, or 
that day be in a low-mood state. There may be implicit or explicit pay-offs – (quoting from 
Phillips 2016 on-line paper) ‘to take an extreme example: observers will have a different 
awareness threshold when they are paid $100 each time they consciously detect a stimulus 
than when they are penalised $100 each time they fail to detect a stimulus’.  
In consequence, subjects may adopt a conservative response criterion which might be 
more inclined to produce one result to the y/n preliminary – one which underestimates the 
extent of the awareness involved. Phillips applies this to the case of neglect already 
mentioned in Marshall and Halligan, in which a subject unconsciously favours a house which 
does not have smoke and fire coming from a window on its left side, even though she claimed 
not to see the feature because of left-side neglect. Phillips argues: ‘[The questions faced by 
the subject, PS] are prone to response bias and so do not convincingly establish that PS was 
not (dimly) conscious of the flames.’ 
 
Resisting response bias claims. 
More attention to this question will be given in the chapter concerning Ian Phillips’ 
contribution to the debate, but our response here is twofold – firstly, to defend the subjective 
responses of individuals, against the problem of the criterion, and secondly, to count them as 
only one standard of judgement, and so side-step the criterion problem. It may be that there 
are other ways of testing for some sensory registration that do not involve the reports of 
subjects, and so we factor out any claim there is response bias. 
On the first question, at the heart of the problem of the criterion is the wider question 
of how far we should trust the subjective responses of individuals in these dissociation 
studies. While there might be very good reason to exercise some judiciousness in trusting the 
responses, the idea that we should not trust them (all of them) at all is not justified. To 
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mistrust all, on the basis that some might be untrustworthy, is itself a Cartesian conceit, 
straight from the First Meditation.  
In general, such a view loads up the burden of proof too heavily against the subjects 
themselves, and is too dismissive of their reports. Phillips says of Weiskrantz, when he 
‘bluntly insists: ‘I trust my subjects’ reports’ that this is foot-stamping, and (quoting 
Kentridge 2015) ‘it is ultimately dangerous to rely on introspection’. But it seems to me that 
the blindsight cases are being asked to meet impossible standards of proof, and taking the line 
that: for all that people may protest that they have no experience, they may be wrong is not a 
good bedside manner. If it were indeed the case that subjects’ reports are unreliable, or too 
subjective, then we would of course lose the ability to define scotoma and establish their 
limits in the first place. Underwood, in the Campion et al paper, (p.463) goes further: ‘If we 
were not to ask humans about their beliefs about their internal states, then a great deal of 
activity in psychology and medicine is called into question’. 
The second response is to look for a wider support for the absence of experience. Our 
position here has been that the subject must be the best judge of whether he/she is conscious 
of a stimulus or not. But there are ways of grounding this. Verbal reports should be 
understood as simply part of, or the main feature of a wider criterion, embracing objective 
evidence and agentive responses of other kinds. Those who feel that objective methods need 
to be taken into account – typically the psychologists and neuroscientists, but some 
philosophers too (eg Flanagan 1992) – will argue that the evidence of fMRI scans, PET scans 
of brain activation, percentages of correct responses in recognition or stimulus tests, reaction 
times to stimuli or targets are valuable in making judgements about the ascription of 
consciousness. We can call this the ‘outer criterion’. This need not collapse into 
behaviourism; those who contend that outer criteria are necessary, or helpful, need only claim 
that these kinds of methods and evidence have an appropriate place alongside subjective 
criteria.  
In the light of this, the scepticism shown by Phillips et al is especially hard to defend 
if there is substantial neurological evidence lined up to support the claims made by the 
subjects. Taking for a moment the case of blindsight in TN (de Gelder et al) – the study 
established through a variety of brain imaging assessments that TN completely lacked any 
functional striate cortex, (through bilateral stroke damage) and yet still showed remarkable 
blindsight capabilities. Here, the evidence of neurological deficit is incontestable, and 
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supports the reports made by TN. Yet here is Phillips’ reply: ‘evidence of neurological 
damage, even taken together with behavioural and report-based evidence, does not offer a 
direct route to claims about consciousness’. At which point we have to wonder what evidence 
would be sufficient to bring Phillips round. Only his final comment (‘that more empirical and 
theoretical work is required before the traditional view that all seeing is conscious is taken off 
the table’ Phillips 2016) gives grounds for thinking his position is not a Cartesian redoubt, 
impervious to any kind of attack. Still, the burden must surely be on him to say what 
work/evidence would provide the progress he hints may be possible.  
The commitment to outer criteria in studying blindsight is consistent with other 
studies in neglect and agnosias, which understand the conditions as the product of differential 
degradation of parts of the brain, and which themselves act as evidence for modularity in 
brain processing. Blindsight itself is probably best understood as the product of visual 
information processing by other pathways and systems in the brain, without feedback loops to 
the (absent) V1 area – which may be an essential, but not sufficient condition of 
consciousness. Empirical evidence is building to support the view that, in the absence of V1, 
other routes to various processing areas are in play: Superior colliculus to Middle Temporal 
(MT) for discriminations in orientation of movement, (Barbur et al 1993 working with GY), 
the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) to V4 for discriminations concerning colour (Stoerig 
and Cowey 1992), and the colliculo-pulvino-amygdalar pathway to Superior Temporal 
Sulcus for processing emotional stimuli such as the emotional valence of faces (Gonzales 
Andino 2009 working on TN).  
In the light of such evidence, the problem for many working in the field is no longer 
to prove blindsight, but rather to use it as a tool to understand vision. The physiological 
results contribute to an understanding of mid-brain vision and help us to formulate the 
differences between cortical and sub-cortical vision. Such results however are predicated 
upon the absence of conscious experience which we may suppose is a product of the loss of 
V1 as a location for feedback information from the wider vision system.  
Neurological evidence as part of the wider criterion for judging is one route, but there 
may be others too. Here, we can conscript one of our targets, Tim Bayne. Bayne proposes 
(Bayne 2010) that we consider, as evidence of perceptual success, not just their verbal 
reports, but also the fact that the non-verbal responses of the subjects in blindsight trials were 
intentional. ‘It is utterly commonplace to suppose that the non-verbal behaviour of an 
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organism can give us evidence about its experiential life’ (Bayne, 2010, p.97-8). Bayne calls 
this the ‘agentive criterion’ – the idea that reports are merely one tool among many when it 
comes to specifying that creature’s experience. 
The agentive criterion would allow that the subjects have successful access to the 
information received – in the case of GY, there is a quite deliberate and specific control of his 
arm in mimicking the movement of the stimulus shown to his blind field. His explanation of 
this – suggesting that he ‘knows’ that there has been a stimulus shown, but cannot explain it 
fully -looks like the deliberate control of behaviour, and the formation of some sort of belief.  
Similarly, Helen (Humphrey’s monkey) acted without hesitation and automatically, 
when a nut was thrown into her environment20. She did not give a subjective report, and 
could not offer a view of her experience, but she did spontaneously pick up nuts thrown to 
her, and avoid obstacles in her environment – in other words acted as an agent.  
Finally, there is a relatively new line of enquiry and experimental paradigm that 
seems to establish that subjects unconsciously perceive stimuli, and can confirm this in a way 
which does not involve the problem of the criterion at all. As we have seen, this is in 
experiments that explore ‘affective blindsight’. (Weiskrantz, 2009, p.12, Tamietto et al, 2009, 
Gonzales Andino et al, 2009). Recall that subjects DB and GY were tested for their ability to 
discriminate between fearful/happy faces presented to their blind fields, and, as before, they 
could do so on 2AFC tests, significantly above chance – in GY’s case, especially if the faces 
shown were moving, rather than still photos. While this feature of the experiment is still 
subject to the criterion problem, it is doubtful whether the next is. 
DB was also tested for his capacity for emotional contagion. This term refers to our 
tendency to synchronise our facial expressions with those of others. On encountering a 
shocked/sad/happy/angry/fearful face, there is a tendency for us all to assume the same 
expression. Pictures of people with such faces, or bodily expressions were presented to DB’s 
blindfield, and contractions and relaxations of their corresponding facial muscles were 
measured through electromyography – specifically two muscles, one exclusively involved in 
frowning, (Corrugator Supercilii) and the other involved exclusively in smiling (Zygomaticus 
major) The study found that stimuli in the blind field nevertheless triggered contractions of 





more quickly than the same stimuli shown to unimpaired visual fields.) The muscle 
contractions married up with the emotional valence of the picture and the verbal responses of 
the subject.  
What does this show? These responses establish that at some level, neurological sub-
systems processed the visual stimulus and made the information available to visuo-motor 
areas, and the muscles contracted or relaxed appropriately. But the responses were automatic 
and involuntary, and so not subject to any choice the subject could make concerning whether 
to respond or not, conservatively, or liberally.  
In summary, and in rejecting Chalmers’ and Phillips’ contention that there might after 
all be experience behind the discrimination successes of blindsight and dissociation cases, 
their case seems to rest on a rejection of subjects’ testimony that they have no experience in 
the test situations, and to claim that there may after all be some degraded experience present, 
guiding the subjects’ responses. This contradicts the subjects themselves – an odd recourse, 
since Chalmers and others have been quick enough to appeal to first person reports in the 
grounding of qualia and phenomenal consciousness, when it suits them. For them now to be 
sceptical of their reports, seems selective. Our response is that the starting position with 
subjects is that they should be taken at their word. Not all positive results are likely to be the 
product of a conservative response bias, even if some are. It is illegitimate to make the leap 
from some to all in such cases. Lastly, we should factor in the neurological evidence, and 
other criteria for perceptual success and absence of awareness. Neurological studies can give 
us fine-grained evidence for the role of specific brain areas, and allow us to make progress 
with understanding what area is responsible for different functions. If we were always to 
claim that the testimony of subjects is to be doubted, irrespective of the evidence presented, 
we could make little progress in understanding the neurological basis of consciousness.  
 
Conclusion. 
Recall that Chalmers’ first argument against blindsight was that: ‘it is not obvious that there 
is no experience in these cases […] perhaps there is faint experience’ (Chalmers, 1996, 
p.227). We have explored the possibility that there could be a degraded form of experience in 
the dissociation cases, that blindsight in particular could be an artefact of light scatter in the 
eyeball, and that the self-reports of subjects might be the product of a conservative response 
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criterion, and under-reporting of experience. As we remarked at the outset of this chapter, 
these are largely empirical questions which should not be beyond investigation. Our first 
conclusion was that neither Type 2 and, with stronger reason, Type 1 blindsight can be 
regarded as degraded vision if any credibility is attached to the accounts of the subjects 
themselves. This, however, is the theme which runs through this whole section – to what 
extent should we ground our conclusions on the testimony of the subjects themselves? At the 
one end (the sceptical end) of the scale, we find Campion et al arguing ‘there is no way of 
verifying the fidelity of the report of personal experiences’, and that therefore it is impossible 
to treat scientifically (Campion et al, 1983, pp.425 and 427). Alongside this we have 
Chalmers who says ‘we lack an experience meter [to confirm the link between reportability 
and experience]’ (Chalmers, 1996, pp.112, 226, 239). These positions caution against a 
reliance on subjects’ testimony at all. We were to do so, we then find Phillips arguing that the 
testimony may be flawed with response bias. At the same time, other critics of the blindsight 
phenomenon put a great deal of emphasis on the accounts of subjects, especially where these 
seem to hint at some experience (as in the commentaries of those with type 2 blindsight). On 
this view, it is odd to claim that ‘it is not obvious that there is no experience in these cases’ 
while at the same time lamenting the ‘lack of an experience meter with which to confirm or 
refute these hypotheses’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.226-7). Equally, it seems odd, in a section of The 
Conscious Mind which is dedicated to creating a science of consciousness, to find reasons to 
discredit the very considerable corpus of scientific findings which have accumulated on 
blindsight. 
A more measured approach would be to exercise care in interpreting and making use 
of the accounts of the subjects themselves, and in creating experimental paradigms to 
investigate the conditions, but ultimately to trust the subjects and to put their accounts 
alongside other evidence, such as non-verbal reports and neurological evidence. Where 
neurological studies establish the absence or destruction of specific areas in multiple cases, 
and even more so, where there is a double dissociation21, we have compelling evidence of 
what might be the medical underpinnings of the conditions, - a causal account of the 
neurological deficits creating the dissociations. Resisting this approach on a priori grounds 
would have little to commend it. 
 
 
21 An example would be visual agnosia and optic ataxia – the ventral/dorsal stream malfunctions. 
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B Chalmers’ second point: Blindsight cases are ‘far from being standard cases 
of awareness’ 
Let us now consider the second case that Chalmers makes against blindsight: Blindsight cases 
are ‘far from being standard cases of awareness’. Subjects with the condition seem to lack the 
usual sorts of access to the information at hand: ‘their access is curiously indirect – not 
straightforwardly available for verbal report, and the deliberate control of behaviour. 
[Information] is only made available by unusual methods such as prompting or forced choice’ 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.227). 
How should we respond to this case against blindsight? First a prefatory comment 
about the terms being used. Recall that ‘awareness’ here is advanced by Chalmers as a 
psychological term, one wing of a structurally coherent relationship with phenomenal terms, 
for: ‘where there is consciousness, there is awareness’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.220).  At the same 
point he remarks: ‘My visual experience of a book is accompanied by a functional perception 
of a book’. It is clear from these comments that Chalmers is content to put perception and 
awareness together, such that, to be successful perceptually is to have awareness of one’s 
environment. The challenge Chalmers wants to head off with his treatment of blindsight is 
the suggestion its supporters make that it constitutes a case of unconscious perception – 
awareness without the accompanying phenomenal character.  
More specifically, and in this context, Chalmers advances his definition of awareness 
as something which is ‘directly available for global control’. When the subject is aware, ‘that 
information is available to bring to bear in the direction of a range of behavioural processes’ 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.221). In this way, Chalmers defines awareness (or perception) in terms of 
its function in the organism’s life. 
This definition or something like it, first saw light of day in Block’s distinction 
between P-consciousness and A-consciousness, (Block 1995) in which, we may imagine, 
Chalmers saw a correspondence between the phenomenal on the one hand and the 
psychological, on the other. In the article, Block himself dismisses blindsight as ‘not 
available as a premise in reasoning, or for rational control of action, and thus saw it as 
rejecting the idea of unconscious perception. 
More recently, as Chalmers’ hand has been picked up by Phillips and others, Block 
has come to defend the idea of unconscious perception, and whether or not he has revised his 
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P-conscious/A-conscious distinction, he nevertheless does not regard blindsight and other 
dissociations as being easily dismissed as case of unconscious perception. In later 
contributions to the debate, the definition more frequently used at the outset of argument is 
one borrowed from Tyler Burge. We shall return to this, but for now let us make our case on 
Chalmers’ original dismissal. 
Recall that Chalmers says: it is ‘only by prompting and forced choice’ that 
information is available to control processes, and in any case, these are fewer, in the case of 
blindsight. ‘Access is curiously indirect and not straightforwardly available for verbal report 
and deliberate control of behaviour’. 
The first charge to make is this: Chalmers sets a very high bar with his criticism that 
information is available to fewer control processes. Consider what would satisfy him – 
suppose that information in these cases is made available to a full range of control processes. 
In this event, the subject concerned would be functionally like a zombie, with information 
reaching all control processes, and reacting in no wise differently from a neurotypical human 
being, but lacking the relevant inner life. All of the cases we study here, are cases in which 
less than the full range of control processes are involved, but just because we have a case in 
which information is available to a limited number of control processes, does not make the 
condition less interesting, or do anything to blunt the charge that what is happening in these 
cases is perception of a stimulus without the associated phenomenality.  
We can see this clearly in the case of visual agnosia presented by Dee Fletcher, as studied by 
Goodale and Milner (2004). Though not strictly a standard case of blindsight, it is a 
dissociation not dissimilar. The visual impairment in this case stemmed from damage to the 
ventral stream of visual processing. DF lost the ability to distinguish the shape, or orientation 
of an object before her, and the ability to distinguish it from its background (or: the ability to 
identify edge). On the other hand, she retained an ability to see colour and surface detail, and 
did not lose her sensorimotor functions. This meant that while she could not identify objects 
before her, she nevertheless had no difficulty in positioning her hand to grasp objects 
presented in different orientations. She could not tell if a pencil was upright, but she could, 
when asked to take it, orient her hand to take hold of it correctly. She could not say it was a 
pencil, but she could say what colour it was. In this case, it would be natural to say DF lacks 
awareness of (some of) her visual mental states.  
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DF’s case allowed Goodale and Milner to claim that there are two visual processing 
streams – the ventral, responsible for processing form and orientation, and also the conscious 
processing of visual information, on the one hand, and the dorsal, responsible for the 
unconscious control of action. It is this latter stream that is preserved in DF, which allows her 
deliberately to control behaviour, even though her perception of objects is absent.  
Goodale and Milner record that DF’s deficit does not prevent her from walking 
without stumble along a steep and uneven path to reach a picnic site, or making tea in a 
kitchen – all of which do not need prompting or involve forcing a choice upon her. Several 
control mechanisms would seem to be at play, and she has a deliberate control of behaviour 
throughout, and yet she has no awareness of specific kinds in her visual processing. 
Sceptics could argue that DF is simply suffering from degraded vision, just as similar 
sceptics have argued that blindsight is simply degraded vision. However, support for the idea 
that there are two visual processing streams may be found in a mirror image case to that of 
DF. Rudolph Balint described a syndrome in 1909 in which a man presented with bilateral 
damage to his parietal lobe, or dorsal processing areas, which had no effect on him 
recognising objects and people, but left him with a failure to reach out and pick up the objects 
properly. He would often miss the object by several inches (Goodale and Milner, 2005, 
pp.31-2). Other cases have come to light. 
Double dissociations of this kind start to make a very strong case for different, quasi-
independent processing modules, handling the sets of abilities dissociated. In DF’s case, brain 
imaging reveals that her pattern of intact and impaired visual abilities maps accurately onto 
the areas of brain activation in her dorsal and ventral systems. While we concede that we 
cannot prove that the one is causally related to the other, we do have a neurological account 
with considerable explanatory power; we do have a conceptual framework which can accept 
the notion of unconscious perception, and both stand as improvements over a reluctance to 
take the phenomenon seriously. Dee’s access to information – the correct way to grasp the 
pencil - is indeed indirect: it arrives as the product of an unconscious process, but this is a 






Resisting Chalmers’ claim with Superblindsight. 
A second case, that of TN, (de Gelder et al, 2008) provides us with a distinct case, this time a 
blindsight case to meet Chalmers’ points directly. It would seem to be strongly suggestive of 
an instance of superblindsight – ‘a situation where subjects are trained to have much better 
access to the information in the blindfield’ (as per Chalmers, 1996, p.228). Chalmers goes on: 
‘There are clearly conceivable cases of awareness without consciousness in the vicinity, but 
Block himself notes that there is no reason to believe that such cases are actual. [In those 
examples which come closest] there is reason to believe that phenomenal consciousness is 
actually present.’   
Here, Chalmers hides behind Block in the claim that ‘there is no reason to believe 
such cases are actual’, but it is his defence nevertheless. We shall explore TN’s case as a 
possible example of superblindsight. On the last claim (that phenomenal consciousness may 
be present), Chalmers offers no evidence at all, and moves on without further development.  
The paper presented by de Gelder et al 2008 is the product of a short study of TN, 
who experienced two strokes in succession, suffering lesions which damaged his visual 
cortex in both hemispheres, and causing clinical blindness over his entire visual field. The 
neurological damage was confirmed by brain imaging techniques, and no active visual cortex 
could be found when TN was shown visual stimuli while undergoing imaging sessions. The 
neurological damage was confined to the occipital cortex in both hemispheres. The 
examining team record: ‘Behaviourally, TN was blind across the whole visual field, [but] he 
did show some evidence of visuo-motor integration in spatially guided reaching’, and was 
able to discriminate the difference between a long rod placed in horizontal or non-horizontal 
positions. This puts TN into a similar category to that occupied by DF, and alongside other 
blindsight subjects, but the really interesting feature of the case came when the team 
‘constructed a complex obstacle course, consisting of boxes, chairs and so on, arranged 
randomly along a long corridor, without any person to guide him, […] Astonishingly, he 
negotiated it perfectly, and never once collided with any obstacle’ (de Gelder et al, 2008). 
This would seem to be a case where TN’s access to information is clearly better than 
those subjects who have to be prompted, and no part of TN’s passage down the corridor is 
forced choice. It puts TN alongside Helen, Humphrey’s monkey as a possible superblindsight 





C The claim that the situation in Blindsight is under-determined.  
Recall the point was:  
 ‘the description of the situation is somewhat underdetermined, given our lack of access to the 
facts of the matter.’  
Expanded, this suggests that there is a number of ways in which we can categorise blindsight 
and other dissociations; further progress is likely to be limited since we do not have the 
means to close in on any of them since we lack any way of progressing with a third person 
approach. We lack the ‘experience meter’ to which Chalmers refers ‘This process of 
refinement can only go so far, as we lack an experience meter with which to confirm and 
refute these hypotheses empirically’ (1996 p.226). This remark is close in spirit to those made 
by Campion et al (1983, p.425-6) ‘[..] experience lies outside the field of scientific 
psychology’. And: ‘From the practical point of view [blindsight] is impossible to treat 
scientifically.’ 
These are claims that there is no objective, scientific way that the inner subjective can be 
investigated, a claim which has roots in Nagel’s 1974 paper.  
 
The absence of an experience meter. 
Let us discuss Chalmers’ claim that we lack access to the facts of the matter. If we can 
establish that we are not blocked off from access to consciousness by some principled 
commitment, then the condition that is blindsight might be more definitively described. In 
spelling out his position, we find ourselves returning to the what-it-is-like formulation. In The 
Conscious Mind, Chalmers clearly fences off the phenomenological into what is felt, first 
hand, first person, and in appealing to the fact that we have no ‘experience meter’ is arguing 
that we have no third person access to phenomenology. We have first person access, but only 
to our own experience. In making these claims, Chalmers shares the same commitment to the 
explanatory gap arguments of Nagel (1974), Block (1978), Jackson (1982) and McGinn 




Chalmers is quite clear about how far subjective reports can be used to contribute to 
the understandings of science in pages 215-216. While he makes a case for using subjects’ 
reports as a useful constraint on a theory of consciousness, and arguing for plausibility in 
rejecting the wilder theories that can be drawn from first person accounts alone, he 
nevertheless maintains that a science of consciousness will always retain a speculative 
character not shared by other theories in most scientific domains, precisely because we 
cannot poke around in others’ minds to measure their conscious experience. 
Despite all these careful, generous concessions to plausibility etc, there is something 
of the doctrine of privileged access in setting consciousness outside the limits of scientific 
investigation in this way. Chalmers expresses interest in what science can contribute, and 
recognises that much can be learnt from the studying the brain’s computational and 
representational capacities, all this comes with a reminder that the qualitative properties of 
the subject’s experience remain untouched. The ‘very feel’ of experience is left out by 
science, no matter how deep the analysis goes. 
 
Flanagan’s third person phenomenology 
However, following Flanagan (1992) we can narrow the gap between the first person and 
third person. In promoting his own, naturalistic theory of consciousness, Flanagan refers to 
Hume’s remark that it was possible to have knowledge or conception of a missing shade of 
blue, even though we do not experience it; in a similar way, we have knowledge or 
conception of others’ inner phenomenology, even though we do not experience it. The right 
kind of approach would embrace a rich first-person phenomenology, combine it with a theory 
of how the phenomenology connects up with behaviour, and at the same time provide a 
neuro-scientific realisation theory about how all kinds of mental states – conscious and non-
conscious – are realised in neurology. In time, and with the addition of detail, we would 
expect these elements smoothly to connect together, and explain anomalies like the 
dissociations we are studying. In fact, the combined theory would welcome information taken 
from dissociations for what it can tell us about the inner structures and components of mental 
life, and how these are themselves connected to neurological structures and processes. 
Flanagan argues for a ‘third-person approach to phenomenology’ in the following 
ways: Firstly he warns against the approach which privileges the first person, saying there are 
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several mistakes to avoid. The first is the belief that, ‘by virtue of being the sole subject of 
your experiences, no-one else can imaginatively come to see the missing shade that is you.’ 
In coming to grasp others’ experiences, I need to show sensitivity in detecting what others 
say, do, and intend; I must deploy knowledge of a shared form of life, and become a ‘mental 
detector’. Just as a metal detector detects metal beneath the ground, ‘so too mental detectors 
detect invisible mental states. Good mental detectors understand a great deal about the form 
of life in which they live, and about behavioural regularities.’ (Flanagan, 1992, p.102-3). 
The second mistake to avoid is the assumption that because there is a limit here to 
physicalist explanation, that that means it is false. Physicalism can still be true even when 
there are limits to what it can explain. Heisenberg identified one limit in the 1920s – the 
momentum and position of fundamental particles cannot simultaneously be determined – the 
more we know of the first, the less we know of the second. Similar observations might be 
made of M theory, and the question of multiple universes. Despite the limits involved in 
empirical investigation in these domains, Physicalism as a general theory of the world is not 
undermined. Similarly, there may be limits to what we can determine of others’ experience, 
but this does not defeat the contention that what there is, and all there is, is physical stuff, and 
the relations combining it.  
Frank Jackson’s Mary in the black and white room argument works with a similar 
intuition. Mary, a colour perception scientist in the well-known thought experiment is granted 
complete physical knowledge of what happens physically when the colour red is perceived, 
but according to the thought experiment, learns something new on exiting the black and white 
room, - she learns what-it-is-like to see red – something new, not captured by the physical 
description of red-perception.  
For the sake of clarity, here is the argument:  
• Mary (before her release from her room) knows everything physical there is to know 
about colour perception. 
• On exiting the room, and seeing a tomato for the first time, she learns something new. 
She learns what it is like to see red for the first time (we can imagine her sense of 
surprise, perhaps.) 
• If she has learned something new, then all of the physical facts are not all of the facts 
about colour experience. 
• Therefore physicalism is false in contending that physical facts alone are sufficient. 
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Flanagan contends that the argument is easily defeasible, since it opens with the contention 
that Mary has complete physical knowledge of colour perception. Flanagan argues that 
actually she does not. He insists that the experience of seeing red is a physical event, and she 
does not have this knowledge in the situation described. A full physicalist account of red-
seeing would contain information about the sensations Mary would have on seeing the 
tomato. ‘Jackson has made [Mary] extremely smart. [But] he can’t have Mary both so smart 
she knows all that he says she knows, and so stupid that she will be so surprised upon seeing 
that first tomato’ (Flanagan, 1992, p.100). 
We can amplify and add to Flanagan’s point. One of the reasons the story has such an 
appeal is that, because the room is monochromatic, there are so few points from which an 
imagined red-experience can be extrapolated. The story loses a great deal of its appeal if we 
allow that the room is populated by colours but not including red, and so contains yellow and 
oranges, and purples and blue. Mary can advance to a third person phenomenology – a sense 
of what-it-is-like to have a red-experience without actually doing so – much more easily in 
such circumstances. She can extrapolate to red from the shades approximating to it. In this 
way we diminish the sense of surprise when she sees the tomato. Our own insights into other 
people’s phenomenology come with such extrapolations, if we know someone well, and share 
a form of life. In some circumstances it might even be possible to know the inner states of a 
person better than they do themselves. Ordinarily, people have special authority about their 
inner states, but are not infallible, and outsiders with good knowledge of their friends, a sense 
of detachment, not distracted by the stresses and preoccupations of the other, can see the truth 
of a situation better than their friend. ‘You’re right; I just don’t feel the same way about him 
anymore.’ ‘You’re right; I am not valued or supported by my colleagues’ (Flanagan, 1992, 
p.92). 
The reply could be: ‘Ah yes, you can tell me what my inner state really is, but you 
can’t know what the character of that state is – what it is like. The specific sense upon 
realising that work colleagues have not been supportive is not something that can be captured 
naturalistically, but we must allow that we could approximate to it by referring to similar 






The third person approach to what it is like to be a bat. 
When a form of life is not shared, the exercise becomes more difficult, but it is not 
impossible. We can go a long way to extrapolating to the inner life of a bat for example, even 
though we employ different sensory mechanisms. This was addressed by Akins in her 
contribution to a book on Dennett. (ed Dahlbom, 1993) Nagel posed his question: ‘what is it 
like to be a bat?’ anticipating the conclusion that we cannot know, not only the bat’s inner 
life, but that of others in general. Akins, however, argues that we can make a good 
approximation of the inner life of a bat, and a fortiori, those of others like ourselves. 
Her richly provocative articles have more to say about the neurophysiology and 
behaviour of bats than we have space for here, but a brief summary of her position is that we 
can work back from behaviour and physiology and imagine how things would be for you, if 
you were in that subject’s situation – you can empathetically project yourself into that 
subject’s point of view. Let us see how this can work:  
If humans are lucky in having (during daylight) an independent source of light – the 
sun – which makes it possible for objects to be readily located by our eyes, bats lack this 
permanent possibility of detection, and must produce its own signals, and have them bounce 
back from objects in its world. The advantages of light signals are many, and include the 
possibility of detecting small objects, because light has short wavelengths, and signals may 
be focussed by lenses and small apertures. Sound, however has problems, including a high 
absorption rate, and some materials and surfaces scatter sound (in the way stealth fighters 
avoid detection by radar by having surfaces that disperse outgoing signals). It is not a 
medium that makes it easy to focus; distance and size of object may be detectable, and 
signals can be processed to establish the fact that something the size of a moth is at twelve 
o’clock high, but otherwise an object is indeterminate. The one important advantage of 
course, is that echolocation works just as well in the dark, so the bat has exclusive access to 
prey not available to competitors at night.  
How does this help to answer the question about the experience of the bat? The 
conclusions that can be drawn might be limited, but in keeping with Flanagan’s natural 
method, the experience of the bat is not impenetrable. The processing properties of the bat’s 
auditory system, and the nature of sound suggests that what the bat hears is a much poorer 
representation compared to that constructed on the basis of our visual mechanisms. The 
auditory picture it constructs on the basis of signals received back from objects is, in all 
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likelihood, poorly focussed, highly partial in the sense that the bat will probably be less 
interested in creating a reconstruction and permanent memory of the bigger features of its 
environment, and more interested in the moth-sized signals that move rapidly, and flutter.  
The ‘picture’ will be rebuilt repeatedly and rapidly especially as the bat approaches its prey. 
There are many details of the bat’s cortical arrangements and their lack of complexity which 
suggest that the bat does ‘not possess the necessary building blocks for complex spatial 
representations’ (Akins 1993 (a), p.150), but it may not need to. The bat is purely interested 
in its prey, and avoiding objects in its flight path. All of this would suggest that the 
complexity of the bat’s experience would be much reduced compared to ours, but there is 
here nevertheless an attempt to describe in representational terms, what it is like to be a bat. 
The bat’s representational mechanism would lack the definition of reconstructions put 
together by the processing of visual information; its auditory ‘picture’ would be very 
different from ours, but it is doing what humans do for the same reasons – building a model 
of its environment. 
As Akins concedes, this story is one which does not address the central question that Nagel 
(and we may suppose, Chalmers) raises – the phenomenal aspect of experience – the ‘what-it-
is-like’ nature of experience, which is the point at issue. It is projecting an account of the 
inner life of the bat in representational terms, but not phenomenal. Chalmers and Nagel can 
reply: As good as we can become at empathetically projecting ourselves into the inner life of 
others, it might still be possible that you, my neurological equivalent, still see the 
Mediterranean Sea as red where I see it as blue, or have nothing phenomenologically 
happening where I have a whiff of leonine quality when we both imagine the lion. As good as 
we can become at using the various branches of science to arrive at a representational account 
of what is happening in perception, this still misses its qualitative aspect.  
Akins, however, asks a telling question: ‘In order to justify the essential 
mysteriousness of consciousness, the theory (put forward by Nagel) must show that the 
mystery is, in principle, one that science could never diffuse.’ (1993 (a), p.127) It must give 
us good reasons to believe that there are some facts about conscious experience that will 
remain inaccessible to scientific explanation. The relevant sciences: neurophysiology, 
neuroanatomy etc are still in their infancy (a position not a lot further advanced as it was in 
1993) and so cannot yet be expected to demonstrate their own explanatory inadequacy. In the 
absence of any obvious shortcomings, the matter could be settled a priori, but here again we 
can be sceptical. We can make no progress in discriminating between the representational and 
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phenomenal properties of experience on the basis of introspection, and in consequence, we 
cannot know, a priori, what insights will result from empirical investigation.  
In the light of this, we can return to the suspicion that science has something to 
contribute – in developing an objective phenomenology - allowing conclusions to be drawn 
from neuro-science, and on the basis of this, informing our empathetic projections. If it turns 
out that that ‘what-it-is-like’ boils away to very little or nothing, then the neurophysiological 
account above, aimed at capturing the representational picture-building may be what it means 
to give an account of experience.  
Of course, this returns us to the spirit of Flanagan’s third person phenomenology, which aims 
to give science its due.  
 
Conclusion 
Recall that, according to Chalmers, the absence of an Experience Meter prevents an access to 
the facts of the matter, and allows that blindsight and the dissociations may have multiple 
interpretations. The question of access to the facts of experience depends very much on 
whether we subscribe to the explanatory gap position first introduced by Nagel, and whether 
this commits us to a principled divide between those facts about consciousness that are 
accessible to science, and those that are not. Akins demands that Nagel’s and Chalmers’ 
thinking on this identifies the reasons why there are some facts about conscious experience 
that are inaccessible to science. The jury is out on the question, and until and unless it can be 
shown that science has no tractability, there must be a presumption that empathetic 
projection, observation of behaviour in psychophysical tests and the accumulating detail from 
neuroscience is a route into others’ experience. The claims (in Campion et al, for example, 
with which we have imagined Chalmers would have sympathy) that ‘experience lies outside 
the field of scientific psychology’ must be countered by the reply made by Judith Economos 
in the peer review section: ‘What in the world cannot be investigated scientifically? Only 
something supernatural, by definition’. (Campion et al 1983, p.452) Going on: ‘I trust it was 




Equally, Chalmers must not so easily dismiss the interpretations of blindsight, and 
other dissociations on the grounds that we do not have the kind of access which his own 
conception of experience in any case makes impossible.  
 
D Blindsight can never damage the principle of coherence. 
Chalmers’ final case against blindsight in his dismissal is as follows: 
 
Such cases (of dissociation) can never ‘damage the principle of coherence; they can 
only bolster and refine it’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.227) since ‘any conclusions about the 
presence or absence of consciousness in these cases are drawn precisely on functional 
grounds. […] the evidence for unusual states of consciousness usually relies entirely 
on evidence for unusual states of awareness’.  
Let us unpack this claim and what it amounts to. It reads like a claim that the empirical 
investigations of dissociations cannot have any contribution to our understanding of 
consciousness – the principle of coherence which he has identified, is immune to any 
evidence accrued. It seems also that the empirical evidence (whatever is found) will have the 
effect of supporting his position.  
The first point is this. We remind ourselves that Chalmers is arguing for a coherence 
between phenomenology and psychology, such that, in normal cases, entirely uncomplicated 
cases of phenomenology (say- the qualitative state of tasting coffee) correspond to 
uncomplicated cases of psychology – the associated awareness involved. He repudiates a 
reading of blindsight and dissociations as cases in which consciousness/phenomenology 
comes apart from the associated psychological terms identified by their functional role. It is 
not possible to have awareness (of a stimulus) without an associated qualitative state. Hence 
the repeated claim that (some degraded) phenomenal consciousness is present ‘[…] in these 
cases, perhaps there is a faint experience that bears an unusual relation to verbal report’ 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.227). Or, (Discussing Helen and DB on page 228) ‘there is reason to 
believe that phenomenal consciousness is actually present.’ 
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As we see in these quotes, Chalmers maintains that unusual states of awareness seem 
to go hand in hand with unusual states of consciousness, and so the principle of coherence is 
not damaged. There can be no dissociations.  
However, it is our claim that dissociations are genuine cases in which the principle of 
coherence breaks down: they are the coming-apart of phenomenality and awareness. The 
repeated use of the term: ‘unusual’ superficially suggests coherence, but in point of fact, what 
is unusual is quite different in each case. In Blindsight, consciousness of the stimulus is 
unusual in the sense that it appears to be absent, but awareness is only unusual in the sense 
that its registration may need to be prompted somehow, or comes as unexpected to the 
individual concerned, or that the functional role is preserved without accompanying 
phenomenality.  
Secondly, the claim: ‘any conclusions about the presence or absence of consciousness 
in these cases are drawn precisely on functional grounds’ is again suspect. (On the face of it, 
this is an odd thing for Chalmers to maintain, since he has held that the route into an 
individual’s consciousness is privileged to the first person). We hold, however, that we can 
certainly draw conclusions about the absence of consciousness on the basis of the testimony 
of subjects. It may be that Chalmers is arguing that (say) we identify the extent and position 
of a subject’s blindfield by functional means, and so claims about blindsight are open to the 
criticism that they are not definitively or objectively established, but this seems to have a 
feeling of desperation about it. We certainly cannot allow this argument to rule out the 
possibility of dissociations in principle. If the functional deficiency corresponds to a precise 
area of neurological damage, in a repeated number of cases, we have further evidence to go 
on, and an argument to best explanation becomes compelling. 
Once again, we can conclude that Chalmers has not given due weight to blindsight, 
and the other dissociations. Far from bolstering and supporting the coherence principle, 
dissociations are just that: in being cases where function comes apart from the phenomenal, 








Tim Bayne and The Unity Contention 
 
Prefatory note: on the Mereological principle. 
Let us turn now to a different claim made by philosophers in the neo-cartesian stable. It is 
important to deal with this claim, as it constitutes an obstacle to the kind of alternative theory 
we wish to advocate. Before we do so, a specific problem needs to be dealt with.  
The following chapter will deal with the challenge posed by the dissociations to the 
Unity of Consciousness. In it we shall make reference to brains split by the division of the 
connecting tissue between them – the corpus callosum. We shall also have something to say 
about alien hand syndrome and other conditions. In the course of this chapter, we shall find 
that the description of these conditions by some neurologists and experimenters may involve 
the attribution of psychological predicates (such as ‘has a belief’, or ‘has the thought that’) to 
the brain, and indeed to parts of it – hemispheres, in the case of the split brain cases, or even 
to smaller sub-systems involved in the processing of information (Zeki and Micro-
consciousnesses).  
It is appropriate, before we begin, to anticipate and confront an issue which has a 
bearing here. Hacker and Bennett have directed a substantial part of their book, Philosophical 
Foundations of Neuroscience, (2003) against what they describe as the mereological fallacy – 
ie the fallacy of attributing psychological predicates to something other than a person, or 
whole, undivided human being. The authors specifically address the split brain cases and 
blindsight in their work. Adverting to Kenny’s 1971 article: ‘Homunculus Fallacy’ they 
concede that it may not strictly speaking be a fallacy to ascribe psychological predicates to 
the brain or its parts, since it is not in itself a form of invalid reasoning, but it can lead to 
fallacies, confusions and creates nonsensical descriptions (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.73 
fn13). 
This present work will acknowledge the argument as they make it, but will argue that 
the case raised by the dissociations against the unity of consciousness should not be blunted 
on this view by their insistence on an ordinary language description of what is going on in the 
conditions. If, in the end, we persist with the descriptions of the dissociations given by the 
neurologists or psychologists, we shall have good reasons for doing so. It may be possible to 
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re-describe the dissociations of function in such a way that meets their objection, yet presents 
a case against the claims for a Unity of Consciousness. Bennett and Hacker themselves allow 
an important counter-argument against their position, suggesting that neuroscientists are not 
precluded from using verbs such as ‘to perceive’, ‘to believe’ etc ‘in new ways according to 
conditions other than the received conditions of their use, as long as they can explain what 
these new uses mean’ (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.384). Short of any re-description that 
might satisfy their objections, we may have to make a case for a conceptual change. 
In this prefatory section, however, I wish to outline Hacker and Bennett’s objections, 
to identify what can be rescued from their criticism of Pat Churchland’s view that the 
concepts involved in the area need a thorough review. 
Hacker and Bennett make the point that it was a characteristic feature of Cartesian 
Dualism to ascribe psychological predicates to something other than the whole human being. 
In Descartes’ case, it was to the mind, and only derivatively to the whole person, that 
psychological predicates were ascribed (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.72). They observe that 
neuroscientists and others are increasingly drawn to talk in this way about the brain, or even 
its parts. 
Against this tendency, they advance the mereological principle – which they describe 
as being a logical principle, and therefore not amenable to empirical or experimental 
confirmation or disconfirmation. It is a convention that determines what does or does not 
make sense. Thus, the idea of attributing knowledge, or belief or agency, visual sensation to 
each hemisphere is ruled out (as, one might say, a category mistake). ‘It is senseless to speak 
of the right hemisphere observing the actions of the left hand. […] neither hemisphere can 
observe, [nor] does the left hand perform any actions’ (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.392).  
That there is a temptation to speak in such ways is undeniable. We have already seen 
Weiskrantz do so. Other neuroscientists and psychologists, even some self-described 
philosophers, do so. Sperry wrote of split brain patients as having two separate minds, that is, 
two separate spheres of consciousness. John Eccles, a Nobel laureat for work in physiology, 
commented, when wrestling with the split brain question, that the right hemisphere can’t 
know because only the left hemisphere can have thoughts or knowledge.  
Puccetti speaks of the left hemisphere as being unaware of the other, which considers 
mind therefore to be unitary, whereas the right hemisphere has ‘known the true state of affairs 
from a very tender age. It has known this because beginning at age two or three it heard 
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speech emanating from the common body’ (Puccetti 1981, p.97). McGilchrist, writes 
extensively about the functional differences between the two hemispheres, and comments: ‘I 
do think a hemisphere can have a will’ (McGilchrist, 2009, p.215).  
Bayne, our target in this chapter, and, as we shall see, rather characteristically,  keeps 
the option open: ‘Experiences are properties of subjects of experience [..] Talk of ‘the left 
hemisphere doing this’ or the ‘right hemisphere knowing that’ is tempting – indeed I myself 
have engaged in it on occasions – but it needs to be taken with a large pinch of salt’ (Bayne, 
2010, p.204). He concedes that his unity thesis is put under a lot of pressure by the split brain 
cases, in which the best account of their condition might be to accept that a commissurotomy 
involves the multiplication of subjects of experience. It is the object of this chapter to explore 
this possibility. 
If so many speak in this way, it may be indicative of the claim that this is the best way 
of making sense of the cases. In fact, to attribute a different psychology to each hemisphere 
may be the only way we can make sense of something like the ‘alien hand syndrome’ we 
shall discuss in this chapter. One of the criteria for attributing psychology to a hemisphere 
might be whether the hemispheres act with separate discriminable agency, and this seems to 
be happening in this case. But let us examine the Bennett/Hacker case in more detail.  
They give an account of the split brain cases as follows. They concede that what has 
been discovered by experiments on split brain patients22 ‘is a very strange dissociation of 
functions that are normally intimately associated’ (Bennett and Hacker, p.391). We note their 
use of the word ‘strange’ here. Such a word alerts us to expect an account which properly 
accommodates this strangeness. They go on to say, however, that there is no sense in which 
one hemisphere of a split brain see things that another hemisphere does not, nor that one 
hemisphere knows what another does not. Rather ‘the transmission of neural signals across 
the corpus callosum, which is a necessary condition of the person knowing […] has been 
prevented by the commissurotomy’ (Bennett and Hacker, p.393). The patient may still 
respond to what is visually presented to him [by pointing to objects] even though he does not 
know why he thus points. ‘In short, everything that Sperry and Gazzaniga have discovered 
can be adequately described without transgressing the mereological principle […]’ (Bennett 
and Hacker, 2003, p.393). 
 
22 For further details see the section: ‘The Split Brain Syndrome’ p.134 et seq below. 
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This is of course, an account of the experiment we shall consider in the section to 
come, but it does not capture the strangeness of the result. As we shall see in the studies that 
follow, the subject gives different responses to questions in the experiments – (eg what was 
the object shown?) The left (the verbal) hemisphere has no access to the visual information 
presented to the right and so because of the commissurotomy does not know what was 
presented to the right, and says so, or confabulates. The experiment can similarly establish 
that the right hemisphere has no access to the visual stimulus shown to the left, and cannot 
identify the object (although it would do so in a non-verbal way). These negative responses 
are in keeping with the account Bennett and Hacker give. The subject as a whole person fails 
to have knowledge, because the commissurotomy has interrupted the passage of neural 
information. But the experiment has positive responses too – each hemisphere has a correct 
response unavailable to the other, and these responses are best accounted for by allowing that 
the two hemispheres each have different access to different visual information. What is 
strange is not what the subject doesn’t know, but what is to be found in, or concluded from 
the correct but differentiable responses of each of the hemispheres.  
Bennett and Hacker also give an account of blindsight in ways that make it quite clear 
that the characterisation of blindsight as unconscious perception is ruled out. Thus: ‘The 
conceptual apparatus Weiskrantz invokes to describe the phenomena is defective. [Once 
cleared up] we must shed the description of blindsight patients as people who have sensory 
experience of visible objects within their scotoma, but who are unable to apprehend that they 
do’ (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.395). We are presented with the question whether subjects 
like DB or GY can or cannot see in their scotoma, ‘but this is precisely the question that 
cannot be answered’. They go on: ‘[the conceptual conflict that an insistence on using 
ordinary language creates means] that one can neither say that the patient sees objects in the 
scotoma, nor that he does not’ (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.396). It has been our contention 
throughout that DB and GY do see objects in their scotoma, with a great deal of accuracy, 
and detail in the sense that they respond accurately as to the detail of the stimuli shown. 
Whether they intended to or not, it is evident that this approach lends weight to the 
neo-cartesian view of consciousness which seems to reject the notion of ‘unconscious 
perception’. This seems to be evident from their comment: ‘[In the behaviour of a 
blindsighted person] we resort to paradoxical descriptions such as ‘blind-sight’ or 
‘unconscious awareness’ (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.396) They take the view that there is 
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nothing paradoxical about blindsight – there is only an indication that a concept is 
inapplicable.  
As we have made clear elsewhere, this thesis is inclined to a view that these 
dissociations prompt a review of the way they are dealt with by the neo-Cartesians, and 
possibly conceptual revision, and this is precisely the response we might make to the case 
presented by Hacker and Bennett. We can cite in support, the position taken by Patricia 
Churchland in her work: Neurophilosophy (2000). We have already quoted her view on the 
importance of blindsight: ‘This is a case where empirical discoveries put pressure on us to 
make conceptual revisions’ (Churchland, 2000, p.228). 
She makes a methodological point later in her book: ‘To make theoretical progress we 
precisely expect some degree of meaning change, and certainly, if observation sentences are 
revised then observational predicates undergo meaning change’. Churchland’s own 
illustration of this point can be improved (Churchland, 2000, p.274), so we advance our own: 
Newtonian concepts of space and time, were generally accepted by the scientific community 
down to the end of the nineteenth century. That community regarded them as absolute: time 
exists and passes at a rate irrespective of any observer at any point in the universe. Space is 
absolute insofar as it was similar (throughout) and immoveable. Such concepts were deeply 
embedded in the thinking of the time, and were thought obvious. However, by the beginning 
of the twentieth century these concepts were challenged by Einstein, with observational 
evidence from the precession of the orbit of Mercury, and confirmed by Eddington’s study of 
a solar eclipse, which showed light bending in the sun’s gravitational field. As scientists 
gathered evidence to challenge the Newtonian concepts they thereby acquired reason to 
accept a change of meaning to the concepts in question, and absolute space and time have 
been replaced by new concepts. 
The point of this is to show that science can help to bring about a profound change in 
conceptual architecture, and Churchland’s point is to claim that this can be true of 
neuroscience and the concepts of mind too. She sides with Feyerabend in thinking that the 
whole fabric of mental concepts might be systematically improvable and revisable 
(Churchland, 2000, p.275). 
On the other hand, Bennett and Hacker insist that ‘[…] neuroscience can contribute 
nothing to the clarification of the concepts of consciousness’ (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, 
p.403), which is a claim which sits oddly with their concession that neuroscientists are not 
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precluded from using psychological predicates in new ways, so long as they can explain what 
these uses mean (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p.384). Of course, we can agree with them that 
merely adding an asterisk to an existing expression (eg ‘perceives*’) is inadequate, but it 
should be possible clearly to specify an extension to the use of an expression. We might agree 
and establish, for example, that ‘perceives’ can properly be used when the candidate in 
question responds to a stimulus in a way other than verbally, or in contradistinction of 
another response made verbally, or in cases where the candidate in question has no awareness 
of doing so, or where a response seems to be at odds with his/her verbal account of things. 
All of these extensions to the use of an expression will need the support of experimental 
results, but such formulae would allow the ‘strangeness’ of split brains and blindsight to be 
fully accommodated. Making such changes is part of our project after all, and this thesis has 
been able to endorse Hacker’s criticism of other concepts, such as qualia and ‘what-it-is-like’. 
The results of the studies we shall look at will provide reason enough for making such 
conceptual changes.  
In summary, Bennett and Hacker were right to criticise the Cartesian claims that 
psychological attributes could be predicated of mind, but to insist that only the whole person 
may legitimately be ascribed psychology, seems excessively conservative, especially if a 
change allows theoretical and empirical progress. Following the spirit of Churchland’s own 
methodology: the preservation of the status quo should not override considerations of 
empirical adequacy, and it should be possible for discoveries in neuroscience to ‘mold, shape 
and perhaps transmute the language of the mental’ (Churchland, 2000, p.275). 
Notwithstanding this, in this chapter we shall make efforts to avoid the charge of 
being in breach of the mereological principle. However, if the empirical evidence makes it 
necessary to depart from this, or if doing so is the only way to make proper sense of some of 
the dissociations, then we shall allow the descriptions of the neuroscientists and psychologists 
some licence. What we are here exploring are phenomena which are, in several ways, 
extraordinary, and properly to describe what is going on may require a change to ordinary or 






Tim Bayne and the Unity of Consciousness. 
 
In 2000, Tim Bayne shared authorship of a paper ‘What is the Unity of Consciousness’ with 
David Chalmers - a paper which featured ultimately in Chalmers’ book: The Character of 
Consciousness (2010). Bayne’s book: The Unity of Consciousness (2010) is a substantial 
restatement and defence of the position they jointly took up in the 2000 paper. It is this book, 
and the position taken by Bayne and Chalmers which will be at issue in this chapter.  
In their work, Bayne and Chalmers argue for a certain structure of consciousness 
which puts a constraint upon wider theories of consciousness, which specifically militates 
against atomistic, or Higher Order Thought theories of mind. This is in keeping with an 
overall commitment to the more dualistic picture of mind as they have defined it. The paper 
makes this wider motivation clear: ‘[We argue that the unity thesis] is incompatible with 
these theories: if the unity thesis is true, then these theories are false’ (Chalmers, 2010, 
p.498). The basic claim is this: if consciousness has a unity to it which means that ‘the basic 
notion of consciousness is that of a total phenomenal state: what it is like to be a subject at a 
time.  This yields a holistic rather than an atomistic view of consciousness’ (Chalmers, 2010, 
p.538). Using Bayne’s own distinction, an holistic picture will be one which denies that there 
are any independent conscious states that need to be bound together to form part of a 
phenomenal field, while an atomistic picture might hold that there are discriminable features 
of the phenomenal field, which need to be bound together to form the whole. We shall look 
further into the atomistic/holistic question at the end of this chapter, but for the time being we 
note that an atomistic picture is one which is consonant with the idea of stray independent 
conscious states not bound holistically. We shall present synaesthesia as such a case in point.  
As noted, Bayne and Chalmers aim their unity thesis against those Higher Order 
Thought theories which give an account of phenomenal consciousness, specifically those put 
forward by Rosenthal and others. Their claim is that these Higher Order Thought theories 
advance the view that: ‘A mental state M is phenomenally conscious iff a subject has a higher 
order thought about M’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.531). Chalmers and Bayne suggest that nothing 
about this position requires that ‘phenomenally conscious states will always be unified. 
Certainly, it will not be necessary that they be unified’. Thus it is entirely possible for a 
subject to have a phenomenally conscious state A1, phenomenally conscious state A2, 
phenomenally conscious state A3 and so on, and the corresponding higher order thoughts: ‘I 
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am in A1’, ‘I am in A2’, and ‘I am in A3’, and yet without also having the higher order 
thought: ‘I am in A1, and A2, and A3’ (Chalmers, 2010, see pp.532-533). Such a subject 
could have contradictory beliefs that she never puts together, and so never has the thought: ‘I 
believe in x, and in not-x’. Chalmers adds: ‘This might be strange or unusual, but there would 
be nothing contradictory about it.’  
A higher-order thought position would allow that there might be phenomenal disunity 
at times. If it is true, then it would contradict the central intuition behind the Unity Thesis, 
that, necessarily, there is something it is like to be in A1, A2 and A3 all at once. Bayne and 
Chalmers conclude that the two positions are at odds with each other. ‘If the unity thesis is 
true, the higher order thought thesis is false’, and vice versa.  
Anyone defending the higher order thought position can reply in a number of ways. 
He can argue that the theory agrees that there could be cases of unified experiences, but 
disagree on what constitutes that unity, and explore this line of enquiry. Or he can deny the 
Unity thesis and embrace the view that unity holds typically, but not necessarily.  
This work will investigate the latter course. We aim to put pressure on the idea that 
the unity thesis can be sustained, and in so doing, release ourselves from neo-cartesian 
constraints upon a wider theory of consciousness. We are then free to explore atomistic and 
higher order thought theories. The chapter will follow this plan: I will firstly identify the 
unity principle, and how it sits with the general position on mind that Bayne endorses; I will 
then argue that the dissociations we are interested in present more of a problem for his 
position than he would allow. On this view, Bayne might be more open to blindsight and 
other dissociations, such as alien hand syndrome. The chapter will examine his own account 
of how split brain cases may be understood (the so-called ‘switch model’). We shall then turn 
to other challenges to the unity of consciousness, in synaesthesia. Finally, we shall examine 
the criticism made of the notion of Unity by S Zeki and his claim that consciousness is 
disunified. 
The claims involved. 
The central contentions of Bayne’s work are these: 
• The kind of unity enjoyed by human subjects and which is the primary subject of his 
examination, is defined as phenomenal unity. 
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• Phenomenal unity is to be understood as there being something-it-is-like for a subject 
to have multiple experiences together. 
• ‘Phenomenal consciousness’ is pleonastic – all consciousness is phenomenal (Bayne, 
2010, p.6). 
• There are no obviously decisive counter-examples to the contention of unity, and so, 
we never have dis-unified experiences (Bayne, 2010, p.16).  
• (This allows the move to the stronger claim that) Consciousness is necessarily unified, 
with the implication that a human being can only have one stream of consciousness at 
any one time. 
• The claim of phenomenal unity (and not representational unity, or any other kind of 
unity) of consciousness delivers on the substantive claim that Bayne wants – that 
atomistic theories stressing the role of neurological sub-systems, or higher-order 
thought theories are ruled out of account by the Unity Contention.  
Let us first be clearer about the Unity Principle and what is being argued. Bayne considers 
that there is something-it-is-like to see the saxophone, and something it-is-like to hear it 
being played, and there is a third thing: there is something-it-is-like to see it, and hear it being 
played at the same time – to have both experiences, but also to have them together. Bayne 
describes the relationship between the experiences as being ‘unified when, and only when 
they are co-subsumed’ (Bayne, 2010, p.20). 
In other words, there is a phenomenal state which ‘subsumes’ all the other 
experiences which are part of this state – ‘My total experiential state is a whole that includes 
within itself various experiential parts, such as my overall perceptual experience, my overall 
auditory experience, (and experiences in other modalities)’ (Bayne, 2010, p.21). In defining 
subsumption, in the same place, Bayne gives a mereological account – in terms of the 
relationship between parts and the whole: ‘conscious states are phenomenally unified in 
virtue of the fact that they occur as the parts of a single conscious state.’ It is clear that, 
although this single unified state is a conscious state in its own right, it does not exist as 
separate from, or independent of its constituent parts.  
A further feature of phenomenal unity as defined by Bayne is its relationship to 
representational content. More will be said on this issue later, but we can now briefly 
introduce the idea. He comments: ‘Experiential states don’t merely have a phenomenal 
character, or ‘what-it-is-likeness’; they also possess representational content. Indeed it is 
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plausible to hold that the phenomenal character of conscious states is intimately related to 
their representational content. And this suggests it might be possible to analyse phenomenal 
unity in terms of relations between the representational contents of unified states’ (Bayne, 
2010, p.48). In this connection, and against his claim, Bayne entertains the possibility that 
there might be ‘phenomenological danglers’ – ‘states whose phenomenal character outruns 
whatever representational content they might possess’ (Bayne, 2010, p.51-2). If there are 
phenomenological danglers as defined, there is a problem for the claim that phenomenal unity 
can be analysed in terms of representational content. The central commitment to unity may be 
undisturbed (I could have an undirected mood of discontentment unified with the feeling of a 
woolly jumper on my skin), but danglers could create a difficulty for the view that ‘we can 
fully capture the phenomenal character of consciousness by an appeal to the propositional 
contents of representational states’. In other words, he can fall back upon the what-it-is-like 
characterisation, or the mereological account of unity, but he concedes that, in cases where 
we cannot define phenomenal states in terms of representational content, we can count those 
a ‘diagnostic of failures of phenomenal unity’(Bayne, 2010, p.72). 
Within this context, Bayne discusses moods and pains - states which lack 
representational content altogether, or are such that their phenomenal character is not fully 
captured by their representational content. One example might be boredom. Bayne however, 
leaves it open that there could be plausible responses to these phenomenological danglers, 
and so sets them aside. We shall return to this area in a later section – there may be more 
serious danglers which present a problem for the representationalist picture Bayne and 
Chalmers endorse and which may be diagnostic of a failure of unity. 
 
Some preliminary critical comments on the Unity Principle. 
Before we embark on the main line of attack on the unity principle, - its handling of 
dissociation cases - I offer some further commentary identifying the position taken, and how 
it fits into a wider philosophical discussion of mind. 
Returning, for a moment, to the characterisation of unity as one in which unity is a 
further state, over and above individual experiential states, and using the what-it-is-like 
formulation that the neo-cartesians are wedded to, they would argue as follows. There is 
something-it-is-like to hear the samba drummer, (v1) and there is something-it-is-like to see 
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the drummer hit her drum, (v2); there is something-it-is-like to smell the barbeque (v3); there 
is something-it-is-like to feel the pain in one’s head (v4), and there is something-it-is-like to 
wonder when the band will stop (v5). In addition, there is something-it-is-like (R1) to hear 
the drumming, while seeing the drum being hit, while smelling the barbeque, feeling the pain 
and wondering when they will stop. (v1, v2, v3, v4 and v5) This total state R1 captures what 
it is like to be the subject at the time.  
There is a telling criticism of the principle, which is broadly shared by Tye (2003) and Hurley 
(1998) and which has become known as the ‘phenomenal bloat’ problem. If phenomenal 
unity is meaningful, then there must be a sense in which I experience it. Suppose R1 is the 
unity relation between experiences v1, v2, v3, v4, v5. A condition of me enjoying 
phenomenal unity is that I have the experiences, and also the relation R1 between them, or 
there is no compelling reason to think they are unified at all. The subject must be conscious 
that they are conscious of v1-5 and R1. But then, in order to account for the fact that R1 is 
unified with v1-5, we need to posit a further unity relation R2. The arguments (recalling the 
third man argument of classical philosophy) suggest that the content of one’s experience is 
multiplied beyond necessity, (just more content) or even fatally, if the argument ends in 
regress (Bayne, 2010, p.30).  
In short form then: 
• Suppose phenomenal unity is a relation between experiences v1-v5 
• This unity relation (R1) between them must itself be experienced, or 
there would be nothing it is like for v1-v5 to be unified. 
• If R1 is itself experienced, it must have its own phenomenology. 
• If R1 has its own phenomenology, its phenomenology must be unified 
with that of v1-v5 
• In order to account for the fact that R1 is unified with v1-v5, we must 
posit a new unity relation, R2 
• R2 must itself be experienced, for if there were no experience of the 
unifying relation, there would be nothing it is like for v1-v5 to be 
unified with R1 
• We have thus begun a vicious infinite regress. 
(Bayne, 2010, p.30, referring to Tye’s argument in 2003 pp.21-22). 
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 Bayne deals with the objection by suggesting that we deny premiss 2 above, that R1, 
the phenomenal unity of v1-v5 must itself be experienced. He argues that there is 
nevertheless a unity relation, between v1-v5, without there being an experience of the unity 
relation itself, that phenomenal unity is a relation that makes no additional contribution to 
what it is like to be the subject in question. (Bayne, 2010, pp.31-2). He then acknowledges a 
contribution made by Ian Phillips – that understanding unity is not a question of experiencing 
that unity as an object, so much as a manner of experiencing’. No further development of this 
key point is given. 
This now seems to be something of a tangle, partly caused by the attachment that 
Bayne (and Chalmers) have to cashing in the idea of being in a total conscious state in terms 
of there being ‘something-it-is-like’ to have a unified consciousness. This thesis takes the 
view that this phrase is unhelpful and contributes little beyond an appeal to intuition in 
defining any aspect of consciousness or experience.  
We now have a claim that what it is to experience the unity of v1-v5, is for the subject 
to consider those experiences in a certain way, or fashion, not that they present a unity in 
themselves. At the very least, this seems to weaken the claim that experiences are necessarily 
unified, as their unity would seem to turn on the vicissitudes of the subject’s manner. 
There are other issues. If a commitment to the unity principle is a commitment to 
analysing ‘what-it-is-like’ in terms of multiple experiences, there is then a question of how 
many experiences there may be, synchronously. A holistic approach suggests many, or a 
lavish view of consciousness. An atomistic approach, such as we might find in the higher 
order thought account, might make a claim for a ‘sparse’ view of consciousness. In 
considering this, we encounter the ‘lavish/sparse’ debate.  
 
Lavish/Sparse conceptions of consciousness. 
The unity principle, in presenting ‘what-it-is-like’ in terms of multiple experiences 
unified together, might be thought to be a picture in which consciousness is rich, or lavish – 
suggesting that, at any one time, a moment of consciousness contains a detailed and multi-
modal representation of the world. If this were the case, then Bayne would appear to be 
siding with other non-reductive monists, who also subscribe to an ‘abundant’, or ‘lavish’ 
conception of experience. John Searle, for example, describes his experience as having an 
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attended centre, and a broad periphery of consciously experienced but unattended objects and 
sensations (Searle, 1992, pp.137-8). 
The ground for this position is, as Searle and Bayne admit, how consciousness 
appears from within, ie as a consequence of introspection. Thus: Bayne (2010, p.75) ‘The 
plausibility of the unity thesis derives largely from introspection’ and: ‘the unity of 
consciousness that is revealed to introspection is […] a feature it enjoys all the time, even 
when one doesn’t introspect.’ Schwitzgebel makes a similar observation: ‘Those who see 
consciousness as abundant generally provide little positive argument. They tend simply to 
state the position and expect the reader to agree’ (Schwitzgebel, 2011, p.94). 
We have dealt with the problems of a reliance on introspection elsewhere, and so need 
not repeat too much of that here. Bayne concedes the weakness of such reliance (Bayne, 
2010, p.76 et seq)23 and ultimately comes to declare that: ‘Although introspection appears to 
lead some subjects to embrace a rich account of consciousness, [...] I myself incline to some 
degree of modesty here. As best I can tell, my typical phenomenal field involves a small band 
of focal experience surrounded by an experiential penumbra. This focal experience is usually 
dominated by at most two or three modalities at a time, with only a few objects and features 
represented in any detail across these two or three modalities. [..] This sketch might not 
qualify as an endorsement of the ‘sparse’ view consciousness, but it is certainly some 
distance from the lavish model’ (Bayne, 2010, p.79).  
In saying this he suggests he is going some way to repudiating the lavish or 
abundance model, but another reading of this picture is not a middle course between 
sparse/abundance – it leans directly towards abundance. A ‘few’ (objects and features) times 
‘two or three’ (modalities) starts to look fairly lavish. This is only to be expected; the unity 
thesis must lean in some way to a lavish conception of consciousness, as unity is necessarily 
the unification of several experiences at the same time.  
Bayne’s co-author, Chalmers, does not dissemble. He certainly embraces lavishness 
in his speculative chapter on Consciousness and Information (Chalmers, 1996, ch 8) in which 
he equates consciousness with information processing. According to this, consciousness is 
everywhere. 
 
23 Bayne is nothing if not generous to counter-positions to his arguments. So much so, that he seems 





Why is this distinction and the positions taken in it relevant and indicative? 
Schwitzgebel hints at the answer. A commitment to abundance is more likely to come from 
those who hold a Chalmersian concept of phenomenal consciousness – the kind of concept 
which ‘makes dualism tempting and the mind-body problem interesting’ (Schwitzgebel, 
2011, p.94).Those who lean to the sparse conception are, unsurprisingly, those who are 
inclined to the possibility of reduction – Dan Dennett, (1991), Mack and Rock (1998).  
Why is this the case? If defenders of abundance are right, our consciousness is awash 
with detail in several different modalities at any moment in time, and on such an account, 
there is no place for unconscious perception, if it is conceded that it exists at all. We are 
conscious of all our perceptual states in every modality – the position we ascribe to Chalmers. 
A narrow, sparse view of consciousness is consonant with the picture held by HOT theorists 
– it is the view that our experience is limited to a few events or objects at any one time. On 
this view, most of our perception is unconscious. It is perhaps no accident that the same 
divide in the philosophical community over the question of reduction and the idea of 
unconscious perception, is the same divide on the sparse/abundance question. 
Schwitzgebel concedes that resolving the sparse/abundance question may not be easy, 
it is arguably very important, since settling the range of conscious experience (and thus the 
range of unconscious experience) might be prior to any commitment to a more general theory 
of consciousness. Resolving it without resort to a war of intuitions (Schwitzgebel, 2011, p.96) 
needs a thorough-going evaluation of the possible deliverances of introspection. Necessary 
too, is some agreement on how we might individuate experiences and ways of counting the 
number of experiences we have at any one time.  
This last problem is nicely exposed by the flashlight objection. First mooted by Jaynes 
(1976), he argued: ‘Consciousness is a smaller part of our mental life than we are conscious 
of, because we cannot be conscious of what we are not conscious of.’ […] ‘It is like asking a 
flashlight in a dark room to search for something that does not have any light shining on it. 
The flashlight, since there is light in whatever direction it turns, would have to conclude that 
there is light everywhere. And so consciousness can seem to pervade all mentality when 
actually it does not’ (Jaynes, 1976, p.23). 
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Wherever we look, whatever we attend to, there is experience. There is no easy way 
of settling the question of how much content is involved. Introspection is necessarily flawed 
as a line of inquiry into this. 
Empirical research in the form of ‘numerosity judgements’ may have a bearing. These 
are much replicated studies which show that subjects are only able to identify four items or 
fewer in displays, with any degree of accuracy of confidence, while error rates and reaction 
times are poorer with displays using five items or more (Sperling 1960; also Atkinson 1976, 
Livermore and Laing 1998) Again, Bayne generously allows that these studies have some 
purchase: ‘Taken as a whole, this research certainly provides some support for the sparse 
conception of consciousness’  (Bayne, 2010, p.78; emphasis in the original).  
A final judgement is not delivered, however; Bayne leaves the question of empirical 
support for the lavish/sparse debate open. Nevertheless, a good deal of his book deals with 
the challenges to the unity contention provided by empirical studies of dissociations and other 
conditions. It is these conditions that we may argue provide an empirical challenge to the 
unity contention and then help to settle the lavish/sparse debate. If we can make an argument 
for unconscious perception and establish counter examples to the unity thesis, show that 
experience is limited to a very small number of attention-occupying objects at a time, we 
dismantle some of the motivations for non-reductive monism, and the constraints dualists 
impose on a wider theory of mind.  
It is now time to consider whether the unity contention stands up against the evidence of 
dissociated minds. 
 
The Unity Thesis and the evidence of dissociation. 
In Bayne’s defence of his claim, and in the empirical elimination of counter-examples, he 
considers cases of neglect, agnosias and the ‘split-brain’ syndrome, which is the product of a 
commissurotomy. Blindsight also figures in his discussion, but as part of an argument 
explaining the extent to which we can use, or rely on the testimony of subjects, and the kind 
of report we may admit as evidence for perception. We shall consider his rejection of these 
dissociative conditions, and whether he is right to contend that there are no counter-examples 
to his Unity Thesis. If any of them do constitute a counter-example, that would be sufficient 
to undermine the claim of necessity. 
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Bayne on Blindsight 
As we have noted, Bayne is a generous, non-dogmatic advocate for the Unity Thesis, and he 
is careful to concede ground where the evidence or strength of argument demands it. One 
such concession comes in his discussion of blindsight (Bayne, 2010, chp 5). For reasons that 
may be understandable, he does not consider blindsight as an empirical test for the unity 
claim, but it features in a ground clearing discussion of how to evaluate the unity claim. It is 
mentioned in context of: what emphasis should we put on the subjects’ reports of their 
experience, (the ‘introspective criterion’) and whether other forms of reporting may be 
allowable. Further, to what extent can intentional agency be a criterion of consciousness? (the 
‘agentive criterion’).  
In the course of his discussion, he makes a number of claims which are germane to 
our investigation, and we shall look at these before we acknowledge his concession. He 
acknowledges the well-rehearsed problems for the introspective criterion: introspective 
reports can be wrong, they cannot be made by higher animals and pre-linguistic children etc. 
It is in connection of the agentive criterion that he deals with the dissociations. 
Firstly, he recognises that the agentive criterion does not have widespread support, 
since cognitive sciences have come to the belief that much of our cognitive and behavioural 
control is the product of ‘zombie systems’ – systems that operate on the basis of unconscious 
representations’ (Bayne, 2010, p.98). In short, Bayne goes on to repudiate this claim, and to 
make a defence for the agentive approach to the ascription of consciousness.  Blindsight, 
DF’s visual agnosia, and continuous flash suppression are the conditions considered in detail. 
Bayne assesses the evidence for these as examples of ‘zombie systems’ and finds it wanting 
on the following grounds.  
He argues that they are none of them entirely ‘zombie’. The conditions ‘are not 
homunculi – ‘mini-me’ who form and execute their own plans. Instead, their operations are 
very much under the control and guidance of the contents of perceptual and intentional 
consciousness’ (Bayne, 2010, p.100). This is in context of a rejection of the idea that Milner 
and Goodale’s DF unconsciously perceives the letterbox in order correctly to orient her hand 




Blindsight is also unconvincing as an example of unconscious perception: ‘subjects 
are unable to discriminate complex shapes in their blindfield, and even those properties that 
they can unconsciously identify are not spontaneously integrated into their practical and 
theoretical reasoning’. (They have to be prompted). Perceptual content is not manifest to the 
subject or available to them, if they take themselves to be ‘merely guessing’ (Bayne, 2010, 
p.100). Helen, Humphrey’s monkey, did seem to exhibit unprompted spontaneous behaviour, 
but this superblindsight is not replicated in humans24.  
Let us pause for a moment to summarise and examine these points. The claims are these: 
• Blindsighted subjects are unable to discriminate complex shapes 
• Perceptual content is not manifest or available to the subject 
• Availability of content might be conceded if ever a case of superblindsight were 
found, but none has. 
• Further, in the case of DF, in her visual agnosia, Bayne claims that a lot of her 
unconscious representation is parasitic upon conscious perception. 
On each of these points there is something to add. Firstly 
i) On the attempt to suggest that, whatever blindsight is, it is confined to simple 
stimuli and paradigms, and is not therefore to be taken seriously – a few recent 
studies call this dismissal into question. Tamietto et al (2009) shows that 
blindsight subjects are able to detect the emotional valence in a projected face 
projected to the blindfield, whether it was smiling or frowning. There is evidence 
here for a ‘zombie system’ identifying projected shapes, and responding with the 
twitching of muscles in the subject, uniquely used for smiling or frowning, and 
doing so without the awareness of the subject. Weiskrantz also reports the 
increased sensitivity in DB after some years (Blindsight 2009 edition p 18), and 
found that he, DB, could successfully identify low-contrast outline images of 
objects and animals, and make same/different discriminations of pairs of such 
images with an 89% accuracy. This is clear evidence of an ability to identify 
complex shapes, rather than simple light stimuli.  
 
24 In point of fact, that Helen could move around under visual guidance suggests to Bayne that she 
was actually visually conscious, this despite the fact that Helen’s visual cortex was removed. Her 
perceptual success is too successful. This is redolent of the difficulty of satisfying conspiracy 




ii) On the claims above concerning superblindsight – as noted earlier, recently the 
case of TN has come to prominence (de Gelder et al, 2008), - a bilateral case of 
blindsight, and the case closest to a condition of superblindsight yet encountered. 
The absence of superblindsight in humans is accounted for by the fact that lesions, 
the product of brain damage or strokes rarely disable the V1 to the extent that a 
subject loses sight in both eyes and completely (usually a lesion leaves part of the 
visual field affected – an area called a scotoma), so that subjects continue to have 
some visual function in a sighted field, and so never have to develop a 
spontaneous response, or exercise a reliance on the subcortical pathways to the 
extent that Helen was.  
iii) On DF’s case, and the claim that much of her perceptual accomplishments were 
parasitic upon conscious perception, and thus: ‘very little behaviour is under the 
exclusive control of zombie systems’ (Bayne, 2010, p.100)- a closer reading of 
Milner and Goodale (2005) is prompted. DF’s condition is not one where the 
zombie systems can be separated out so easily. It is understood that there are 
linkages between the ventral and dorsal processing systems, so that the vision-for-
perception (ventral) route does get some feedback information, so yes, there is 
some sense in which DF’s behavioural success can be put down to piggy-backing 
off conscious perception. However, her condition is such that much of her success 
in orientation of her hands, in placing her feet in rough terrain while walking, is 
accomplished without awareness in any proper sense of the term. DF cannot 
identify objects or separate them from their background. She fails to register edge 
or shape. As Goodale and Milner comment, (2005, p.10) ‘it is not a question of 
her failing to interpret a clear visual experience; her problem is that she does not 
have that clear visual experience to begin with’. In the absence of this, DF was 
nevertheless able to walk up an uneven and steep pathway, and walked 
confidently without stumbling over roots and without colliding with branches. She 
was able to hold her hands in the correct position to receive plates, knives, forks 
despite the fact that could not verbally identify them. She was able to catch a ball 
thrown at her. She did not have much conscious perception off which to piggy-
back, and on this view, Bayne is too quick to dismiss her case, and eliminate the 
idea of zombie systems at work. 
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However, it is clear Bayne does not regard blindsight and DF’s agnosia as being challenges to 
his unity contention, or they would have been given their own chapter. As noted, they are 
considered in connection with the question –how are we to evaluate the unity claim - to what 
extent should we rely on the reports or introspective judgements of subjects, or on their 
behaviour as agents.  
His eventual conclusion on this question (and this is the concession we remarked 
comes in this section) that other forms of behaviour may count as evidence for successful 
registration of stimuli, including examples of intentional agency (that is – actions of subjects 
mimicking movement, pressing commentary keys, orienting hands, and reactions to 
emotional valence etc.) This seems right, or we would rule out of account important 
evidence, and in particular, studies which concern animals or pre-linguistic children or others 
who cannot give verbal responses based on introspective judgements. Philosophers post-
Wittgenstein are unlikely to think it sufficient to base contentions solely on 1st person reports 
of introspective judgements25, and Bayne takes the same view: ‘Introspective reports may 
play a core role in the ascription of consciousness [..] but they are not the sole basis on which 
conscious states can be legitimately ascribed’ (Bayne, 2010, p.96; emphasis in original). 
He does concede that sometimes, introspective reports might dissociate from other 
forms of behaviour, and it is a matter of some delicacy on the question of which to prefer, in 
this event. A conservative approach would be to ascribe consciousness to a creature iff each 
of the possible markers point in the same direction, but he acknowledges that there is no 
obvious reason why we should be looking to prefer a conservative approach.  
These are important questions that have a bearing on other parts of this thesis, but 
here at least, it is important to note, and to rebut his resistance to ‘zombie systems’ in these 
conditions, since it is our goal to establish that such automatic unconscious systems 
processing individual features of experience exist, and account perhaps for a big proportion 
of human behaviour.  
However, to put maximum pressure on the unity contention we should now turn to the 
dissociative cases which Bayne deals with, as potential empirical counter-examples to his 
 
25 Even so, Bayne thinks it is an open question as how to respond when the different markers of 
consciousness point in different directions (when, for example, an agentive response (eg orienting 
hands, or indicating a light source’s movement) points in the opposite direction to introspective 
judgements (‘I don’t see anything’)). It seems to me we could be less equivocal.  
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claim. Recall that Bayne says that consciousness is necessarily unified, and so one counter-
example is sufficient to create a difficulty for him. 
 
The Split Brain Syndrome. 
The brain has two hemispheres, connected by a network of fibres – the corpus callosum. 
There are two kinds of divided brain patients – ones who are born without a corpus callosum 
(acallosal subjects) and those who have had this network to some extent surgically severed, 
usually to control epilepsy (split brain subjects). The operation– a commissurotomy – is today 
infrequently performed, but was much studied in the 1960s and 1970s after operations 
performed by Sperry became the subject of studies conducted by Gazzaniga and others. It is 
an operation of last resort today, as epilepsy is now largely controllable by drugs.  
The commissure is a differentiable structure, and it is specialised in the sense that 
different information is transferred by different sections of the collosum. Different operations 
in which different parts of the commissure is severed, identify the functions of the several 
parts: the anterior mid-body transfers motor information, the posterior mid-body transfers 
somatosensory information, the isthmus transfers auditory information, and the splenium 
transfers visual information. (Funnell et al, 2000). It is not possible completely to separate the 
two hemispheres, and some connectivity always remains, even in cases of more radical 
sectioning – the brain stem maintains some linkage. Some studies involve incomplete 
transections and are interestingly different from those in which complete transections are 
done, but all cases may be relevant to the question of the unity of consciousness, depending 
on the nature of the dissociation. 
What is the practical outcome of the operation? Third party observers are surprised at 
the limited nature of the changes seen in a post-operative patient, and those who are 
uninitiated often remain unaware that subjects have had the change, but since the way the 
outcomes are to be understood by the casual witness is one of the things at issue, we will 
discuss this below. 
Under testing and laboratory conditions, however, the Split Brain syndrome emerges 
more strongly. An easy-to-repeat paradigm shows this. In the majority of normal human 
brains, speech centres are located in the left hemisphere, and can report verbally on objects 
presented to the Right Visual Field (RVF), but in the case of the split brain patient, in whom 
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the inter-hemisphere connective channels have been severed, information concerning objects 
in the LVF, does not reach the speech centres, and the subject cannot verbally report on the 
contents of any experience exclusive to the LVF, however, the subject can single out and 
retrieve the object with her left hand (Sperry 1974). If asked what she had (correctly) 
retrieved, the speech equipped left hemisphere fails to identify the object.  
 
The studies invite the following comparison and interpretation. 
In the studies of blindsight, the subject is arguably not aware of a stimulus, but is 
conscious of her behavioural response to it. She maintains that she sees nothing, but is aware 
of her arm pointing in a certain direction, or making a guess as to the colour of a stimulus. 
Given the surprising degree of success with these guesses, we argue that she is unconsciously 
perceiving the stimulus shown. Blindsight shares some similarities and some differences with 
the split brain cases. In split brain scenario, there is a case for saying that one hemisphere is 
not aware of the stimulus given to the other, and often not aware of the response either. In 
any event, a stimulus is correctly processed, and a successful discrimination made, but one 
hemisphere at least is unconscious of it. If it is the left hemisphere that is excluded, as it were, 
from the stimulus-response story, it often confabulates – the subject creates a spurious 
account of why the response was made. To this extent, there are some parallels with the 
blindsight cases. But there are differences - in every split brain paradigm, wherein the 
hemispheres are separated in their stimulus-response stories, consciousness goes with 
perception. Each hemisphere perceives a stimulus, and correctly responds to it; our interest 
arises in the dissociation created by the splitting of the brain, and the fact that the 
hemispheres can operate independently. 
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The relevant interpretation of the cases as far as the Unity Contention is concerned is 
this: It may be that the callosal section creates two separate streams of consciousness, and 
provides us with a counter example to the Unity Thesis. This is indeed the claim made by 
Sperry, saying: ‘both the right and left hemispheres may be conscious simultaneously in 
different, even in mutually conflicting, mental experiences that run along in parallel’ (Sperry 
1974). It is for this reason that Bayne dedicates a sizeable chapter to the split brain syndrome, 
and our next task is to evaluate his response to it. 
 
Bayne’s response to the Split Brain Syndrome. 
Before defending his own case for the split brain syndrome, Bayne first considers the case for 
the prosecution. He considers three arguments – firstly, the empirical evidence for agentive 
disunity; then two a priori arguments, which he considers valid, and which for sake of 
brevity, we shall set aside.  
We shall look at his dismissal of the case for disunity, and then his own account of the 
everyday appearance of unity – the switch model. According to this position, consciousness 
in the split-brain moves or switches from one hemisphere to the other. ‘Although both 
hemispheres can process information concurrently, they take turns in supporting 
consciousness’ (Bayne, 2010, p.210).  
 
Bayne’s case against the disunity claim 
i) Agentive disunity 
Bayne is ready to concede that, on the face of it, there is agentive disunity in Split Brain 
cases, with evidence to be found in manifestations of inter-manual conflict, or anarchic hand 
syndrome (not unlike the unruly gloved hand in Peter Seller’s depiction of Dr Strangelove). 
Bayne however stresses that the most salient feature of the Split Brain cases is not a 
dysfunction so much as their ‘social ordinariness’. 
On this view, however, Bayne is too quick to dismiss the case for agentive disunity – he 
suggests that the anarchic hand condition typically subsides within a few months (Bayne, 
2010, p.195, citing Bogen 1998), but the condition can persist – Baynes (K) et al 1997 is a 
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report of a study of AW – a woman with a chronic case which had persisted over 10 years. In 
the same paper, they review other studies of long-term inter-manual conflict or anarchic hand 
syndrome, some lasting years. The latter study reported: ‘the patient’s chief complaint was 
that her left hand did not obey her. On several occasions while driving, the left hand reached 
up and grabbed the steering wheel from the right hand. The problem was persistent and 
severe enough that she had to give up driving. She reported instances in which the left hand 
closed doors the right hand had opened, unfolded sheets the right had folded, snatched money 
the right had offered to a store cashier, and disrupted her reading by turning pages and 
closing books.’  
The persistence of the condition sits at odds with the claim of social ordinariness, about 
which we will have more to say. There are other symptoms, which include: signs of 
indecision, or being internally conflicted, problems with short-term memory, and absent-
mindedness. Bayne concedes these symptoms are long-term (Bayne, 2010, p.199) arguing 
however that these symptoms do not challenge the unity principle in the way long-term inter-
manual conflict might seem to - absent-mindedness, even indecision, is still consistent with a 
unified phenomenology. But the case of the anarchic hand strongly suggests a disunity, born 
of separate competing intentions in the different hemispheres. Recall the mereological 
account of phenomenal unity given by Bayne from the outset – Unity is described as having 
an experience e1, and an experience e2, and for there to be a further experience R which is 
not separate or independent of e1 or e2, which is e1 and e2, - summed up as what it is like to 
be the subject in question. In the anarchic hand situation, we have a subject who has difficulty 
in tracking the contents of their subjective states, and who has lost a sense of (some of) them 
being their own. What it is like to be the subject for whom one hand is steering right and the 
other pulling left is hard for the subject to give an account of, much less anyone else, but it 
seems we must agree that the situation lacks an essential unity. 
Bayne gives this account of the syndrome: it is ‘best thought of as triggered by stimulus-
driven intentions’ (Bayne, 2010, p.195), but the subject herself need not be conscious of the 
intentions, (just as one can be unconscious of navigating down a street whilst engaged in 
conversation). Motor independence (of the anarchic hand) seen here involves only 
subconscious mechanisms, and we do not need to posit conscious intentions in each 
hemisphere, or think of each hemisphere as harbouring an autonomous agent.’ This makes 
the syndrome no more interesting than an account of the automatism sometimes involved in 
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long distance driving, and seems to have no compelling account of the conflict that clearly 
exists in the subject, the feeling they have that their hand is out of control.  
It is not easy to see why this characterisation makes the anarchic hand less of a problem 
for the question of phenomenal unity. An account which sits more naturally with the facts of 
the case is this: the sundering of the neurological links between the two hemispheres sunders 
the mechanisms by which the processing of, and response to situations are integrated into a 
single agentive behaviour. The anarchic hand, or inter-manual conflict is evidence of agentive 
disunity, and agentive disunity is more compellingly explained by phenomenal disunity. As 
Bayne concedes, there are subconscious mechanisms at play in the behaviour of people with 
the condition, and stimulus driven intentions may be unconscious, but a natural explanation 
of this is because such intentions and behaviour are linked with different hemispheres with 
poor access to each other’s contents. 
 
ii Spatial decoupling. 
Bayne introduces a second form of agentive disunity – spatial decoupling, citing the study of 
JW (Franz et al, 1996) in which a split-brain subject is shown to be capable of drawing 
distinct patterns simultaneously with left and right hands. Bayne: ‘Spatial decoupling is [..] 
consistent with phenomenal unity. [..T]he kind of motor independence seen here involves 
only subconscious mechanisms; we needn’t posit separate conscious goals or intentions in 
each hemisphere’ (Bayne, 2010, p.195). 
Bayne concludes ‘that there is no evidence that each of the patient’s hemispheres 
thinks of itself […] as an autonomous agent’, and that ‘the evidence suggests that split brain 
patients are single agents who are attempting to get by as best they can.’ Indeed, he repeats 
approvingly a quote from JW: ‘Are you guys trying to make two people out of me?’, as 
evidence that despite the researchers’ probes, there is but one agent present in the study.  
In this section, the argument and evidence is somewhat thin. JW’s comment can be 
quickly dealt with as the product of a linguistically competent and assertive left hemisphere 
speaking on behalf of itself, and unaware of its relationship with the other hemisphere. There 
is only one verbal agent present in the study. Moreover, a further study of JW takes his 
spatial decoupling further, in a study which makes a stronger case for phenomenal disunity as 
well. In Eliassen et al (2000), JW is shown tachistoscopically, two figures either side of a 
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focus point and asked to draw the figures with pens in both hands. JW responds quickly and 
without error – a feat which strongly suggests that each hemisphere is conscious of the object 
shown to its corresponding visual field, and that JW himself demonstrates agentive disunity, 
and that this is the product of a divided phenomenal field. Gazzaniga: ‘It was as if two people 
were present, one guiding each hand with absolutely no interference from the other’ 
(Gazzaniga 2015).26 Bayne asserts, in this section, that, were JW ‘deluded in taking himself 
to be a single agent, […] this would be an unwelcome result’ (Bayne, 2010, p.196). 
In the anarchic hand cases however, this is where the evidence does point, even if the 
case is not, and perhaps cannot be completely conclusive either way. The subject does not 
report herself as having a fragmented self, or recognise competing wills within, but we have 
third-person evidence of competition, we know that the vocal left hemisphere is dominant, 
and inclined to speak for both, and confabulate where it is denied information exclusively 
available to the right. In such circumstances, we might be as sceptical of verbal reports as we 
are when we ask the blindsight subject if they can see. Bayne concludes the section: ‘Split 
brain patients are single agents who are attempting to get by as best they can’ (Bayne, 2010, 
p.197). But it may be at least as credible to say: split brain patients have separate, 
hemisphere-based agents, lacking the structures of integration and inhibition, whose left 
hemispheres are creating a narrative of unity.  
 
Everyday Integration. 
Bayne goes on to weigh the evidence for the ‘two streams’ models’ ability to account for 
everyday integration and behavioural unity in the split brain. He claims: ‘it is far from clear 
how the disunity models might account for ‘social ordinariness’ (Bayne, 2010, p.200). In this 
section, there is a presumption of ‘social ordinariness’ or behavioural unity, and he finds 
neither of the two models offered adequate, but if we can account for social ordinariness in 
other ways, or establish that it is perhaps an illusion, then his argument against these two 
positions is diminished. This is the aim of this section.  
In many other contexts, we know that how things seem is not necessarily a reliable 
guide to how things are. It may well be the case that ‘naïve observers are rarely aware that the 
subjects suffer from cognitive impairments’ (Bayne, 2010, p.199), but this is not a reason for 
 
26 See: https://vimeo.com/96628409 
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concluding that the subjects themselves have a unified experience in some way. We have 
already noted that the subjects themselves do have difficulty in making decisions, or are 
absent-minded. Other subtle effects include: deficits in ability to solve geometrical problems; 
associating names with faces, poorer memory. Prima facie, this, together with our discussion 
of the long-term alien hand syndrome, is some evidence for thinking the subjects are not as 
ordinary as depicted. Not all of these indicators point in the direction of disunity of 
experience, it is true, but all suggest a lack of usual integration and cooperation between the 
hemispheres, which might begin to point to a severing of experience. But there is, in the idea 
of cross-cuing, a means for explaining what ordinariness they do exhibit. Bayne mentions 
cross-cuing, but discusses it briefly, and without assessing the evidence (Bayne, 2010, p.196).  
Cross-cuing is a way of each hemisphere providing the other with information about 
its experiences, exogenous to the brain. It can be subtle and hard to detect, and is something 
which investigators make efforts to eliminate from their studies. Springer and Deutsch 
provide us with one example (1985 p.36). They report a study in which a subject was shown 
numbers to the right visual field, and asked which number was seen. The vocally equipped 
left hemisphere had no access to the information shown to the right, and so could not at first 
say what the number was. After a while, however, the subject was able to come up with a 
correct response. The investigators concluded that the left hemisphere was counting 
subvocally, and when the right number was reached, the right hemisphere would signal the 
left to stop, and report the signal out loud. This was confirmed when larger numbers were 
used in the experiment. When the larger numbers were presented to the right visual field, it 
took longer for the subject to respond; this fitted well with the suggestion that the left 
hemisphere was counting subvocally. ‘The larger the number, [..] the longer the list of 
numbers the left hemisphere would have to go through before reaching the correct one’ 
(Springer and Deutsch, 1985, p.37). 
Gazzaniga (1967) gives us another example. A red or green light was exclusively 
shown to the right hemisphere (RH), and asked to say what was seen. The RH saw red, and 
heard the vocal LH guess ‘green’. Knowing this was wrong, the RH shook the subject’s head 
and frown, and cued the LH to say ‘red’ and correct the response. If the first responses were 
taken out of the study, the correct response rate dropped to 50%. 
Given the fairly extensive literature on cross cuing (Bittner 2011, Gazzaniga 1969 as 
examples) and that many of the sources cited by Bayne feature in his bibliography, it is a 
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little surprising that cross-cuing does not feature more as a way in which the split brain can 
restore the unity of behaviour of the subject. Of course, the unity of behaviour of a subject 
does not mean that the unity of experience is restored.   
This then, is an answer to the question of ‘social ordinariness’ of split brain patients 
raised by Bayne. In such cases, we evidently have two hemispheres with different mental 
contents, and an inability of one hemisphere to get direct access to the contents of the other. 
(See Sperry’s 1979 study of LB). However, in ordinary, non-laboratory circumstances, a split 
brain subject finds no difficulty in equalising the contents of both hemispheres and 
behavioural unity is the product. It is only natural for the patient to use whatever information 
she has, to make sense of her situation. In practice, the fact that the two hemispheres share a 
single body constrains the extent to which any individual can behave in a disunified fashion 
(Schechter p.217). The subject will naturally want to be seen to be normal, and behave in a 
socially acceptable manner. Finally, it would be natural for the subject to want to create a 
unified life story, even with events originating exclusively in the right hemisphere, and 
unshared with the left. For all these reasons, the subject might present as ordinary, and 
remarkably unaffected, but the underlying reality is subtly different. 
We do not need to labour the differences between the two accounts Bayne suggests 
explain this ordinariness (contextualist and duplicationist) as cross-cuing would appear to 
apply in both cases.27 Nor do we need to be committed to Puccetti’s (1981) claim that normal 
brains are divided in the same way. Our purpose is met by finding a reason to question 
Bayne’s position on disunity models. Our next task is to examine Bayne’s own account of 
Split Brain patients, in which he maintains that they enjoy phenomenal unity – the ‘switch 
model’. 
The ‘Switch Model’. 
According to this account, there is still a single stream of consciousness in the split -brain 
subject, but the physical basis for this moves or switches from one hemisphere to the other, as 
 
27 See Puccetti (1981). Puccetti would appear to be a duplicationist, but accounts for laboratory mental duality 
by cross-cuing of information from speaking to mute hemisphere. He also maintains that this is a mechanism 
which would give the subject an illusion of mental unity, since the mute or minor hemisphere has known its 
subordinate status ‘from a very tender age. (…) Post-surgically, little has changed for this mute hemisphere 
(other than the loss of sensory information about the ipsilateral half of bodily space). It does find that it can now 
sometimes undertake an independent action (…) but on the whole it has no way of expressing itself, except 




a function of which hemisphere has won the competition for attentional resources. Bayne 
concedes that both hemispheres can process information concurrently, but each takes turns in 
supporting consciousness – over time, a hemisphere has one and one only centre of 
consciousness, that never diachronically overlaps with one sustained by the other. If they do 
not overlap in time, they do not constitute a threat to the unity thesis. The picture created is 
one in which there is a ‘fluctuating perceptual extinction in each hemisphere’ (Bayne, 2010, 
p.210), as stimuli are favoured in each visual field, and the switch takes place. At any one 
time, there is one subject, but ‘consciousness switches rapidly and effortlessly between 
hemispheres in response to the demands of the patient’s context.’28  
This section will review the arguments against this picture, regarded as implausible 
and ad hoc by Van Gulick (in Bennett and Hill 2014), and with scepticism by Prinz (2013). 
The best attack comes from Schechter (2012). We begin with one which Bayne himself 
concedes is the most powerful.  
Bayne considers the model thus: ‘The switch model holds that the contents of 
consciousness are sequentially informed by processing in each hemisphere. If this were so, 
then one would expect patients to report sudden changes in the contents of their 
consciousness. [..] Why are split brain patients apparently unaware of the alteration between 
rival percepts?’ (Bayne, 2010, p.218).  
In non-laboratory situations, and where the contents of each hemisphere are unlikely 
to be too different, the subject might not be expected to report a shifting experience, but in 
those experimental conditions, where different words or symbols projected to different 
hemispheres, and a different experience is contrived for each, one might expect a subject to 
report discontinuities. Schechter puts the question: ‘why don’t they say things like: “moments 
ago I saw a boat, but now that’s gone, and instead I see a fork; no – wait, there’s the boat 
again”’ (Schechter, 2012, p.219). In fact, this is an unlikely response, given that each 
hemisphere would not be aware of the other’s perceptions. (In the story given, there is no 
observer in a position to see the boat change to the fork and back again.) On the other hand, 
one might expect them to report a jerky, discontinuous experience, as the subject switches 
from one to the other, depending on whether she is asked to focus on the function, or the 
 
28 This is not unlike the imagined situation in Dan Dennett’s well-known story ‘Where am I?’, in which on-line 




emotional response to the object shown. If a clock is built-in as part of the paradigm, she 
might report a certain ‘gappiness’ in her experience. 
Bayne concedes he is not sure he has a lock-down answer to this point, but defends 
his thesis by saying that there are several other occasions where other neurologically 
compromised subjects can be quite unaware of radical changes to the contents of their 
consciousness – he offers achromatopsia, in which subjects fail to realise they have lost the 
experience of colour; another example might be unilateral neglect, so it is not unusual to find 
patients unaware of deficits or changes in their perceptual experience. This of course does not 
meet the objection head-on, and Schechter makes the point that this would put the split brain 
phenomenon on a par with, and essentially no different from, other disorders of attention, and 
fails properly to deal with the charge that, if a switch model does indeed imply that there 
would be gaps in experience, then we might expect the subject to comment on it. 
 
The switch model and psychology in the split brain. 
Schechter makes another point which we must amplify. If the two hemispheres preserve a 
unity as Bayne contends, we might expect little or no psychological difference between the 
two hemispheres, as far as we can detect it. But there is a psychological difference, and the 
idea of disunited hemispheric consciousness is rather better able to account for psychological 
difference than unity. Schechter puts it thus: ‘There is evidence that they have different 
emotional propensities, access to different memories, perhaps even long term dreams and 
goals in life’ (Schechter, 2012 p.219). Even Bayne himself concedes that ‘split-brain patients 
may have distinct RH and LH self-conceptions’ (Bayne, 2010, p.196). Some evidence for this 
is given in Schiffer et al (1998), a study in which a Split Brain patient AA was asked 
emotionally sensitive questions, and required to respond with his hands, hidden by a screen, 
by touching pegs in a row, indicating how he felt about the issue. AA gave significantly 
different answers to emotionally sensitive questions, to those given verbally. Other studies 
have been able to detect differences between the hemispheres on the question of belief in 
God, or favourite colour. McGilchrist devotes the whole of the first half of his book (The 
Master and his Emissary 2009) to asymmetries in function, processing and cognitive 
differences, and so on, between the two hemispheres. Arguably, it is easier to account for this 
psychological distinctness, by assuming a disunified inner experience.  
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Perhaps more tellingly, in Schechter’s view, what the switch model implies is that 
there is no important psychological distinction between consciousness in the split brain 
subject and in anyone else. ‘[It suggests] there is a single stream of consciousness per human 
being, any human being, realized dynamically in the brain, and what you are conscious of 
depends upon the outcome of a competition for attentional resources. So, [the switch model 
seems to promise] there is no genuine psychological puzzle of split brain consciousness’ 
(Schechter, 2012, pp.220-1). 
But, as she goes on – there is a psychological difference, and there is a problem of 
accounting for that difference, and the switch model seems to recognise neither. 
The switch model and JW 
Lastly, in a section defending the duality model, Schechter notes that the split-brain 
experiments identified different responses in the left and right hemispheres, but without 
determining that the hemispheres were simultaneously, separately conscious, and if the 
switch model was to be defeated, ‘it would be nice to find some cases in which right and left 
hemisphere conscious events were simultaneously manifested’. On this view, the case 
mentioned above, of Gazzaniga’s patient, JW, seems to provide just the kind of case 
Schechter needs. JW seems to be briefly aware of two different shapes, and then each 
hemisphere, controlling the different hands, can draw the shapes without difficulty. ‘It was as 
if two people were present, one guiding each hand with absolutely no interference from the 
other’, notes Gazzaniga. Van Gulick makes a similar point, without using the example of 
Gazzaniga’s JW, arguing that the split-brain patients seem capable of carrying out 
independent and contrary actions with their right and left hands at the same time, each of 
which is complex and non-habitual to a degree that would indicate conscious control rather 
than control by a “zombie system” according to Bayne’s own criteria. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that collectively, these empirical cases concerning split brains put a question mark 
against the Unity Thesis, and the switch model. 
 
The switch model and attention 1 
In a separate paper. Prinz makes a short but telling point (Prinz 2013) ‘[If consciousness 
depends on attention, that means that, in the switch model interpretation of the split brain 
experiments] attention is shifting from one hemisphere to another. This is empirically 
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implausible’. Here is why. In the split brain studies, patients are presented with two stimuli 
simultaneously – one to each hemisphere - and they successfully respond to both. ‘The 
stimuli in [the] studies are usually presented for 150 milliseconds, and while attention can 
switch in as little as 60 ms, usually attention doesn’t shift as quickly as that. When staring at 
an unchanging stimulus, attention often remains fixed by about three seconds […] Even a 
saccade to a suddenly appearing stimulus takes about 200 ms to initiate’ (Prinz, 2013, p.221). 
His point is that there is not enough time for consciousness to shift between hemispheres in 
the experiments, and so the switch model is unlikely as an explanation of unified behaviour in 
the cases. There are signs that Bayne has anticipated this line of attack and he may reply that 
this argument is predicated on the idea that there are two attentional systems that the split 
brain patient switches between. The evidence for this is uncertain. Indeed, he boxes himself 
in when he argues: ‘some attentional systems remain unified in the split-brain’ (Bayne 2010, 
p216). He goes on, rather less convincingly: ‘it is possible that these systems play an 
important role in ‘shuttling’ consciousness between hemispheres as and when required.’ 
Sadly, this remains undeveloped.  
 
The switch model and attention 2 
There is a further collision between Bayne and his critics on the question of attention. Again, 
he opens the flank himself – ‘Given the intimate connection between attention and 
consciousness, surely attentional disunity in the split brain constitutes strong evidence for 
phenomenal disunity’ (Bayne, 2010, p.214-5). Bayne concedes that there is some evidence 
for split brain patients having independent attentional systems. He and Schechter cite the 
same papers in support. But after consideration of papers pointing in a different direction, 
Bayne declares: ‘I am not sure there is any tidy story to tell. […] At the very least, split-brain 
patients do not have two attentional systems’ (Bayne, 2010, p.216; emphasis in original). 
It is easy to reach a different conclusion, which indeed Schechter does. There is 
evidence that the corpus callosum itself plays a role in creating a unified spatial attentional 
system, and once severed, it can no longer provide the neurological basis for a unified 
attentional system. How the switch model is grounded in neuroanatomy remains a problem.  
We have examined the case for unity and the hard case that Bayne suggests is the 
most likely counterexample to unity of consciousness. We will turn now to a line of criticism 
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which presents a different hard case, one not considered at all by Bayne. This is the 
suggestion that in cases of synaesthesia, there is a phenomenal superunity. 
 
Synaesthesia as a challenge to the Unity contention? 
In brief, synaesthesia is a condition some have in which the subject engages in some act of 
perception, and is successful in doing so, but at the same time she/he also experiences 
something extra. Sounds can be accompanied by tastes, or by colours, tastes can be 
accompanied by feelings, and in the most common version, letters and digits can induce 
unexpected experiences of colour. The many different variants make generalising difficult, 
but for the purposes of this section, we can mostly concentrate on this ‘grapheme-colour’ 
synaesthesia, which constitutes about 66% of all cases (Cytowic and Eagleman p.24). This is 
a form of synaesthesia known as ‘projective’ – in which colours are projected upon objects, 
or items in the visual field, or sometimes to nowhere geographically specific29. Another type 
of synaesthesia is ‘associative’, where colours, or other unexpected perceptual experiences 
are associated with nothing that one could say is part of the perceptual field – thus some 
synaesthetes might describe a day of the week as being associated with a colour.  
  Recent developments in brain scanning (fMRI) and testing have made the study of 
synaesthesia more respectable, and case studies are starting to feature in the thinking of 
philosophers of perception, and neurologists. There is still debate about whether the 
additional experiences are illusory or perceptually veridical, but there is no question that the 
subjects themselves are often highly consistent in their claims to have experiences; these 
experiences are ones they cannot ‘turn off’ at will, the experiences are not the product of 
some early associative learning (Gray in Robertson and Sagiv, 2005), and there are studies in 
which the colour experience improves the discriminatory performance of subjects – for 
example the ‘pop-out’ effect (see Blake et al in Robertson and Sagiv, 2005). Illustrating this 
last point is a study now almost regarded as a clinical test for synaesthesia – a subject (with 
the grapheme-colour variant) is shown a matrix of 5s with a triangle of 2s embedded in it. 
 
29 Some report that they experience the concurrent (colour experience)  as transparent, and as being 
located just on top of the inducer grapheme’s true colour. (..) Other participants report that they 
experience the concurrent as an after-image floating some distance above the grapheme. Often the 
language used by subjects is confused: Thus, FS, quoted by Brogaard (2012), ‘The colours are not out 
there [..] I think it’s related to imagery. It feels like imagining something has a colour. But I am not 
just imagining it. I think it’s perceptual. The phenomenology is sensory.’  
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Control subjects find it hard quickly to find the triangle, but because synaesthetes see the 5s 
as one colour, and the 2s as another, the triangle of 2s ‘pops out’ and can be quickly 
identified (see illustration below). Other subjects find that synaesthesia facilitates memory, 
(see Cytowic, 2011, p.80) to the point where subjects have extraordinary powers of 
recollection. This paper will proceed on the basis that synaesthetes really do have the 
experiences they claim to have, and are not suffering an illusion; enough brain-imaging 
studies point in this direction. ‘Projectors’ show increased activity in the brain’s colour 
regions (V4/V8) when looking at graphemes (Simner 2012). 
 
Bayne is silent on the phenomenon of synaesthesia, and one explanation might be that 
he does not consider it a challenge to the unity thesis as he has framed it. Recall that it is 
phenomenal unity that he is focussed on: ‘a subject has a unified consciousness iff at a certain 
time t, every one of their conscious states is unified with every other. [..] The total state will 
capture what it is like to be the subject in question’ (Bayne, 2010, p.12). He might therefore 
say: in the case of the consistent synaesthete, the visual experience of the number 5 is unified 
with a (veridical/illusory, but consistent) visual experience of the colour green. The fact that 
it is hard for the non-synaesthetic normal to imagine what that is like is neither here nor there 
– there clearly is something it is like for the synaesthete to experience the two together. In 
this way, he may consider that synaesthesia is not a challenge. However, there are some 
observations which make it worthwhile discussing the condition. The first point I propose to 




Synaesthesia and representationalism. 
At the outset of his book, Bayne (2010, p.12) stipulates: ‘We want a [unity] thesis that might 
capture the thought that the simultaneous experiences of a single subject must bear some kind 
of unity relation to each other.’ The unity he is committed to is phenomenal unity, wherein 
the unity, or the overall phenomenal field, is understood as what-it-is-like to be the person in 
question at that point. Recognising, perhaps, that this might not be entirely satisfactory, he 
explores the question that this might be captured by appealing to the representational content 
of phenomenal states. ‘Experiential states don’t merely have a phenomenal character, or 
‘what-it-is-likeness’, they also possess representational content’ (Bayne, 2010, p.47). 
A little further into the chapter he says: ‘I will adopt the claim that the phenomenal 
character of consciousness can be fully captured by appeal to the propositional contents of 
representational states’ and: ‘[It ought to be possible] to analyse phenomenal unity in terms of 
relations between the representational contents of unified states.’ 
Bayne declares he is following a number of other philosophers in making these 
claims, and the wider commitment to representationalism. However, he does face a difficulty 
in being attached to his specific version. It may be claimed that synaesthesia presents a 
difficulty that other positions in the Philosophy of Mind may have to deal with, including 
ones opposed to Bayne’s wider position. We may find that the dissociative condition in 
question again requires us to think about the theory and concepts to be adopted. 
Representationalism takes many forms and as we note, is a position in its broadest 
form which can be endorsed by philosophers of mind from many different commitments. In 
that broadest form it is the view that mental states can be understood as representing outer 
objects, or be about them in some sense. This much is shared by Chalmers (2010), Bayne 
(2010), Rosenthal (2005), Gennaro (2012), but it is just the point at which their versions of 
representationalism diverge. Unsurprisingly, Chalmers and Bayne subscribe to a version of 
representationalism which is non-reductive – that is, they hold that phenomenal properties 
(the qualitative character of some mental states) ‘are identical to representational properties, 
where these cannot be understood without appeal to phenomenal notions’ (Chalmers, 2010, 
p.350). Other philosophers see representationalism as the first stage in a reductivist or 
naturalistic account of consciousness. If consciousness can be explained in representational 
terms, and if representation can then be explained by neurology, then we can hope for a 
complete account of consciousness in naturalistic terms. Here, I hold that synaesthesia 
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presents difficulties, but perhaps more for the non-reductive version of representationalism 
than the latter. 
The specific form of representationalism endorsed by Bayne is a ‘weak’ version rather 
than strong, where weak representationalism is the claim that ‘the phenomenal character of 
consciousness can be fully captured by appeal to the propositional contents of 
representational states.’ This is distinct from strong representationalism according to which 
phenomenal states just are those representational states. This commitment to weak 
representationalism is a view shared by Chalmers (2004).  
As we have already noted, any conscious states which might lack representational 
content are a challenge to this position; these would be ‘phenomenological danglers’ to use 
his own term, (Bayne, 2010, p.51), and any failures in the representational account should be 
taken as ‘diagnostic of failures of phenomenal unity’ (Bayne, 2010, p.72). 
If the following argument works, I maintain that it concerns representational unity 
only. Insofar as it does work, in Bayne’s terms, the danglers are diagnostic of the failure of 
phenomenal unity, rather than being outright refutations. To pose a threat, however, we have 
to establish whether concurrent synaesthetic experiences represent anything or nothing. That 
being said, we turn now to synaesthesia as a possible example of a phenomenal dangler. 
The problem posed by synaesthetic experiences is this: in the case of the green 
concurrent ‘hovering above’ the inducer number 5s – the experience of the 5 can be said to 
have representative content, but it is much harder to say what the experience of green in this 
situation represents. One way of spelling out the argument is captured by Brogaard (2015). 
She is committed to a version of representationalism which works on the premise that the 
character of an experience is constituted by the properties of the objects experienced, and so 
she gives a definition thus:  
If E consciously and visually represents o as F, then visually attending to o regularly 
and non-deviantly causes a visual appearance of o being F.  
She argues that: the experiences of the projector synaesthetes ‘involve a property that is not 
represented as being instantiated by objects.’ Take, for example a subject who has a visual 
experience as of a brownish orange volume in front of a grapheme R printed in black on a 
page. It never occurs to her that the grapheme is brownish orange. ‘It follows from [the 
definition], that there is no property F instantiated by the grapheme that regularly and non-
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deviantly causes her concurrent experience. So her experience does not represent the 
grapheme as instantiating brownish orange [..] so the phenomenology of projector 
synaesthesia is not exhausted by its representational content’ (Brogaard, 2015, p.8). 
On this reading of representationalism, synaesthesia presents a challenge; the 
concurrent experiences are phenomenological danglers. This in turn threatens Bayne’s claim 
that ‘phenomenal unity can be analysed in terms of relations between representational 
contents of unified states’ (Bayne, 2010, p.48). Bayne already concedes that danglers such as 
boredom, nausea, or certain moods, - states whose phenomenal character outruns 
representational character – might be less easy to set aside than he imagines, and if 
synaesthesia joins them, we have an additional reason to doubt whether phenomenal 
character can be captured by appeal to the propositional content of representational states, as 
Bayne claims. On boredom, he admits that, ‘if the experience of boredom has intentional 
objects, then its objects are not ‘open to view’ in the way that those of perception, imagery or 
bodily sensations are.’ Elsewhere, he seems committed to a kind of ‘object-
representationalism’ (Bayne, 2010, p.10), so the line of attack that Brogaard makes has 
purchase here. 
There are possible lines of defence, however, which may not involve the kind of 
representationalism Bayne is committed to. We might pursue the line advanced by Tye 
(2000) – recognising that, in the case of indiscriminable hallucinations, there may not be 
objects which our experiences represent. According to his version, the properties which 
constitute the character of an experience are indeed the properties of objects, but may not 
necessarily be properties that are currently being instantiated by objects. Instead, they are 
properties that the experience represents as being instantiated30. This version of 
representationalism would allow that the synaesthetic colour could be represented as being 
present, but not as a colour belonging to the object. This however, is not the situation as 
described by synaesthetes, who all say that their occurrent colour ‘belongs’ to the object 
experienced. It is not clear, in any event, that this version of representationalism is one which 




30 I owe this distinction to William Fish (2010)  
157 
 
Synaesthesia, representationalism and supervenience 
There is a second claim which Bayne appears to endorse, and which is an implication of 
representationalism – ie that a subject’s phenomenal states supervene on her representational 
states. In other words, there would be no phenomenal change/difference without a 
representational change/difference (Bayne, 2010, p.69). 
In synaesthesia studies, it has been shown that, although the relevant inducer does not 
change, there is not always consistency in the synaesthetic experience generated. Evidence 
comes in a study of Cassidy C (Cytowic, 2011, pp.68-70) – ‘when Cassidy C encountered the 
word ‘phthalocyanine’ his synaesthetic colour experience was determined by the word’s 
individual letters. However, upon learning that phthalocyanine is the name of a vivid blue-
green pigment used in paint, his synaesthetic experience became quite different. Those letters 
which once had a red or pink experience attached, were suddenly projecting blue. The colours 
of the letters of the word ‘synaesthesia’ appeared differently to him when the word as a whole 
was encountered.  
Ramachandran and Hubbard presented a stimulus involving an ambiguous letter as 
per the picture below. The figure can be seen as either an H or an A. When flanked by T, E it 
is read as an H, and when flanked by C, T, it is read as an A. When the synaesthete subject 
read the first she saw the ambiguous letter as an H and had the concurrent experience of the 
colour blue; when she read the second, she saw the letter as an A, and had the concurrent 




A final example. In the figure below, a Five composed of threes. When two synaesthetes 
were shown this, they reported that their concurrent experiences flickered backwards and 





The point here is this: according to the principle of supervenience in this connection, there 
should be no phenomenal change without a change in representation. But there would appear 
to be no change in the object represented, - the ambiguous letter remains as it is, equally the 
figure above, but there is a change in the phenomenology of the subject. This would again 
appear to create difficulties for Bayne’s position – the phenomenology is detached from the 
object represented.  
We can find the same problem applicable to Chalmers’ position here. In a densely 
argued chapter of Chalmers 2010 (The Representational Character of Experience), Chalmers 
argues for an identity between phenomenal properties and representational properties of a 
certain kind, admitting that the only obstacle to this identification is the possibility that two 
distinct phenomenal properties might correspond to the same representational property. He 
writes: ‘This will happen if two perceptual experiences in different modalities [a visual 
experience and an auditory experience] could have the same content. [It would also happen] 
if two phenomenally distinct experiences in the same modality [two visual experiences, for 
example] could have the same content’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.347). In this context, the content 
of a representation is to be understood as given by what it is the representation concerns.  
Chalmers confesses: ‘It is not clear whether any of these cases can arise’. In the case 
of the first, he writes: ‘One might argue that a visual experience and an auditory experience 
might have the same content, perhaps representing the fact that there is an object on one’s 
left. In this case, it is far from clear that such states can have the same specific 
representational content, which is what is needed for a counterexample to equivalence’ 
(Chalmers, 2010, p.348).  
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It is the view of this thesis that just the kind of example needed here is provided by 
synaesthetic cases. A substantial minority of synaesthetic cases are sound-to-colour cases, 
constituting 33% of all types presenting, with Liszt, Rimsky-Korsakov, Sibelius and 
Messiaen all as exemplars. In all such cases, with the playing of a certain note or chord, a 
concurrent experience of colour, a visual experience, is occasioned.  
On the second issue, ie: ‘It is not easy to come up with specific cases of phenomenally 
distinct visual experiences with the same content’, again, cases from synaesthesia studies 
provide telling and obvious examples. Cytowic and Eagleman (2011) cite a particularly good 
example – a subject, presented with a 5 comprised of smaller (black) 2s (not unlike the figure 
immediately above), had a concurrent perception of a red composite 5 if the subject focussed 
on the 2s composing the 5, and a concurrent perception of a green composite 5 if the subject 
attended to the figure that the 2s composed. In this case, one might argue that the content of 
the experience was the black figure as described, but we have a subject whose phenomenal 
experiences were phenomenally distinct, and who could shift between red and green as 
attention was shifted.  
Both Bayne and Chalmers are evidently committed to positions which track 
phenomenal properties with representational properties. The purpose of Bayne’s version is to 
work towards an analysis of phenomenal unity in terms of representational unity. The 
purpose of Chalmers’ version is to ground intentionality in consciousness, without allowing 
for a version of representationalism that paves the way for reduction. It is clear from a 
reading of their work that they neither of them yet consider synaesthesia worthy of 
incorporation into their thinking, as the condition does not feature at all in their arguments. 
Because of this absence, it is not clear that they cannot accommodate it with appropriate 
changes.  
It is also unclear whether a reductive form of representationalism is not also troubled 
by synaesthesia. It is not easy to weave through the bewildering varieties of 
representationalism on offer, but the issue is addressed generally by Wager (1999). He makes 
the position clear: the reductive representationalist must give an account of phenomenal 
properties which explains them in terms of properties of the external objects giving rise to 
them. In the case of a coloured-hearing synaesthete who has a synaesthetic visual concurrent 
of redness on hearing Middle C, this is a problem, since an objective account of Middle C 
requires Middle C to ‘possess integrated reflectance properties’, which of course, it does not 
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(Wager, 1999, p.274). There are some responses to this, but it is not clear that they rescue a 
reductive representationalism. Brogaard suggests that if synaesthetes ‘perceive the inducer as 
instantiating the concurrent, then the perceptual experience probably ought to be taken to 
represent the inducer as instantiating the concurrent’ (Brogaard 2014). But of course the 
inducer/object doesn’t actually have the (concurrent) property in question, so the experience 
has to be counted as illusory.  
Torin Alter also contends that synaesthesia does not undermine representationalism 
(Alter 2006), but does so in a way flatly at variance with Wager. The core of the argument he 
presents is built on the case of DS, who is a sound/vision synaesthete. DS is someone who, 
when stimulated by sounds, also has concurrent visual experiences of shapes. Alter objects: 
‘[..] why couldn’t DS’s experiences also represent shapes? I see no basis for inferring from 
(a) DS’s experiences represent sounds to (b) these experiences do not represent shapes. 
Further, it seems intuitively plausible that DS’s visual experiences represent shapes’ (Alter, 
2006, p.5). Alter repeats the testimony of DS in support: ‘The shapes are not distinct from 
hearing; they are part of what hearing is […] that’s what the sound is; it couldn’t possibly be 
anything else.’ Alter would again be defending a version of representationalism in which a 
subject experiences a stimulus which can in no way be said to be spatially extended, but 
which has a concurrent experience of something which is. In spite of DS’s testimony, it is 
hard to reconcile this with any kind of representationalism that would fit neatly into a 
reductive account of perception. It would seem such an account would need to defend 
diaphanousness – the subject would, ideally need to ‘see through the experience’ to the 
property of an object, or some other distal property: in DS’s case, to the sound of Middle C 
for his concurrent experience. This does not seem to capture what is happening in 
synaesthesia cases. 
Short of a Brogaard-inspired account in which it is claimed that the concurrent is an 
illusion, it might therefore be contended that synaesthesia, like the other conditions in this 
thesis, prompts a reconsideration of concepts in the field, but a fuller discussion of the debate 






Synaesthesia and the neurological evidence. 
We must return to the difficulties posed by synaesthesia for Bayne, and we turn now to an 
argument from the neurological evidence from synaesthesia studies. Bayne defends his 
approach to consciousness as being holistic– an approach which seems central to his unity 
thesis. Holists, he claims, ‘hold that the components of the phenomenal field are conscious 
only as the components of that field. [They] deny that there are any independent conscious 
states that need to be bound together to form a phenomenal field’ (Bayne, 2010, pp.225 et 
seq). 
Bayne dismisses the atomistic approach on grounds that their position requires a 
mechanism which binds together the ‘atoms of consciousness’ - a mechanism which the 
holistic approach does not need to posit. Such a mechanism would be responsible for binding 
together the elements of consciousness, but Bayne claims there is little evidence of its 
existence. ‘If there were such a mechanism, we would expect it occasionally to malfunction, 
with the result that the subject would be left with phenomenal fragments, (un-integrated into 
phenomenal wholes.) To the best of my knowledge neuropsychology furnishes us with no 
examples of phenomenal fragmentation.  [..] there are no syndromes in which the 
phenomenal unity of consciousness breaks down’ (Bayne, 2010, p.236-237).  
Here, my claim is that synaesthesia is a candidate for phenomenal fragmentation. To 
begin with, it challenges Bayne’s analysis of phenomenal unity (see above), - we can argue 
that the phenomenal extra (the greenness) is a stray, not connected to the object (the 5) 
represented. Studies of the syndrome have more to say in the subject of atomism. The 
neurological/fMRI evidence coming in from studies of grapheme-colour synaesthesia suggest 
that it is caused by cross-activation between adjacent brain regions – the LH fusiform gyrus, 
which is linked to word processing, and the V4 colour area. (Ramachandran and Hubbard in 
Robertson and Sagiv, 2005). It is still entirely possible that other, even more exotic forms of 
synaesthesia might be the result of such cross-activation, since there are connections between 
areas of the brain more geographically remote from each other. But one particular study is of 
interest. Ramachandran and Hubbard asked some synaesthesia subjects to report their 








Fixating on the cross at the centre, it is easy to see and identify the number 5 on the left hand 
side, even if not looking at it. The number 5 on the right hand side, however, is ‘crowded’ 
with number 2s, and much less easy to see and identify. Control volunteers are at chance 
identifying this number, when the display is shown. Synaesthetic subjects however, gave a 
different account. The first question was – did they see the number as coloured? (and did the 
colour rescue the number from the crowding effect?) Synaesthetes did indeed perform better 
than controls. But, As Ramachandran and Hubbard comment, ‘the really exciting part came 
when we asked subjects about their experience. Instead of saying that they saw the number, 
and then the colour, [..] they said “I did not see the middle number – it was fuzzy. But it 
looked red so I guessed it must be a 5.” This suggests they were not consciously registering 
the number as a number, but it was nonetheless being processed somewhere in the brain at an 
unconscious level.’ 
This can be presented as another example of ‘zombie systems’ perception, - systems 
that operate on the basis of unconscious representations - and even more tellingly, it seems to 
show that the processing of the number, in the fusiform gyrus takes place, and evokes the 
appropriate colour early in the sequence of sensory processing, and before the number itself 
is consciously perceived.  
This suggestion of there being different stages in sensory processing sits badly at odds 
with the holistic picture that Bayne advocates. Further evidence that the attributes of the 
visual world are processed at different speeds and with different pathways is provided by the 
work of Zeki, which will feature in the next section. In Zeki 2003, he claims that it has been 
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shown, for example, that colour is perceived before motion by about 80ms. Colour itself is 
processed after location, and location precedes orientation31.  
The robust identification of atoms, or composite parts, of experience is a difficulty for 
Bayne. He throws down a last gauntlet (Bayne, 2010, p.248). ‘The real pressure on atomism 
derives from the fact that conscious states occur as the components of a single phenomenal 
field. How might atomism account for the phenomenal unity of consciousness? They can 
deny that consciousness is unified […] but this flies in the face of introspection.’ But even if 
we discount the evidence from synaesthesia, Prinz points out that this cannot be challenged: 
disunity can never be introspected, since attending to two stimulus features to see whether 
they are unified would unify them. We are faced with a refrigerator light illusion – unity is 
always present simply because it is present when we look for it (Prinz 2013). 
In synaesthesia then, we find amongst other things, evidence working against the holism of 
the unity thesis.  
 
Synaesthesia and Access Disunity 
The Unity Contention faces a second, more direct challenge from Synaesthesia. The line of 
attack is provided by Bayne himself (2010, ch 5), where he identifies the criteria by which we 
can evaluate the unity thesis: 
‘A [more potent] line of argument for phenomenal disunity concerns the uses to which a 
subject’s conscious states can be put. In general, the contents of a creature’s conscious states 
are available to the same range of cognitive and behavioural systems. But suppose we came 
across a subject who appeared to be in two conscious states at the same time (e1 and e2) 
where the contents of these two states were not available to the same systems of cognitive 
and behavioural consumption. It would be tempting to take this selective accessibility – this 
breakdown in access unity – as evidence that e1 and e2 were not phenomenally unified’ 
(Bayne, 2010, p.107). 
Clearly, what is understood as consuming systems in this context is central to whether 
synaesthesia provides us with a case of phenomenal disunity. Bayne is not altogether clear. 
 
31 This hierarchy of processing helps to explain the sequence of events as I remember them in the incident of the 
snake. I reacted to the processing of the shape (?) of the snake, before the whole thing was bound up together 
and brought to consciousness as a snake. 
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He gives two examples, suggesting that different experiences might be available for verbal 
report, or available for memory consolidation. He also discusses the problem of individuating 
consuming systems (Bayne, 2010, p.110) in a section in which he gives himself a line of 
retreat. In it, he makes it clear that he is thinking along the lines of systems identified as 
neuropsychological processes, which produce a specific behavioural response. He discussed 
the suggestion that such systems might be individuated by types of motor responses, but 
considers that there might not be a one-to-one relation between consuming systems and 
motor responses, as ‘a single consuming system might be implicated in multiple behavioural 
responses.’ He finally concludes that individuating systems is an empirical matter, but that 
arguments from access disunity are ‘hostage to fortune, for our current assumptions about the 
borders between consuming systems might be quite wide of the mark.’ As we advance our 
knowledge of cognitive and behavioural systems, we may find that what we once thought 
were two discrete consuming systems, might turn out to be linked in some way. It is the 
difficulty in individuation of consuming systems, and the possibility of future advances that 
gives him cover.  
  With such prefatory considerations in place, we may imagine that Bayne would agree 
that consuming systems might be individuated by neurological processes involved, by 
different cognitive accomplishments, especially if these were accompanied by different 
behavioural responses. If so, then the following empirical evidence taken from synaesthesia 
studies may provide us with evidence of access disunity and therefore phenomenal disunity.  
Firstly, there is now considerable neuro-imaging evidence that different brain areas 
are in involved in synaesthetic perception in the same modality. Thus, for those synaesthetes 
who have a concurrent experience of a colour, when triggered by seeing a number (colour-
graphemic synaesthesia), ‘[In synaesthetes] synaesthetic colours were associated with 
activation in area V4/V8 in the left hemisphere, whereas visually detected colours activated 
the corresponding areas in the right hemisphere’ (Triesman in: Robertson and Sagiv 2005, 
quoting Nunn et al 2002).32  
 
32 Interestingly, this study established that while the V4/V8 colour areas of the brain were activated 
during the synaesthetic experience, the primary visual cortex (V1) was not active, which on this one 




Evidence is still coming in, and the picture is confused by the wide variety of 
synaesthetic experiences, but we can conclude that it is likely that different and segregated 
consuming systems at the neurological level are responsible for synaesthetic and physical 
colour perception. This is even more likely to apply in synaesthetic cases where different 
sensory modalities are involved – for example in phoneme trigger – colour concurrent 
synaesthesia cases. In the same 2002 study by Nunn and colleagues, it was found that, for a 
spoken word trigger – concurrent colour case, spoken words, which would presumably have 
been processed by an auditory/neurological consuming system, was associated with brain 
activation in an area specialised for colour vision – an entirely separate consuming system.  
Thirdly, and lest it be argued that these cases do not involve separate consuming 
systems since they are commonly perceptual, there are synaesthetic cases where what 
distinguishes the consuming system in question is a role in interpretation or involves 
meaning. Cytowic and Eagleman (2009) discuss a case in which a phoneme trigger-colour 
concurrent synaesthete Cassidy C had a different colour experience of the word 
Phthalocyanine on learning that the chemical was a vivid blue-green pigment. The 
synaesthetic experience before the meaning of the word was learned, was of letters which 
were predominantly red or pink in colour. After the meaning was disclosed, the red and pink 
were replaced by blues, and the green became more pronounced in the synaesthetic 
experience. The case would suggest that the phoneme was processed by the usual visual 
consuming system, in both before and after cases, but at some point a different consuming 
system, one involving meaning, was involved in producing the concurrent. Recall again, the 
case of the ambiguous letters in the presentation below: 
 
Cytowic and Eagleman note - the middle letter is graphically identical in the two words, yet 
most synaesthetic (and non-synaesthetic) subjects will automatically interpret the first as an 
H, and the second as an A. in the case of the synaesthetes, however, a different colour 
concurrent is triggered according to the context. This would indicate that it is not the shape of 
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the letter on the retina that generates colour, but the consciously attended concept of the 
letter’ (Cytowic and Eagleman, 2011, p.75). 
In these cases, we may argue that there is one experience, e1, of the phoneme itself, 
alongside a second experience of colour, e2, which has been routed, not only through a 
discrete neurological area, but also through interpretive mechanisms.  
Finally, a case using the very example of a different consuming system provided by 
Bayne himself – memory consolidation. A number of studies have shown that memories are 
more easily formed and consolidated by the synaesthetic experience. Merikle et al (2002) 
found that, on showing a random matrix of numbers to a synaesthete, he could more readily 
memorise the numbers than non-synaesthetes because of the extra clue provided by the 
colour. Blake et al tell the story of WO who ‘relies on his colours for remembering technical 
terms as well as for recalling telephone numbers’ (in Robertson and Sagiv, 2005, p.48). But 
all of these cases are trumped by that of Daniel Tammet, who combines his synaesthesia with 
other conditions, but who has a prodigious power of memory as a by-product of him having 
concurrent sensations of colour, shape and feel, with numbers. He can, for example, recite the 
expansion of pi to 22,514 digits. (see Baron Cohen 2007, Bor et al 2008, and Matey in 
Bennett and Hill 2014). In Tammet’s case, V4 is not activated by the visual presentation of 
numbers and Bor et al conclude that he has a rarer, more conceptual form of synaesthesia.  
Hupe (2012) had similar results to the Tammet case with a further study, concluding 
that, in some cases, synaesthetic colour experience lies not in the brain's colour system, but 
instead the area of activation is more distributed, over the right retrosplenial cortex, as 
opposed simply to V4/V8. This cortex make it an ‘ideal candidate region to explain various 
synaesthetic associations [..since] it has functional and anatomical links with the memory 
system [..] and is involved in emotion processing’ (Hupe 2012, p.1631). This difference 
between the neurologists in locating the area of activation provides no comfort for Bayne, 
since it is clear synaesthesia involves a consuming system or systems beyond that simply of 
perception.  
In these cases, it may be that the consuming systems are not separate or distinct, but 
singular, complex and hard to individuate, in the way that Bayne anticipated. But more likely, 
the cases are evidence of different experiences associated with distinct consuming systems, 
neurologically, and psychologically, involving not just perception and concept interpretation, 
but also memory formation and recall, producing interesting behavioural responses. On this 
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account, synaesthesia provides an example of access disunity and phenomenal disunity. Tied 
together with other observations suggesting that synaesthetic experiences are 
phenomenological danglers, we may conclude that, at the very least, Bayne must 
acknowledge and find some way to meet the challenge of synaesthesia. We now turn to a 
fuller treatment of the challenge to the unity thesis presented by those who lean towards 
atomism. 
 
Bayne’s holism, and the case for atomism. 
Bayne observes that the distinction between holism and atomism in their approach to 
consciousness is one which cuts across established positions on consciousness, but that 
‘atomistic accounts of consciousness are at odds with the unity thesis, and (recommends) that 
we should adopt a holistic conception’ (Bayne, 2010, p.228). An atomist would assume that 
the phenomenal field is comprised of discriminable contributory features, which are 
independently conscious, while a holist would hold that components of that field are 
conscious only as part of that field (Bayne, 2010, p.225). Bayne, unsurprisingly, nails his 
colours to the holist mast. His commitment to holism has a methodological implication – ‘a 
holist will recommend a top-down methodology’ (Bayne, 2010, p.226). He does not say so, 
but this approach makes an assumption of unity as he has defined it, and is clearly 
predisposed against the idea of unconscious perception, or dissociable modules of 
consciousness which are the focus of this work. Such a presumption would start from the 
premise that there are no phenomenal ‘danglers’, or fragments. At the very least a holist 
would be disposed to resist the empirical evidence for them.  
In debating the case for holism, Bayne asserts that, (if an atomistic picture is right), 
perceptual features – colour, motion, shape and so on, ‘ought to be capable of independent 
existence within the stream of consciousness, and that doesn’t seem to be the case’ (Bayne, 
2010, p.233). 
Going further, he claims that, for atomism to work, there needs to be a binding 
mechanism which can bring together the constituent units of phenomenal experience for there 
to be a unified consciousness, but that many atomists seem reluctant to posit such a 
mechanism. Moreover, there is little evidence of its existence. A few pages later: ‘what we 
know about the role played by local neural activity in the generation of consciousness does 
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not provide any support for atomism’ (Bayne, 2010, p.241). Accordingly, he makes the claim 
that: ‘we should regard total states as the basic units of consciousness’ (ibid p.244). 
It is the view of this thesis that, the more we have come to understand the 
dissociations studied, and the neurology involved, the more we have come to identify the 
functionally specific regions of the brain, and their interactions – inhibition, excitation, 
feedback, feedforward etc, the more we might need to revise our philosophical concepts. 
Blindsight would appear to provide us with excellent evidence of the dissociability of all 
these aspects. To add to the list already given, Carlson (2013, p.4) gives an example of how a 
patient, protesting his blindness after a stroke, was nevertheless able to orient his hand to a 
cane presented in his blind field. GY was able to point in the direction a moving light 
stimulus was projected. The emotional valence of faces was correctly registered etc. Bayne 
does claim that ‘there is in general no perceptual experience prior to feature binding’ (Bayne, 
2010, p.233) but this can only resist the evidence above if we understand experience always 
to be conscious.  
To make this clear, the Unity of Consciousness makes a claim about the basic unit of 
consciousness as already composite – as a quilt, to use Bayne’s metaphor (ibid p.244), but 
that this is the basic unit of consciousness, and nothing is prior to it. This thesis takes the 
view that this picture of the structure of consciousness has more evidence against it than 
Bayne is ready to concede, and that the concept needs revising, indeed jettisoning.  
In fact we side with the view made by Zeki: [progress in finding the] “neural 
correlates of consciousness will remain elusive until we acknowledge that consciousness is 
not a unity” (Zeki, 2003, p.214). Instead, Zeki may be right to claim that there are multiple 
micro-consciousnesses that are distributed geographically in the brain, with different 
processing times.  
Neurology aside for a moment, it should be noted that Bayne himself provides us with 
no account of what it is that makes it the case that we are having a unified experience of 
seeing-and-tasting the wine. There appears to be nothing advanced to explain why we have a 
Kantian smooth and unified experience, instead of a Humean tumult. As Platchias asks: ‘Is it 
another intrinsic property of the (allegedly) essentially conscious mental states? In Bayne 
(and Chalmers’) view, it just seems to happen that one is having a unified experience: it is a 
happy coincidence’ (Platchias, 2011, p.89). This is an assumption at the heart of their 
position, and nothing has been advanced to argue it. If it is made, it would seem to be made 
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on the strength of introspection, and we have identified the weakness of that line of thinking. 
The lack of empirical support confirms the view throughout this thesis that the kind of 
dualism Bayne and Chalmers promote is at one remove from empirical confirmation.  
 
Zeki’s Microconsciousnesses 
Let us briefly make the case for distributed micro-consciousnesses. Zeki argues that the 
foundation for such a theory is to be found in the geographical and functional separation of 
areas of the brain specialising in different roles. The identification of such areas and their 
roles is not a matter of controversy, but of empirical fact. 
Working from a study of the visual system in the brain, Zeki reminds us of studies 
showing that there are recognisably different geographical areas responsible for motion (V5) 
and for colour (V4) in the brain. ‘A lesion to one area does not invade or disable the 
perceptual territory of the other’ (Zeki, 2003, p.214). And so, a lesion to V5 produces 
akinetopsia, while still being able to perceive colour, and a lesion to V4 produces 
achromatopsia, while still being able to see and be conscious of motion. Zeki argues that each 
system is a distinct micro-consciousness which needs to be bound or integrated into a whole, 
and it is this binding that leads to the conscious experience – or, ‘what-it-is-like’. (This study 
focusses on the visual system; a wider study (Koch 2016) summarises the different ways 
lesions to the brain can affect cognitive performance, and produce disabilities of a specific 
character, each identifying candidates for micro-consciousnesses. Many of these have 
featured in this thesis33.) 
Zeki’s claim is that these two mechanisms are features in a hierarchy of 
consciousness, which culminates, at its highest level, in unified consciousness, but that it is 
essential these micro-consciousnesses are recognised as prior to unified consciousness, or we 
cannot make any progress in neuroscience.  
 
33 There is some comfort for Bayne in this recent (2016) article. A candidate for the location in the 
brain in which constituent units of consciousness could be brought together and fashioned into a 
unity, as per the atomistic picture, was the fronto-parieto cortices. Koch et al suggest that other more 
recent findings put this in doubt. While they now lean towards the ‘posterior cortical hot zone’, the 
truth of the matter is that there is still no confirmed location, and we may have to get used to the idea 
that, because of the complexity and interconnectedness of the brain, there may be more than one.  
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Bayne however, does have a reply, and while conceding that the neural mechanisms 
underpinning consciousness ‘are distributed across a multiplicity of cortical loci’ (Bayne, 
2010, p.239), he does not follow Zeki in concluding that this demonstrates the atomic 
structure of consciousness. In fact, he argues that the various systems are unconscious and are 
only manifest in consciousness once unified. The systems register different features (colour, 
shape, motion) and are bound together to produce the unity of experience, but that ‘there is in 
general no perceptual experience prior to feature binding’ (Bayne, 2010, p.233). 
Bayne allows the following replies: firstly, the atomist can simply deny that the atoms 
of consciousness are unified, and that the so-called unity of consciousness is no more than an 
illusion. (He sets this aside quickly, but we note that if introspection was the main reason for 
concluding that consciousness is unified, and if there are powerful reasons for thinking that 
introspection is unreliable, we may not want to dismiss this too quickly). The second reply 
available to the atomist is to posit some neural mechanism responsible for unifying the 
atomic elements of consciousness – to bind them together to bring them into the total 
phenomenal state of ‘what-it-is-like’. Bayne argues that the holists do not need to posit such a 
mechanism – it is not needed in their account. (Though note Platchias’ point above.) Bayne 
does remark, however, that ‘there is little evidence of the existence of a mechanism for 
binding, and that, if it did exist, we might expect it occasionally to malfunction, and produce 
phenomenal fragments’ – surviving atoms of consciousness no longer integrated into 
phenomenal wholes. And, to the best of his knowledge, studies across the realm of 
neuroscience have nowhere shown phenomenal fragmentation. While other forms of unity 
have broken down (we have explored problems for representational unity, for example), 
‘there are no syndromes in which phenomenal unity breaks down’ (Bayne, 2010, p.237). 
What kind of replies are open to those who lean towards Zeki’s position? Zeki himself 
makes two replies: firstly, raising the case of GY, one of our primary blindsight subjects – in 
GY, there is blindness, because of damage to V1, but there is also a ‘crude but conscious 
vision for fast moving high-contrast stimuli, perception of which is mediated by (direct 
access of information to) V5’ (Zeki, 2003, p.214). Zeki seems to argue that this is an atomic 
processing-perceptual site.  
(We might ourselves add: there need not be a single mechanism solely responsible for 
binding – there may be many, operating within a sensory modality, and between them. 
Bayne’s malfunction point seems to be reliant on there being a single mechanism only; if 
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there were several, then the malfunction of one may to some extent be compensated for by 
others.)  
Zeki’s second point is this: he claims that the processing of motion (in V5) and the 
processing of colour (in V4) is ‘significantly uncorrelated’ (because geographically distant, 
and distributed in time). He found, in conjunction with others (Moutoussis and Zeki 1997, 
Zeki and Bartels 1999) that, because of these distinctions, subjects consistently mis-bind 
colour perceived at time t to motion perceived at time t-1. ‘It follows that, over very brief 
time windows, the brain does not wait for each area to complete its processings, rather, it 
simply binds what has been processed and reached a perceptual level.’ Zeki goes on: ‘This in 
turn suggests strongly that binding is a post-conscious phenomenon’ (Zeki in Velmans and 
Schneider p.584). A further indication that binding might be post-conscious comes from 
experiments which demonstrate that the binding of colour to motion comes after the binding 
of colour to colour, or motion to motion (Bartels and Zeki 2006). This would again point to 
micro-consciousnesses at the level of elementary visual features.  
We might add the further replies: reflecting upon the claim that there are no examples 
of a breakdown in phenomenal unity, one is tempted to ask – how would we recognise such a 
breakdown if one were to happen – what would it be like to have such a disunity? There is an 
obvious point to make: if phenomenal unity is understood in terms of ‘what-it-is-like’ – if it is 
inseparably linked, it might make no sense to ask – ‘’what would it be like to have 
phenomenal disunity?’ But the reply might be – phenomenal disunity is a condition in which 
experiences are had sequentially, but not in parallel (I have the experience of drinking coffee 
and I have the experience of listening to music, but I do not have the experience of drinking-
coffee-and-listening-to-music-at-the-same-time.) The critic might reply – this may not be so 
very far from the truth. Resist the siren call of introspection as a testament of unity; the basic 
unit of consciousness is more atomic; we bind micro-consciousnesses into a macro-
consciousness of combined attributes; attention singles out macro-consciousness of attributes 
from a rich potential array of possible experiences. 
The exploration of various agnosias and pathological conditions we have made tends 
to endorse the position taken by Zeki insofar as each singles out registrations and processing 
short of full phenomenal consciousness, and for further progress in identifying neural 
correlates, it may indeed be wise to abandon the concept of the unity of consciousness, and 





It is this view that Bayne’s central contentions, which we began with: that all consciousness 
is phenomenal; that it is necessarily unified, and that we never have disunified experiences – 
struggles to hold up under challenge. The split-brain syndrome seems to provide evidence 
that consciousness can sometimes be disunified, and there is a case for saying that 
synaesthesia poses a different challenge, which he does not consider. Some recent 
developments in neuroscience, and studies in that field have posed further questions.  
In the view of this work, Bayne is right to consider the contribution of neuroscience, 
and empirical work to the study of consciousness – this is what makes his work so appealing. 
(For this reason, Prinz (2013) says it is easily the best thing that has been written on the 
subject.) But there remains a tension in his work: his concessions to the empirical seem 
generous, and the evidence for a contrary position mounts up, but he resists it on grounds 
which are not entirely convincing. This is especially so in his chapter on split brains. Further, 
introspection is still the deciding factor when considering what credibility to give to reports, 
and affords the primary intuition about unity. Although he admits that providing introspective 
justification for the unity thesis is ‘challenging’, (Bayne, 2010, p.92) ultimately, introspection 
is the main way in which we gain an insight into the structure of consciousness. His main 
motivation for the thesis is phenomenological: how things seem. Bayne admits that the 
inference from seeming unified to being unified is risky, but he makes it anyway.  
If we recall, one of Bayne’s original motivations for the unity contention, was to put a 
constraint upon certain theories of consciousness, and if we think his contention fails, then 
some of those theories come back into consideration. These would include: Higher Order 
Thought theories, Prinz’ attention-engendered AIR theory, or scientific theories looking for a 
neurological basis for consciousness.  
Higher order thought theories do at least give us an account of why, in normal cases, 
our experience appears structured and unified – As Platchias puts it: ‘It is plausible to suggest 
that having a higher order thought about these qualitative states smooths them out so they are 
not experienced as particulate or sporadic, but rather as ultimately homogenous and unified’ 
(Platchias, 2011, p.89). But before we consider other candidate theories, there is one further 




Ian Phillips and the exchange with Ned Block 
 
This thesis now turns to a third target – the campaign fought by Ian Phillips against the idea 
of unconscious perception in article and in conversation with Ned Block, during the 
development of this thesis (Phillips 2016, Block 2016, Block and Phillips in Nanay 2016, and 
Peters, Kentridge, Phillips and Block 2017). Phillips has emerged as a critic of the idea of 
unconscious perception in the tradition of Chalmers and Bayne, but in conversation resists 
being pigeonholed as a partisan in the wider debate over what lessons can be drawn from 
blindsight and the dissociations. Among several lines of criticism he explores, he picks up a 
line of thinking from Campion et al (1983) and forcefully argues that the experiments 
establishing a dissociation between function and experience are flawed by a common 
problem – the so-called problem of the criterion. In doing so, he is asking: is blindsight 
properly unconscious? In discussion of other candidate dissociations, he brings other 
criticisms to bear, raising the question whether they constitute perception according to the 
definition with which we plan to work. 
 As we recognise, Phillips resists being typed as a neo-cartesian, but his arguments are 
ones that might assist that cause, and, indeed he admits as much. In defending the view that 
the dissociations have a lesson to be accommodated by philosophy, we will look closely at 
Phillips’s articles and attempt to referee his debate with Block, with whom this thesis will 
have some sympathy. As is evident from the exchange, it is a skirmish in Block’s attempt to 
preserve his Phenomenal/Access Consciousness distinction.  
 Before we begin, a few prefatory comments. In this debate we will be dealing not 
with the definition of phenomenal character, or qualia, — the more fundamental questions we 
dealt with in previous chapters. In the chapter on Chalmers, we were at pains to make it clear 
that the target we were tilting at was the one Chalmers presents – the idea that perception 
necessarily involves phenomenal character, and the claim that the dissociations could not by 
that token have a bearing on this. In the questions Phillips raises, the issue is not closed off by 
this kind of definition, and centres on the notion of unconscious perception, as opposed to 
unconscious phenomenal character. As we explore it in this chapter, the issue will still be one 
of whether blindsight and other dissociations pose a problem for neo-cartesian philosophers. 
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At the outset, it would seem that the debate would be tractable empirically, but as we shall 
see, ultimately, the choice of definition is crucial. 
 Phillips adopts a definition of perception advanced by Burge (2010), who in turn 
borrows upon Kant (Burge, 2010, p.368, referring to the Critique of Pure Reason 
A320/B376). Phillips regards this as a suitable battleground on which to contest Block, since 
he maintains that Block himself adopts it, and it offers a number of lines of enquiry. We can 
set aside any consideration of the merits of the definition at this point (some have defended 
subjective representation as a definition of perception, but I do not think we need to pursue 
this.) 
 A careful look at the definition is a convenient place to start, since Burge himself 
considers it possible that blindsight may be regarded as one of a number of cases of 
unconscious perception within the definition as he presents it. To be clear, and for the 
purposes of his argument, Phillips largely accepts the definition, (at least at first) but then 
contests the view that unconscious perception is permissible within it. Let us in consequence 
identify the position taken by Burge in some detail – it is the battleground on which Phillips 
and Block both manoeuvre. 
 
Burge’s Definition of Perception 
Burge defines perception as constitutively a matter of ‘objective sensory representation by the 
individual’ (Burge, 2010, p.368). A case of perception must in consequence have objective 
content, and be attributable to an individual. There is a further question as to whether 
attribution to an individual means that the content is available to a central co-ordinating 
agency. Burge allows that subsystems, (for example, the visuo-motor system,) might 
perceive, but these would themselves be cases of the individual perceiving. An essential part 
of what it is for an individual to perceive is for that perception to be available such that 
individuals can ‘represent goals of, obstacles to, or threats to their activities and act 
accordingly’ (Burge, 2010, p.370).  
 For Burge, objectivity in perception is achieved by the exercise of perceptual 
constancies which are: ‘capacities systematically to represent a particular, or an attribute as 
the same despite significant variations in registration of proximal stimulation’ (Burge, 2010, 
p.408). Burge offers some examples: Size constancy in a visual system is the capacity to 
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represent the object’s size as the same, even as the stimulus from the object […] moves closer 
to or further away from the viewer. Shape constancy is a capacity to represent a given shape 
under various stimulus and perspectival conditions. A circular pattern can be seen as circular 
whether it is viewed head on or at an angle.’ I present this definition in some detail as it will 
be useful later.  
 Burge contends that, within this definition of perception, there might be unconscious 
cases of it. ‘There is considerable evidence that individuals, not merely subsystems, have 
unconscious perceptual states’ (Burge, 2010, p.374). ‘Blindsight patients perceive 
environmental conditions. The perception involves perceptual constancies […] The 
perception guides action. There is strong reason to believe that some of these patients lack 
phenomenal consciousness in the relevant perceptions.’ (There is clearly something of 
Block’s P-Consciousness and A-Consciousness distinction in this.) 
 As a reminder, Phillips accepts this Burgean starting point, but does not agree that it 
allows for unconscious perception – specifically that blindsight does not meet the conditions 
for perception – one of his complaints is that constancies are not involved. Other 
dissociations are addressed with different objections. One key question at issue will be the 
question of whether the definition of perception as something attributable to the individual 
necessarily involves a further feature – that the content of the perception is available to 
central co-ordinating agency.  
In summary, Phillips will raise some fundamental questions: First: if blindsight and 
the other dissociations are cases of unconscious perception, then they must be demonstrably 
cases of genuine perception, and second, they must be unequivocally unconscious. Block 
points out that establishing that either one of these conditions is met works against the other: 
‘the best evidence for a lack of consciousness would be if there was absolutely no effect on 
the visual system – but that would not be perception. (On the other hand) any effect on vision 
could be used by opponents to argue that visual registration was not really conscious’ (p. 10 
Block and Phillips 2016 on-line paper and now in (ed) Nanay 2016). 
 Phillips does not want to advance the idea of ‘unconscious perception’ as 
oxymoronic, (which he claims Campion et al do, when they argue that any kind of perceptual 
sensitivity is evidence that stimuli are conscious, and that therefore ‘all subjects in all studies, 
are by conventional criteria, aware of stimuli to some extent’ (see Campion et al, p.480)). To 
work with such a definition would be trivially to block any interpretation of dissociations as 
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unconscious perceptions. However, if ‘unconscious perception’ is not to be an oxymoron, 
then there must be some practical way in which each feature can be established as a feature 
of some case or condition. 
 As we shall find, Phillips addresses both questions, asking: are blindsight and other 
dissociations properly unconscious? And, do blindsight and other dissociations satisfy some 
definition of perception, and therefore – are they perception? To use his own terms: do they 
constitute perception of the same fundamental kind as that involved in ordinary perception.  
 In dealing with such matters, Phillips is of course raising important questions about 
what we mean by terms such as ‘consciousness’ and ‘perception’, but throughout the 
discussions he concedes that the questions can in principle be resolved empirically, and so 
empirical detail about the paradigms and the various dissociations – especially recent 
developments – is germane. Let us turn to the first of the two questions Phillips raises. 
 
Phillips and the problem of the Criterion: Are the examples of unconscious 
perception truly unconscious? 
The first issue that Phillips takes with the claim that blindsight etc are cases of unconscious 
perception is with the idea that they may not properly be cases of unconscious perception. As 
acknowledged above, this is a point first made in the Campion et al paper, although in that 
paper, it is not developed fully. The claim is briefly put thus: the fact that a blindsight subject 
reports that he did not see a stimulus, or has low confidence of seeing a stimulus, does not 
mean he had zero subjective experience of it. Some experience may therefore be the root 
cause of the response of the subject, and their protestations may not be relied upon.  
 Here is the detail of the argument: Borrowing from Green and Swets (1966) signal 
detection theory, (as Campion et al also do) a subject’s responses in any task of the kind 
explored by blindsight studies are determined by two things: first, the subject’s perceptual 
sensitivity to the stimulus, and secondly, their response criterion. The latter is the subject’s 
own threshold at which the subject is sufficiently aware, or sufficiently confident of the 





(In the diagram above the two curves are response distributions – one for ‘noise’ (i.e. no 
significant stimulus present) and the other for signal+noise (i.e. stimulus present). The line 
marked ‘Criterion’ is the threshold at which the individual subjectively identifies that a signal 
is present. d´ is a measure of the subject’s perceptual discriminability. The greater the 
distance depicted by d´, the more it is the case that the subject can identify the presence of the 
signal within the noise. The distance d is measured in multiples and fractions of standard 
deviation). 
 The problem advanced by Phillips is that this response criterion is subjectively 
decided, not fixed, and may be subject to manipulation. It is not and cannot be objectively 
located. The threshold at which a subject might begin to report a stimulus may be affected by 
factors such as fatigue, or preconceptions about the importance of the trial, or how the subject 
sees the importance placed by experimenters on the trial, and so on. For a variety of reasons, 
a subject might adopt a conservative criterion, which would mean she might respond ‘no’ (I 
haven’t seen anything) when her sensory response in the trials is actually due to a stimulus 
detected, by some low or degraded experience. In other words, she may actually have some 
awareness of the stimulus, even though she reports otherwise. In such cases, the line 
representing the criterion in the diagram is further to the right. 
 The problem of the criterion re-opens the debate around type 2 blindsight cases, in 
which subjects do report some experience, though we have in an earlier chapter discounted 
this as unconvincing proof of their experience. (Recall that what GY and others said was that 
they had ‘a feeling’ something had moved, like a hand passing in front of closed eyes). 
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 The problem, however, reaches even into type 1 cases.  A subject may say, with utter 
conviction, that they do not see, believe themselves to be totally blind, and assert that they are 
simply guessing, when asked to make a discrimination, but according to the objection, their 
success in making a successful discrimination could merely be down to a conservative 
criterion, and an unreported low-level awareness. As we have seen elsewhere, there are 
factors which might incline them to adopt such a criterion, as Phillips records.  To take an 
extreme example, if a subject is offered £1 for every time they correctly say that a stimulus 
was present, but fined £100 for every time they incorrectly say a stimulus was present, the 
subject will automatically adopt a conservative criterion, and regularly deny that a stimulus 
was present even in cases when they may have clear perceptual sensitivity. The fines would 
incline subjects to shift their threshold to a point where it would be represented by a line to 
the right in the diagram, and under-report their experience.  
 Factors other than financial considerations might have the same effect, with the 
consequence that in all cases of blindsight (and other dissociations) the subject could be in 
possession of under-reported experience, even if she is emphatic that she sees or experiences 
nothing. So we should: ‘reject any approach for distinguishing conscious from unconscious 
perceptual processes that is based solely on the subjective reports’ (Phillips, 2017, p.428 
quoting Reingold and Merikle, 1990, p.17-18). 
 In such circumstances, Weiskrantz’ insistence that he trusts his subjects to report their 
condition accurately, looks beside the point. A subject could be utterly insistent on the 
absence of any experience in tests, but yet nevertheless have some low-level experience at 
work. The phenomenon of blindsight may not be truly blind. To put it slightly differently, the 
claim is that some consciousness is at play, and the perceptive capacity of the subject is not 
truly unconscious.  
Phillips applies the same criticism to the neglect case of PS as studied by Marshall 
and Halligan (1998). Their study concluded that PS failed to make a distinction between 
cards depicting line drawings of a house where some had flames emerging from the house on 
the left of the cards shown and some did not. When asked further, which house would she 
prefer to live in, she replied that that was a ‘silly question’. But when forced to choose, she 
reliably picked out 9/11 houses where there were no flames involved. Marshall and Halligan 
concluded that she unconsciously perceived the flames emerging from the relevant cards, and 
chose accordingly. Phillips however comments that the paradigm has not ruled out the 
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possibility that PS was operating with a conservative criterion and had some degraded 
conscious perception below the response threshold, or that she may have perceived some 
low-level pre-attentive feature, such as asymmetry. PS was asked a y/n question whether she 
detected anything wrong with any of the cards. She replied: ‘no’, but Phillips dismisses these 
questions as ‘biased’ and potentially subject to the criterion problem (Phillips, 2016, pp.432-
433). 
 Other dissociations may also be subject to the same criticism where y/n or 
same/different (s/d) questions are put. This is indeed strongly suggested by studies looking at 
tasks which use s/d discriminations (cited in Phillips, 2015, p.428). He records the 
conclusions of Macmillan and Creelman 2005: ‘participants seem naturally to adopt a 
preference for “same” in hard to discriminate stimuli’. Neglect patients might be particularly 
subject to this, given that, (as Phillips suggests) ‘stimuli presented to their sides showing 
deficits are stimuli plausibly near threshold’, and ‘we should therefore anticipate strong 
biases towards “same” responding.’ PS might, therefore, be inclined to say the pictures of the 
houses presented are the same as each other, and her response to the question of where she 
would rather live is the product of some degraded experience under-reported because of her 
conservative response criterion.  
 The question of s/d, or y/n tasks being more prone to the influence of a conservative 
response bias is explored by Phillips in a longer section referencing two papers by Azzopardi 
and Cowey (1997, 1998) concerning a study of GY. These studies were alive to the criterion 
problem, and sought to circumvent it by a change in task. Alongside a series of y/n tests (did 
you see the stimulus?), GY was asked to reply to a two-alternative forced choice (2afc) test. 
He was given 2 intervals, indicated by an auditory tone across 4000ms, (each interval = 
2000ms). The stimulus was presented for 200ms, but randomly varying with a blank within 
each period. GY was then asked to say which temporal period the stimulus was most likely to 
have been presented. (See the diagram below). This task was chosen for its minimal bias (d´ 





 Azzopardi and Cowey’s findings were instructive: GY’s sensitivity (i.e. percentage 
success rate) was significantly higher in the 2afc test than in the y/n task, scoring percentages 
consistent with blindsight findings in other paradigms (between 81% and 96% correct 
depending on the contrast of the stimulus used. In the y/n test (the test subject to the criterion 
problem) GY’s sensitivity ranged over 66%-75% depending on contrast.  
 The study showed that GY had a moveable response criterion, depending on task 
given, but that success in discrimination was unimpaired – indeed improved – by using a 
bias-free task. A similar study using moving stimuli did not show this effect; instead success 
in discrimination ‘did not differ significantly between y/n and 2afc detection.’ 
 Azzopardi and Cowey conclude that while possible response bias presents a difficult 
problem for any investigation of visual awareness, 2afc responding is bias-free. GY showed 
significant bias in the y/n task, but in the bias-free task, he showed stimulus-sensitivity which 
could not be dismissed as degraded normal vision unreported due to response bias. 
 However, this does not settle the matter for Phillips. Consistent with his strategy in 
dealing with other dissociations (as we shall see later) and having been unable to make one 
charge stick, he explores another confound. His main objection is the argument that 
Azzopardi and Cowey have only shown that GY’s sensitivity is not the product of degraded 
normal vision. His point is that they have not shown that GY’s sensitivity is not the product 
of degraded conscious vision (Phillips, 2015, pp.438-439). For the purposes of clarity: 
Phillips is here suggesting that there may still be some unreported conscious experience to 
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account for GY’s sensitivity. He writes: ‘[some] deny that there is any simple association 
between detection theoretic thresholds and consciousness, typically granting only that d´ = 0 
is a sufficient condition to the absence of consciousness. [..] The crucial point is this: where a 
subject performs well on an unbiased task (eg 2afc) but poorly (as judged by percent correct) 
on a biased task, this pattern of responding does not entail unconscious perception unless we 
make the very strong assumption that consciousness is found only above the subjective 
threshold. If we reject that assumption, we need to consider seriously the possibility that the 
response pattern reflects conscious perception unreported due to a conservative response 
criterion’ (Phillips, 2017, p.428). 
 This returns us to the status of the reported testimony of the subject (‘I did not see 
anything’), and doubt on this question potentially affects every paradigm. Phillips explores 
the case of GY in considering this question (2017, pp.440-1), and says of him: ‘His 
experiences are the visual equivalent of the faintest of murmurs, he sees through a glass 
darkly’ and concludes: ‘it would be rash to conclude that GY lacks any form of conscious 
experience in other trials from this data.’ 
 
Response to Phillips’ contention 
How should we respond to this line of attack? I offer four replies. 
 The first addresses the question of individual results being possibly compromised by 
an unstable response criterion (by, for example, fatigue) or advance expectation (criterion 
‘jitter’). It applies especially to perimetry – i.e. scotoma-defining tasks at the outset of any 
study of blindsight, which necessarily are y/n in character. The argument takes its lead from 
commentary upon Descartes’ First Meditation. In it, and in relation to the veridicality of 
sense impressions, Descartes writes:  
Reason convinces us that we should withhold assent just as carefully from whatever is 
not completely certain and indubitable as from what is clearly false; if I find some 
reason for doubt in each of my beliefs, that will be enough to reject all of them. (1st 
Meditation, 1998, p.18) 
In other words, Descartes invites us to conclude that, if we are wrong about our sense 
impressions in some situations, that is sufficient to doubt all. We might argue that, in the 
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same way, those who cleave to the criterion problem are encouraging the same view of the 
testimony of dissociation subjects. But – is the move from some to all legitimate or 
supportable? It might be that some paradigms have results which are false positives, the 
product of unreported experience coupled with a conservative criterion, but what is the 
likelihood that all the explorations in all the paradigms have this flaw at their centre? The 
move from some to all in Descartes’ application of doubt is often regarded as being too 
quick, or even illegitimate, and our first response to the criterion problem might be to take the 
same line. We have elsewhere argued further that the neo-cartesians play a double game with 
subjects’ experience and their testimonies concerning it – when it suits their argument, they 
are quick enough to build a case upon them. Recall that Chalmers says that it is via this 
introspective route that we know ourselves better than anything else. 
 Concerning the question of whether the data set in the studies is more systematically 
compromised by consistently held response bias, we might argue with the following 
observations. This is also a very practical approach to the paradigms and their results. Let us 
return to Weiskrantz’ late study of DB in 1999, after a break of 15 years. As part of this 
study, (Trevethan et al 2007) DB was asked to identify animals portrayed in low contrast 
(2%) outline drawings, presented in his blindfield (at a 9.4% distance from his fixation point). 
DB’s subjectively reported awareness with low contrast stimuli is in the Type 1 blindsight 
category – he reports no awareness and says of himself he is ‘just guessing’. Nevertheless, 
DB was able correctly to identify 25/28 items, failing only in identifying a deer as a horse. 
Several germane points can be made. Of course, according to the criterion problem objection, 
DB could have had some experience, but under-reported it, owing to a conservative criterion. 
Typically, in higher-contrast paradigms, DB characteristically reports that he is ‘aware’ that 
something had been presented, or metaphorically as ‘moving waves’, but that he did not ‘see’ 
it. To repeat, he did not report any awareness in the paradigm with 2% contrast animal 
drawings, but it is possible he could have had some, allowing him to achieve the high success 
rate, but look at the paradigm again. He was able to make quite fine discriminations requiring 
some degree of detail, in order to (say) distinguish between a horse and a cow, which he is 
clearly able to do. Even if he has some under-reported vague experience, it seems most 
unlikely that it would allow him to make such fine discriminations of form. Identifying a cow 
as a cow (and not as a horse) requires not just a limited experience of a something vaguely 
represented at the threshold of ordinary vision, but details – the cow’s horns, an udder, a 
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shortened neck line. Furthermore, Weiskrantz displayed the line drawings at a very low 
contrast – at 2%, the drawings were subjectively invisible to the experimenters. 
 Additionally, Weiskrantz records that DB was better at identifying the animals when 
presented to his blindfield compared to when he was shown them in his intact field (at the 
same degree of eccentricity in his peripheral vision), and performed significantly better than 
five control subjects. Weiskrantz concedes – ‘a cynical view, [would be] that DB has normal 
vision and is simply simulating’ but no-one could predict a better performance than in the 
intact field, or in comparison with normal controls. 
 To underscore the main point, remember the claim in Phillips’s objections. That DB 
could be consistently under-reporting experience due to response bias. This might be a 
persuasive complaint if the tests dealt with discriminations between gross features – an X or 
an O, for example —, but in this paradigm the task concerned the identification of animals, 
and discriminations on quite fine detail34.  
 A third response is this – made in this case by Block. To some extent this addresses 
Phillips’s final point, the claim that all trials rely on the ‘very strong assumption that 
consciousness is found only above the subjective threshold’. We do indeed lack a scientific 
criterion for consciousness, and there is no proof to establish that any particular type of state 
is unconscious. ‘But what holds for unconscious states also applies to conscious states’ – 
there is no scientific proof that the reader of these words is conscious and ‘this ought to put 
the first [claim] into perspective’ (Phillips and Block, 2015, p.5). To amplify: no conclusive 
scientific test exists to establish that a neurotypical subject is experiencing stimuli, even if 
they show an appropriate or typical response to them, so it is unreasonable to demand a test 
for the absence of experience in neurologically less typical subjects.  
 We can make a fourth point, which is not an argument so much as a strategy. As we 
saw with Azzopardi and Cowey’s (1997, 1998) study of GY a final response could lie in 
finding paradigms wherein the subject finds the right balance between being conservative and 
being liberal in their choice of response criteria. As those papers show, it is possible to 
arrange paradigms in this way. Or we can find conditions and paradigms in which the subject 
does not, or cannot distinguish between a signal and noise, or is not asked to do so, and yet is 
 
34 There is a possible explanation for DB’s improved performance in the 15 years he was away from 
trials, which is that, over that time, his brain reconfigured itself, developing new pathways by which 
the images were processed. It is not clear however, that this provides any defence for Phillips’ 
position. DB still reported ‘no experience’ when shown line drawings with low contrast.  
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still capable of showing awareness of a stimulus. In other words, cases where the detection 
distribution curves, in the Green and Swets diagram above, coincide, and d´ = 0. Establishing 
cases of unconscious perception and confirmed in these paradigms by-passes at least part of 
the criterion problem, even though residual questions may remain. We shall explore this in 
connection with the Block/Phillips debate over perception. As we shall see, many of the 
paradigms at issue in that debate now contrive a situation in which d´ = 0. 
 
 
Phillips and the debate with Block: Is Unconscious Perception still Perception?  
The Burgean definition of perception through two case studies – the role of subsystems. 
Firstly, as a starting point, some further detail about the definition of perception offered by 
Burge, and accepted by both Block and Phillips as their criterion for what counts as 
perception. Here again is Burge: ‘Perception is a type of objective sensory representation by 
the individual’ (Burge, 2010, p.368). In this first section we will be examining the suggestion 
that perception is necessarily by the individual (as opposed to a product of subsystems of the 
individual), and whether that involves central co-ordinating agency. 
 It has been the contention of this thesis so far that unconscious perception is best 
understood by regarding subsystems of the individual as being at the root of the phenomenon. 
In other words, we understand what is happening in cases of blindsight etc if we hold out the 
possibility that the perceptual performance of the subject is the product of the survival of one 
subsystem, in the context of a failure of another. (Blindsight = surviving v4/v8, or v5 in 
context of loss of v1; visual agnosia = surviving dorsal stream in context of damaged ventral 
stream; Prosopagnosia = surviving v1 in context of compromised right fusiform gyrus. The 
differential responses in split brain patients is best explained by the operation of the two 
hemispheres as separate subsystems.) In this way, we can account for the perception on the 
one hand and the lack of consciousness on the other. If we insist that all perception is 
necessarily by the individual, and if that blocks explanation using neurological subsystems, 
then this line of explanation is denied to us.  
 Phillips is clear that he endorses perception as applying to individuals, saying; ‘[..N]ot 
all useable transduced information constitutes perception. Perception is objective sensory 
representation by the individual’. ‘It must be attributed to the individual, not merely, say, to 
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their visuo-motor system’. (Block and Phillips’ 2016 on-line paper, p.1). This last comment 
would appear to be a clear reference to Milner and Goodale’s study of Dee Fletcher, who 
suffers from visual agnosia, and relies on her (intact) dorsal visual processing stream for her 
navigation around her environment and which allows her to orient her hand correctly when 
posting items through angled letter boxes (even though she claims not to be conscious of 
those targets). Phillips would rule this out as a case of unconscious perception as only a sub 
system of DF would appear to be involved in her action in manoeuvring her hand, or 
navigating a pathway. With this understanding of perception, Phillips will easily dispense 
with a variety of dissociations which might otherwise count as unconscious perception.  
 Insofar as Burge acknowledges blindsight, prosopagnosia, extinction-neglect cases 
and states in early vision (Burge, 2010, pp.374-5) as possible cases of unconscious 
perception, he does so, not on the grounds that they are the product of the survival and failure 
of subsystems – he entertains them on grounds that they might nevertheless be examples of 
unconscious perception by individuals. (They are cases of unconscious perception insofar as 
they exhibit unconsciousness in certain respects, but certain perceptual constancies are 
preserved, and the perception often guides action.) 
While Burge is ultimately insistent that it is the individual that perceives and this is 
fundamental35, he does nevertheless provide some helpful qualifications. ‘Perception is the 
product of subindividual processing’ (Burge, 2010, p.368) and ‘I do not claim that all 
perceptions are perceptions by an individual.’ Going on: ‘I claim that all perceptions, 
including any that are not strictly attributable to the individual, serve perception by the 
individual’ (ibid, my emphasis).  These qualifications are more than Phillips would concede, 
as we shall see and his comment suggests, and they would seem to allow that DF’s condition 
is another case of unconscious perception. On Burge’s account, DF makes fine motor 
adjustments on the basis of her intact visuo-motor system, and can act accordingly, although 
it is precisely the absence of a complete visual system that means she does this 
unconsciously. We might say she acts as an individual in manoeuvring her hand, but her 
perception via her dorsal stream is one not strictly attributable to DF as individual.  
 This point is worth labouring; we are considering the question of what counts as 
perception, and the definition we arrive at matters as far as the notion of unconscious 
 
35 ‘The fact that individuals perceive, and have perceptual states is basic to the explanatory roles of the 
notions of perception and individual’ Burge, 2010, pp.369-70. 
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perception is concerned. How we understand perception to be construed is pivotal in deciding 
what if anything counts as unconscious perception. Here, as we have commented at other 
points in this thesis, our definitions act as an important constraint on our wider theories of 
mind, and empirically investigable anomalies concerning mind. 36  
 Let us now consider another example: my own story of the snake-flinching in the 
garden. Recall the sequence of events: I approached the grassy mound; I felt uneasy; I leapt 
sideways away from the mound, and then became consciously aware of the snake sunning 
itself on the mound.  
 It is likely some processing took place in me by some primitive subsystem, allowing 
an early representation of the snake to be fashioned, and recognised as such and as potentially 
dangerous. This representation was made available to response mechanisms allowing evasive 
action to be taken, by me, the individual; all within the 250-300 msecs it takes for one to 
become conscious of seeing the snake.  
 A number of assumptions are locked into this story. Of course, against its anecdotal 
character – was the sequence of events (becoming conscious of seeing the snake only after I 
had flinched) just as I remember it? (The situation cannot be beyond repetition in laboratory 
circumstances, but may be subject to an objection based on a different type of response 
criterion). Was the representational content of the perception that of a snake? (one presumes 
so, as ordinarily, coiled pieces of wire, for example, do not have the same impact.) Was the 
evasive action taken by me, taken as an individual? I would claim: yes. I bodily leapt 
 
36 Before we leave DF’s story, in Peters et al 2017, Phillips makes further claims against the claim 
that unconscious perception is involved in her case, saying: ‘it is far from obvious that vision-for-
action constitutes genuine perception.’ Then, quoting Milner and Goodale 2008: ‘although [they] do 
think perception can occur unconsciously, they insist that “the visual information used by the dorsal 
stream for programming and on-line control … is not perceptual in nature”’  
It is not clear that this comment works to endorse Phillips’ dismissal of visual agnosia as a case of 
unconscious perception. Milner and Goodale describe perception as ‘the conscious experience of 
seeing’ and unconscious perception as ‘mental representations that potentially could reach conscious 
awareness’. On this score, visual agnosia does not count as unconscious perception on the simple 
ground that no part of the sensory information processed by the dorsal system could reach awareness. 
If we work with perception on the Burgean model, according to which consciousness or potential 
access is not considered a necessary feature of the definition, then Dee Fletcher’s condition still 
counts as a case of unconscious perception. Dee’s dorsal system processes low-level information 
concerning orientation and angle, and this instructs the action of manoeuvring her hand. It again turns 




sideways. Was the early processing of the snake completed by a subsystem? In all likelihood, 
yes – as we have noted elsewhere, there are various speeds at which different aspects of 
objects are processed – shape, colour, etc, some markedly faster than others, all accomplished 
by subsystems of the visual processing stream. The amygdala is usually identified as 
responsible in cases such as these. 
 We should not be surprised at the sequence of events in this story. As Jeffery Gray 
points out (Gray, 2004, pp.6-9) consciousness comes late and extra. Fast processing by 
subsystems and fast reaction times are evolutionary necessities, allowing us to avoid being 
prey to some predator; conscious awareness of the predator comes almost superfluously, 
allowing admiration for its pelt and teeth, and other features, best appreciated at a distance. 
Does the case count as one of unconscious perception? The definition provided by 
Burge allows this. He comments: ‘certain states in early vision [states in the first micro-
seconds of visual processing] may count as perception by the individual but fail to be 
conscious […] Perception occurs and figures directly in guiding action [but] at the level of 
conscious access, individuals are oblivious to what they perceive’ (Burge, 2010, p.375). 
I offer some comments as a summary of this section: Burge presents a definition of 
perception which has no bar to unconscious perception insofar as certain other features are 
preserved. He also would seem to suggest that, while perception is individual, there are 
subsystems which help constitute perception at the individual level. This is close to the spirit 
of this thesis, which sees the role of processing subsystems as an explanatory tool in 
accounting for how the dissociations arise and manifest themselves. As we shall see, Phillips 
is selective in borrowing upon the Burgean definition, in his exchange with Block; in doing 
so, he works with a definition of perception which closes off some dissociations as forms of 
unconscious perception. The concept as adopted frames and constrains the reading of 
empirical situations; this is just as we have found elsewhere – the concepts as chosen and 
defined are at the root of the interpretation of the dissociations studied. The adoption of 
certain concepts such as ‘qualia’ ‘phenomenal character’ and ‘what-it-is-like’ and here, 
‘perception’, works to constrain our conclusions about unconscious perception. The adoption 
of a more accommodating concept of ‘perception’ might allow that unconscious perception is 
a possibility. Of course, preferring the one approach over the other has to be argued for: given 
that it is unlikely we can say whether one approach or the other is nearer to the truth, we 
might have criteria such as: does the theory of which this concept is a feature, have greater or 
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less explanatory width; does it accommodate or deny the most likely interpretation, or the 
best explanation of the dissociations we have looked at; how does it fit with growing 
neurological knowledge about the way the brain works.  
 
Phillips, Block and their reading of Jiang et al – Perception as by an individual. 
Let us return to the question we began with – whether unconscious perception is still 
perception. The debate between Block and Phillips ranges over a number of issues and 
paradigms, but one suitable route into their debate, is their respective treatment of a paradigm 
conducted by Jiang et al (2006). This particular paradigm side-steps the problem of the 
criterion since it presents us with a study ‘in which subjects display no preserved 
discriminative capacity in respect of some feature (ie d´ = 0) and yet that feature continues to 
exert some perceptual influence.’ (Block/Phillips on-line paper 2016, p.3). Other examples 
might include masked priming cases, in which a masked stimulus is shown very briefly and 
yet the stimulus shown subliminally has a priming effect on supraliminal targets. Something 
like this effect is seen in the paradigm worked on by Jiang et al.  
In this study, the subject is shown a fixation point, and then each eye gets a pair of 
stimuli for 800 msecs. One eye receives a pair of Mondrians, while the other eye gets a nude 
figure (male or female) and a patch of flesh-coloured fragments. The Mondrians presented to 
one eye suppress the conscious perception of both the nude and the nude texture presented to 
the other eye. (If the subjects do report any difference between the one and the other, on such 
presentations, the data on this is excluded.) 
What the paradigm then goes on to measure is the subject’s attraction to or repulsion by the 
nude, depending on their sexual orientation. This is prompted by the presentation of a final 
target briefly presented (100 msec) – a Gabor patch rotating clockwise or anti-clockwise. The 
patch is located in the same field in which the nude was shown. Subjects are required to say 
which way it is rotating. It is known that accuracy in this judgement is increased by attention, 
and that the subjects directed their attention can be assessed by whether they are right in their 
clockwise/anticlockwise judgement. The finding in Jiang was this: attention in men and 
women was affected by their gender preference for the gender of the nude shown, whether 
the subject was homosexual or heterosexual.  
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In sum, the study aims to create the unconscious perception of nude figures, and tests 
for the reaction of the subject to them according to their gender preferences. This is 
accomplished by judging the accuracy of their judgements in their final test, having been 
prompted by the rotating Gabor patch.  
The study is a variation on a continuous flash suppression paradigm which forms a 
large part of the debate between Block and Phillips. One powerful advantage of this paradigm 
over blindsight cases is that the effect can be replicated in neuro-typical subjects, and is not 
reliant upon brain damage for its causal origin. This is an advantage if brain damage creates 
uncertainty about how to understand the response. 
The question of course is whether the effect on attention is a form of unconscious 
perception. In this part of the exchange between Block and Phillips, we shall be concerned 
with whether the perception in the study conforms to features of the Burgean definition of 
perception - ie whether it is individual-level, and whether it involves central-co-ordinating 
agency. 
The Jiang result is at first dismissed by Phillips on grounds that the differential 
response as a result of unseen nudes does not obviously ‘implicate central agency’. 
Availability to, and response by central agency is another feature of Phillips’ criterion for 
perception drawn from Burge. He makes a reference to Burge (2010, p.333), which Phillips 
reads as follows – a key requirement of representations being attributable to an individual 
turns on whether the representational content is available to central co-ordinating agency. 
Let us look carefully at what this involves. Behaviour associated with perception, imputable 
to individuals needs to be available to central agency, ruling out reflexive responses such as 
muscle twitch, spasms, the firing of neurons, eye saccades. This conceptual stipulation would 
seem to discount as cases of unconscious perception paradigms such as those testing for 
affective blindsight as in for example Tamietto et al 2006, and skin conductance tests in 
prosopagnosia cases. These are cases in which it can be argued a central co-ordinating agency 
was not involved, and subsystems were responsible for the response. It is then claimed that 
the behavioural response could not be imputable to the individual. Phillips asks the same 
question of the Jiang paradigm – is it obvious that the response involves central agency: ‘Not 
obviously, if the effect is due to the automatic attraction of eye saccades’(Block/Phillips on-
line paper, 2016, p.11).  
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There are two questions to raise – first, the empirical question of whether eye 
saccades are the reason why perception takes place, and whether they are automatic. The 
second point to raise concerns the conceptual understanding of what counts as perception.  
The points are linked in the sense that, if eye saccades are automatic, then they can 
hardly be evidence of central co-ordinating agency being involved. On the simpler point - 
whether eye saccades might be responsible for the effect in Jiang: it may be true that eye 
saccades are automatic and might therefore not be a product of central agency, but it seems 
improbable that they would produce the response. The claim in the paradigm is that attraction 
or repulsion associated with gender preference is impacting upon attention, and it is hard to 
see how this could be automatic ‘in any relevant sense of the term’, as Block puts it. Phillips 
defends his position saying: ‘personal level gender preferences correlate closely with many 
reflexive autonomic responses. For example, [there are studies which] examine the 
differential pupillary responses elicited by gendered erotic stimuli.’ (Block/Phillips on line 
paper, 2016, p.18). But the evidence would seem now to suggest that pupillary responses are 
not autonomic, and are integrated with higher level mental phenomena such as spatial 
attention and contextual processing (Binda and Murray 2015).  
We are down to a narrow point in the exchange between Phillips and Block, on the 
question of whether the Jiang paradigm provides us with an example of a stimulus response 
which is more than an automatic reflex, and satisfies the Burgean definition of perception. 
Block argues yes, and that the Jiang results cannot be dismissed as an automatic response, or 
as sub-cortically mediated, and, on the contrary, is the product of the involvement of central 
agency. It is thus a case of perception. Phillips argues that we should discount the Jiang result 
as the product of autonomic reflexes, and so therefore not involving central agency, and is 
thus not a case of perception. 
The dispute illuminates the point of difference - what is it that counts as perception in 
this case. This is a conceptual, stipulative question. Burge identifies the link between active 
behaviour by an individual and the role of central co-ordinating agency, but is quick to 
qualify it, and it is clear from subsequent pages (Burge, 2010, p.334-5), that he does not think 
that involvement in central agency is a necessary condition of unconscious perception. Block 
explicitly agrees with this reading. Phillips is less attached to it, saying: ‘I did not propose 
that involvement in central agency is a necessary condition of perception, but when a 
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representation is unavailable to central agency we lack a positive ground for attribution.’ 
(Block/Phillips 2016 on-line paper, p.18).  
This thesis has maintained that definitions or conceptions are material to the 
recognition of dissociation as problem cases. If our definition of perception includes a 
stipulation that it necessarily involves consciousness then the question whether there can be 
unconscious perception is closed, and there seems little to be gained in philosophers studying 
the dissociations further. If we stipulate that perception is something done by an individual, 
and that that means it must prompt or guide action by the individual, but at the same time 
stipulate that these actions must be under conscious voluntary control, then we have another 
definitional reason to down tools – we seem to have a reappearance of the requirement that 
‘perception must be conscious’. Phillips does not take this final step explicitly, but he is 
demanding that a high bar is met.  
 
Perception as objective representation. The constancies question. 
Phillips notes that, for Burge, perceptual objectivity in perception is achieved by the 
exhibition of perceptual constancies, that is, “capacities to represent environmental attributes 
or environmental particulars, as the same, despite radically different proximal stimulations” 
(Burge, 2010, p.387 but see especially pp.408-413). Burge himself argues for blindsight as a 
case of unconscious perception on grounds that, while it seems to be such a case, ‘blindsight 
patients perceive environmental conditions. The perception involves perceptual constancies’ 
(Burge, 2010, p.374). He holds out the possibility that other conditions might also qualify: ‘in 
several other cases, for example in prosopagnosia and extinction-neglect syndromes [..] the 
perceptual state meets conditions for perception; in particular, perceptual constancies are 
exhibited’ (Burge, 2010, p.375). 
Phillips addresses this issue, asking if it really is the case that blindsight involves 
constancies. Much early work did not address the question – Weiskrantz (2002) concedes that 
none of the ‘visual constancies has ever been addressed in any blindsight studies of which I 
am aware.’ Phillips references several more recent studies, but concludes that none of them 
establish that subjects with blindsight exhibit perceptual constancies. This from Peters et al 
2017: ‘DB perceives neither surface colour, nor chromatic contrast, matching coloured 
stimuli purely on the basis of wavelength’ (Kentridge et al 2007). Motion detection in GY is 
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limited to ‘objectless’ first order motion energy, as opposed to changes in position and shape 
(Azzopardi and Hock 2011).   
However, there is a still more recent study which Phillips must address more fully and 
at the point of writing concedes that it works against his conclusion. The study in question is: 
Norman et al 2014. Before we examine the study in detail let us remind ourselves what is 
meant by constancies, and colour constancy in particular.  
For Burge, perception is: objective sensory representation by the individual. The 
criterion of objectivity in perception is met by the exhibition of constancies – ‘perceptual 
constancies are capacities for objectification’ (Burge, 2010, p.399). Various constancies are 
advanced – motion, size, distance, shape, but the one we are here interested in is colour 
constancy. This is the ‘capacity to represent a colour as the same under various conditions, 
including different illuminations’ (Burge, 2010, p.410). It is this last specification that the 
Norman study looks at. 
The study is another using continuous flash suppression, and so benefits from being 
able to use neuro-typical subjects, thus sidestepping any potential misinterpretation as a 
consequence of damage to the brain. The study also makes an effort to avoid the problem of 
the criterion, as we shall see (d´ is not significantly different from zero). 
Here are the details. Subjects were shown a coloured Mondrian pattern as in the illustration 







They were given a spatial cue for a randomly chosen time duration between 281 and 406 ms, 
then shown a blank for 75 ms, then a prime. The prime was a colour circle shown in the 
region of the spatial cue, and presented for one of three durations – 0 ms, 12.5 ms, or 37.5 
ms. A blank was again shown, during which time there was a change in illuminance. Finally, 
a mask was shown, - a colour target which varied in its colour – either matching the prime, or 
not. In this way, the prime and the mask were presented under different illuminance 
conditions – one resembling direct sunlight, the other, average daylight. Subjects were asked 
simply to identify the colour of the mask at the conclusion of the sequence. Under normal 
circumstances, subjects are quicker to respond when asked to identify the colour of the mask, 
when the prime and the mask match in colour.  
Subjects were asked, over three sessions, to say whether they saw the prime as being 
present or not, on a confidence scale of 1 to 8. Recall that sometimes (in half the trials), the 
prime was not present at all (= 0 ms presentation time). Results established that the subjects 
were not able to detect the presence of the prime for all those presentations in which the 
prime was shown for 12.5 ms. They were little better at 37.5 ms, but two subjects could 
detect the presence of the prime in the longer interval, but taken over the study as a whole, 
mean d´ was 0.006for the short prime duration, and 0.186 for long prime duration. These 
figures, not significantly different from d´ = 0, indicates strongly that the subjects had no 
experience of the prime, and so the study is not prey to the response criterion problem 
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discussed above. The exposure time was very short, and so we may conclude that the colour 
presented as the prime was unseen – the subjects were not conscious of it. 
Was there nevertheless success in perception? Subjects were asked to say what the 
colour of the mask was at the end of the sequence shown. As noted, subjects are quicker to 
identify the colour of the mask if they have been primed with the same colour as the mask. 
This would indicate that the mask has been unconsciously perceived. The key feature of this 
experiment however, is the change in luminance between the prime and the mask (This is not 
easily rendered in the diagram above, but the change in illuminance changes the reflected 
colour of the mask). The results of the study showed that subjects were still able to respond as 
quickly to identify the colour of the mask despite the change in luminance – with the 
conclusion that colour constancy was preserved. How the surface colour was perceived 
remained unchanged, and the luminance was discounted. This is just as we would expect if 
colour constancy is exhibited.  
The study and its additional controls also allow the authors to speculate upon the 
neurological mechanisms responsible as the basis for colour constancy. Although nothing is 
entirely conclusive, it is clear that accepting the possibility of unconscious perception allows 
here as elsewhere, permits scientific investigation into the neural correlates of consciousness. 
As we remarked above, at the time of writing, Phillips has yet to respond fully to the 
Norman et al paper. He concedes that it is an exemplary study in finding a methodology in 
which d´= 0, but very briefly suggests that the response is not a result of a representation 
being available to central co-ordinating agency, and so not evidence of individual-level 
perception. (Block/Phillips on-line paper, 2016, p.4). The Norman et al paper is unlikely to 
be the last word on the issue; it would appear to be simply a question of devising the right 
kind of paradigm to explore the preservation of other constancies in blindsight, or blindsight 
inducing techniques. 
 
Block and the Anna Karenina Principle 
The final case to make concerning Phillips’ campaign against unconscious perception is to 
pick up and add to Block’s charge in Block 2015, an argument that also figures in the final 
pages of Block/Phillips on-line paper in 2016. This is the claim that Phillips has offered 
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several different objections against the various candidates of unconscious perception, but 
without a common theme or denominator.  
He deals with blindsight by raising the possibility that the effect has an explanation in 
unacknowledged and degraded experience, linked with a conservative response criterion. 
This is the charge that it is not unconscious. It is also, as we have seen, dismissed for failing 
to be a case of perception. Further, in taking Burge’s definition of perception as the pivot of 
his argument, (appearing on p.2 Block/Phillips on-line paper 2016 and in fn 20 in Phillips 
2016) he maintains that there is no clear evidence that constancies are preserved in blindsight 
cases, and he repeats the charge in cases in which blindsight is induced by continuous flash 
suppression (Peters et al, pp.5-6). 
Against the Jiang paradigm (continuous flash suppression) and the idea of 
unconscious gender-based responses to primes, Phillips offers the view that the responses are 
the product of automatic reflexes, and so therefore works against that feature of the Burgean 
definition of perception which suggests perception is individual-level. 
Against visual agnosia (DF’s condition) he claims that the responsible mechanism is a 
subsystem and the effect is therefore not attributable to the individual. He writes: ‘[there is a] 
concern whether pertinent modulations of behaviour witness genuine control and guidance 
“by the individual” and so meet [the] requirement for perception’ (in Peters et al, p.6). He 
could make the same case against subjects with prosopagnosia, who are found to have a 
differential skin conductance response to known faces. Presumably in these cases, the 
response could be described as reflexive, not the product of central agency. As we saw in the 
footnote above, Phillips also objects to visual agnosia that it may not be a genuine case of 
perception on other grounds. 
Neglect, as in the Marshall and Halligan paradigm, is partially dismissed as a case in 
which unacknowledged conscious perception is involved. He cites studies which concede that 
flames might not be experienced, but explore the idea low-level features such as asymmetry 
were perceived to account for the preference data (Phillips, 2016, p.432). Phillips also 
launches the criterion problem at the paradigm, complaining that no neglect study comes 
close to the gold standard of d´ = 0. ‘I know of no study of unconscious priming in neglect 
which rules out the possibility that the prime is consciously perceived.’ 
In brief, these are various candidates for unconscious perception for which Phillips 
has found a reason to dismiss. Block, who has defended several of these candidates, points 
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out that there are many other ways of producing unconscious perception – citing Breitmeyer, 
(2015) who identifies 24 methods of producing the effect in neuro-typical subjects, using 
methods such as:  crowding, the attentional blink (and other attentional blinding methods), 
backward pattern masking, metacontrast masking, continuous flash suppression, sandwich 
masking, and single-flash interocular suppression. We can add to this list with more recent 
studies into blindsight-inducing trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (Christensen et al 2008).  
Phillips asked whether, in all these cases (including the cases arising from brain 
malfunction), perception of the same fundamental kind as we find in conscious perception is 
to be found. It is clear that, in each of the cases explored, Phillips has found an ad hoc 
criticism, which collectively share few commonalities. Against the notion of unconscious 
perception, he has catalogued some cases as not unconscious, and against others, he as 
identified them as not being cases of perception. Under the last category, he has claimed that 
some do not qualify as objective representation in which constancies are preserved, and 
others are found not to be individual-level. 
Against this collection of objections, Block’s point is that there is no single common 
flaw to each of the conditions or cases, and raises questions about the totality of the case 
Phillips makes against them. We can amplify this. There is much in common with our 
understanding of the dissociations, and only a series of ad hoc objections that Phillips makes 
in reply. Block observes: ‘Successful conscious perception is a dance of oscillating feed-
forward-and-back loops.’ (Block/Phillips on-line paper, 2016 p.23, Block 2016). Most of the 
paradigms discussed in this chapter have involved a compromise of, or interruption of these 
feed-back and forward loops. In the case of blindsight, the feed-back loops are stalled by the 
absence of the primary visual cortex. In the case of continuous flash suppression, the loop has 
not had to time to establish itself before a stimulus is masked, or disappears (< 100 ms). In 
others, attentional distraction has had the same effect. Importantly, in these mechanisms we 
have a neurological underpinning of the same fundamental kind; there is substantial evidence 
of this underlying commonality (Lamme 2001) to the point where investigators have begun to 
talk about and develop a unified model of conscious and unconscious perception, with the 
difference between the two to be found simply in whether the processing of stimuli enters 
working memory, or is experienced for long enough to consolidate (Kiefer et al 2011). With 
such a unified model of perception becoming available, we might expect any theoretical 





At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that, in the view of Phillips, the question of 
unconscious perception was empirically tractable. He does not trivially block the possibility 
of the idea by defining perception in phenomenal terms, involving the idea that there is 
something it is like to perceive a red patch. The strategy adopted by Phillips, however, is to 
adopt a tight reading of Burge’s definition of perception, as objective representation at the 
individual level with the involvement of central agency in the response to stimuli.  
His first tactic is to suggest there are no clear cases of unconscious perception – that 
some degraded experience is possibly at work in explaining discriminative success. This is 
launched in the form of the criterion problem – that subjects have, notwithstanding their 
protestations, weak conscious awareness unreported due to a conservative response criterion. 
This is met by those investigations and laboratory simulations which aim to contrive a d´ = 0 
result ie in which it is established that the subjects’ subjective criterion is neutralised. 
Phillips then shifts to the question of whether the dissociations qualify as perception 
in the relevant sense. Here, the objections are:  
a) That the cases in question are not ones in which representation is at the individual 
level, or ones in which central agency is involved in responses to stimuli 
b) That the cases in question do not involve objective representation by the individual ie 
involve constancies.  
On these grounds, DF’s visual agnosia was questioned insofar as there are worries that her 
‘modulations of behaviour witness genuine control and guidance by the individual’ (Peters et 
al 2017, p 6). In the Jiang study, Phillips claims that the relevant responses were the result of 
automatic reflexes and so therefore not individual-level. Both of these objections run counter 
to Burge’s definition, for Burge makes it clear that blindsight can count as unconscious 
perception. We may suppose that this applies to other dissociations. As we have noted, at the 
time of writing, Phillips acknowledged that the Norman et al paper works against him, and so 
his objection that constancies are not preserved in forms of unconscious perception fails. 
 Phillips’ objections, in questioning the methodology of the paradigms and other issues 
has led to improved experimental approaches. There is much to be gained from caution and 
the careful elimination of confounds, and for this his contribution has been most valuable. 
198 
 
But on each count his objections have been met, and one suspects the Burgean definition no 
longer serves. He seems ready to distance himself entirely from the Burgean conception when 
he remarks: ‘whilst it has been convenient here to adopt a broadly Burgean conception of 
perception, that conception is hardly beyond dispute’ (Block/Phillips on-line paper 2016, 
p.22). Robert Kentridge believes that his CFS study (in Peters et al 2017) satisfies all Burge’s 
criteria, and that ‘if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck – that unseen 
primes can be perceived, and so colour perception can be can be unconscious […]’ (Peters et 
al 2017 p 5) In the same paper, Megan Peters takes the view that, with the sum of his 
objections, Phillips is now raising ‘philosophical objections to the very concept of 



















Higher Order Thought theories 
This thesis has trailed at points throughout that higher order thought (HOT) theories stand at 
odds with the neo-cartesian position, and it is time to develop these more fully. This section 
will give a sketch of what is involved in the theories and how they hold out a promise of 
accommodating the dissociations. It will explore some of the more obvious objections to 
HOT theory, and show how those objections can be blunted. It is important to stress that this 
can only be an outline of HOT theories, and what they can offer.  
It is part of the appeal of HOT models that they offer the possibility of a reductive 
account of consciousness.  The claim is that they explain conscious mental states in terms of 
other mental states, and leave it open for neuroscience to complete the programme of 
reduction at some later date - a reductive account of non-conscious mental states would 
intuitively seem to be easier than a reductive account of conscious mental states. We have 
also suggested that the dissociations can be understood as presenting non-conscious mental 
states, and so our dissociations should have no difficulty finding a home in HOT theories. I 
shall also argue that HOT models provide us with an account of the evolutionary 
development of consciousness, and the process of learning in children and adults. 
Conceptually, the starting point for higher order thought theories lies in jettisoning the 
idea that consciousness is an intrinsic feature of all mental states. The cartesian view is to 
claim that consciousness is definitive of the mental. With such a presumption, it is obvious 
that the very idea of a mental state we are not conscious of, is problematic. But a counter 
proposal exists in exploring the idea that consciousness is not essential to mental states.  
Let us build this case carefully. The neo-cartesians have argued that consciousness is 
the possession of a something (mental qualitative properties or qualia) - some essential 
element which is intrinsic to the relevant mental states. Experience has been built into the 
concepts of perceptual or sensory states such that there is something it is like to have them. 
The proposal here is to uncouple the phenomenal from what we might call ‘first order’ 
sensory states, such that we leave it a possibility that such first order sensory states can be 
unconscious.  
Our excursions into dissociations have made the case for the possibility that there 
could be mental states (sensory registrations, successful perceptive discriminations) which 
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can occur unconsciously. But this has, in any case been anticipated by Freud and others for 
some time. Since the nineteenth century it has been a commonplace to think of propositional 
attitudes such as desires or beliefs being held by someone, but suppressed, banned from 
consciousness. The conditions we have explored have made a strong case for thinking that 
mental states of the perceptual or sensory kind need not be conscious either. The best 
interpretation we can put on the dissociations is that in those cases, some people have an 
ability to respond appropriately to visual stimuli in the absence of any awareness of having 
seen them. In the terms offered by Chalmers, there is nothing it is like for the blindseers to 
have had those stimuli. Put slightly differently, and in terms other neo-cartesians would use, 
in the cases studied, Dee Fletcher’s visual form agnosia, the cases of hemispheric neglect and 
so on, a very natural way of explaining these results is to say the subjects lack awareness of 
their mental states, but are nevertheless capable of responding correctly. It is a very natural 
thing to say – that they have a kind of sensory state of which they have no awareness, and 
which there is nothing it is like to have, to use the term our target philosophers are inclined to 
use. 
Of course, the neo-cartesian model would disallow such a description, but if we begin 
with a different pre-theoretic commitment, such that we uncouple experience from mental 
states, we create a class of mental states which are unconscious. We have a category into 
which we can naturally position the kind of states which are involved in blindsight. Such 
sensory states would rub shoulders with non-occurrent propositional attitudes, such as my 
belief (when I am not thinking about it) that the battle of Waterloo took place on June 18th 
1815, or my murderous contempt for certain politicians, or other suppressed desires. Many 
sensory states can join them, such as the sensory state that I am in when a car has slowed 
down in front of me while I am driving on the motorway in my automatic mode, or the 
headache I have had all afternoon, but which I am currently unaware of, since I am 
concentrating so hard. Include too, Ken Park’s tragic somnambulism. 
All of these mental states remain unconscious until (according to HOT theory) I have 
a higher order mental state concerning them. In doing so, I become aware of them; I have a 
thought concerning them. On this model, a conscious mental state is a mental state I am 
conscious of. And it is in virtue of the higher order thought that I am conscious of that mental 
state. We now have two classes of mental states – unconscious mental states, (to which we 
will give the term: ά) and conscious mental states (to which we give the term: T[ά] ). A 
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conscious mental state is a state about which I am having a thought. In such an event, the 
thought concerned is intentional in character. 
Self Consciousness 
It is argued that it is quite possible to be in a conscious mental state without being conscious 
of being in that state38. One imagines this is true of the vast majority of our mental states at 
any one time. According to the HOT model therefore, in order to be aware of being aware, a 
further and still higher order thought is necessary.  
To put this more carefully: in the model as described by Rosenthal (2005), our 
thought concerning a mental state, T[ά] need not itself be an introspectively conscious state. 
It is possible for me to be introspectively conscious of a conscious state by having a further, 
still-higher order experience of the conscious state T[ά] by having a further thought about 
that state (ie: T[T[ά]] )  In such a condition, I am aware of being aware of being in ά.  
We now have three kinds of mental states: unconscious states, non-introspectively 
conscious states, (aka first order experiences) and introspectively conscious states (aka higher 
order experiences). These distinctions are important to avoid the charge that the model 
generates a vicious regress of nested conscious states. I look out of the window and I see a 
green tree. T[ά], where ά is the perceptual state, and T[ά] is the experience of seeing a green 
tree. This does not necessarily involve my being aware of myself seeing a green tree, and for 
this to be so, I would need to have the further thought that I am having the experience of 
seeing a green tree.  
Importantly, on this account, there is a place in the menagerie of mental states for 
unconscious perceptual states. They are not dismissed out of account or regarded as a 
contradiction in terms. Instead, they are a foundational state for experiences – or to use the 
neo-cartesian term: together with the higher order thought they are constitutive of the feeling 
of what-it-is-like39.  
 
38 Dretske also makes the distinction between being aware of a stimulus and being aware that one is 
seeing it (Dretske 1998). 
39 Rosenthal clings to the idea that the ‘what-it-is-like’ notion can be analysed or explained in this 
way, and so the term is one he is comfortable using. This thesis remains sceptical of the term, whether 
it is useful, or ampliative, or even properly a synonym for phenomenal consciousness, or qualia. The 
question of whether what it is like can be expressed in HOT terms forms the basis of the 
Block/Rosenthal debate in Analysis in 2011.  
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We can clarify still further: What is it to have a higher order thought? HOT theorists 
maintain that to direct a higher order thought towards a mental state requires the application 
of concepts. The thought that I am aware of seeing a green tree T[T[ά]] requires the 
possession not only of the concepts of: ‘tree’, ‘green’, but also: ‘seeing’, and ‘self’. The first 
order experience of T[ά] has fewer concepts involved, (‘tree’, ‘green’), some other, primitive 
ones will be deployed. This position has obvious similarities with Kantian thinking, in the 
same vicinity. We can say it is the synthesis of the higher order thought and associated 
concepts together with the mental state ά that constitutes consciousness, at least in the case of 
perceptual states.  
This chapter will outline a case for HOT theories, but before we do so, let us consider 
obvious problems with the model, especially those levelled by the neo-cartesians. 
 
The HOT model – drawbacks. 
What is Chalmers’ position on HOT theories? He suggests that the HOT account leads to a 
picture of the mind with unnecessarily duplicative features. ‘To suppose that there are two 
separate cognitive states for every detail of experience, a first order and a second order 
judgement, leads to a cluttered picture of the mind’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.230-31). To illustrate 
this, he reproduces a cartoon in which a character, at the end of a long queue of observers, 
looking over each other’s shoulders, says (of himself) ‘I’m observing myself observing 
myself, as I observe you observing yourself observe yourself as you draw yourself observing 
yourself.’  
I submit that this is mistaken. It seems to hint at a vicious regress in the HOT picture, 
but if so, it is easily deflected. The reader is invited to make the assumption that each 
observer in the cartoon is a conscious, or self-observing homunculus, and this of course 
would be a regress. But recall that, in the version of model promoted, the higher order 
thought need not be a conscious state. Only the combination of the higher order thought with 
the mental state (a perception, or a propositional attitude) results in a conscious mental state. 
The regress is only a problem if we assume that higher order states, by virtue of which 
one is aware that one is in ά, must be conscious. If Chalmers makes this assumption, he 
possibly does so from the point of view that every mental state must be conscious, - the very 
thing we have suggested is a feature of his own account. But that he seems to make this 
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assumption is borne out by further comments in the same section. He writes: ‘A system with 
a second order judgement for every detail in the visual field would seem quite redundant’  
(Chalmers, 1996, p.230). In our reading of Rosenthal’s system, there would not be a second 
order judgement about every detail of the visual field. There would be plenty of items in the 
visual field about which we would not have a second order judgement; there would be many 
more items in the wider sensory field about which we would not have a second order 
judgement. Rather at any one time, there would be perhaps very few ά of which we were 
forming a T[ά], perhaps in the way a torch picks out items in a dark cellar. To the observer in 
question, then, there would not be a cluttered picture of the mind.  
He goes on: ‘it is hard to see why evolution would bother to build these second order 
judgements across the board’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.231). In the position we are taking, the 
Chalmers understanding of consciousness has the bigger problem with evolution. According 
to his position, all mental states are essentially conscious, and presumably always were. In 
this we lack the mechanisms to explain the passage from lower life forms which may have 
had the capacity to taste fruit, or see a predator (capable of having ά) to our early hominid 
ancestors who then became able to form beliefs about the taste (capable of having T[ά]) and 
who then in turn evolved to be able to form a T[T[ά]] – acts of introspection about myself 
and my biography. Chalmers’ account – his commitment to all mental states being conscious 
seems a curiously static, and assumes undeveloping mental sophistication. By contrast, HOT 
theory provides an attractive cognitive architecture which may be able to capture our likely 
evolutionary development. We shall say more about this later. 
Chalmers does not give HOT theory much more attention in The Conscious Mind, but 
of course was committed to the Unity Thesis in later works, which were specifically levelled 
against HOT theories. We can now turn to another problem which HOT theory must address. 
 
The Problem of the Rock  
This problem was advanced by Alvin Goldman (1993), and it seems to anticipate Chalmers’ 
argument concerning the Hard Problem. His question is simply put – How is it possible for a 
higher order thought to ‘confer subjectivity of feeling on a lower-order state that did not 
otherwise possess it? […] A rock does not become conscious when someone has a belief 
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about it. Why should a first-order psychological state become conscious simply by someone’s 
having a belief about it? 
On the face of it, this would seem to return us to a version of what some have called 
the generation problem which lies at the centre of all theories of mind. As Seager puts it: ‘The 
Generation Problem is to explain precisely how the possession of property P generates or 
produces (or underlies, subvenes, constitutes, realises, whatever) consciousness in those 
systems that possess it’ (Seager, 1999, p.18). How can it be that a thought of a certain 
character concerning the unconscious registration of sensory information produce the feeling 
of what-it-is-like to taste coffee, see a sunset. It is easy to see this as a relative of the Hard 
Problem. 
How can HOT theory respond? The first reply is to point out that what we are having 
a thought concerning is not a rock, but a mental state. There is something especially different 
about the first order mental state – it is mental, not a physical state, and the gap to be leaped 
is not one where we begin with the physics of the brain (objective facts of the matter) and ask 
how can it be that physical facts of the brain, obeying the laws of physics, can generate the 
qualitative, subjective character of consciousness. We will encounter this point again when 
we discuss reduction and HOT theory. Goldman posits a false analogy in assimilating rocks 
to first order mental states, in his question. There are features of the mental states in question 
which are quite different to physical states – one obvious difference between first order 
mental states and rocks is that the first is already a subjective mental state of mine, whereas a 
rock is a distal physical state of matter. Part of the gap has already been crossed. 
But it may be that we have not quite answered Goldman’s question. If he was asking 
how does having a higher order thought about a mental state, make that mental state 
conscious? then the problem remains. What can it be about a higher order thought such that 
having one can confer consciousness upon lower order mental states?  
Gennaro (2005) makes a beginning with this issue by taking our invocation of Kant a 
little further. He invites us to consider: our conscious awareness of a brown tree begins with 
the passive reception of sensory information by the senses (through the Kantian faculty of 
sensibility). Some of this information rises to the level of unconscious mental states (ά), 
states which can, (just as it did in our study of dissociations) have causal influence upon our 
behaviour. However, these mental states do not become conscious until the faculty of 
understanding operates on them by application of concepts. Thus I consciously experience 
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the brown tree as a brown tree because I deploy the concepts of ‘brown’ and ‘tree’ in my 
higher order thought to the sensory information in ά. The conscious state: T[ά] becomes 
possible by the contribution of both faculties (sensibility and understanding) – the application 
of concepts gives rise to conscious experience. Gennaro concedes that the neo-cartesian 
might reply: this account might go some way to explaining how, but why does the higher 
order application of concepts give rise to conscious experience? At which point, Gennaro 
believes that the neo-Cartesian is asking an illegitimate question – ‘the chain of explanation 
has already come to an end [..] it does not make sense to ask why this is so’ (Gennaro, 2005, 
p.11). 
It is possible to have some sympathy with Gennaro’s conclusion. There may indeed 
be a limit to explanation: ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’; ‘why are the laws of 
physics such as they are?’; ‘why is seeing red like this, rather than like that?’; ‘why does a 
proton have the mass that it does?’ all seem to be in search of answers that cannot be given.  
In pressing for the deeper explanation, it may be argued that neo-cartesianism has no 
answers to the same questions which are any more convincing. While the HOT account might 
be criticised as being incomplete, the account offered by Chalmers as to how it is that 
consciousness arises from the brain’s physics is reliant on unconvincing relationships such as 
emergence, and the idea that consciousness is ontologically novel, (1996, p.130) or an 
expansion of the fundamental features of physical particles to include experience alongside 
mass, or charge (2010, p.125).  
 
What are the main arguments for HOT theories? 
There are several. The claim often offered to recommend HOT theories is their role in a 
plausible naturalistic account of mind. We shall consider this first. 
HOT and Reduction 
For philosophers and others who find dualism intuitively hard to accept, the prospect of a 
completed reductive account of mind is appealing. HOT theory does not itself attempt to 
explain a consciousness in materialist terms, but it can be part of a wider strategy that does. 
Carruthers (2005 p.6) argues that attempts to reduce consciousness to physical or neural 
terms is implausible insofar as they attempt to leap over too many explanatory levels at once. 
Its advocates claim that HOT theory can be helpful in providing one link in a chain of 
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explanation. Explanation is the ultimate goal in any reductionist strategy – a non-reductive 
position leaves gaps and mystery, and is unsatisfactory on that count alone. 
 Let us see what contribution HOT makes. The goal of any explanatory account is to 
explain a phenomenon in terms of something else. As we have seen, according to HOT 
theory, what it is like to be introspectively conscious (in our terminology: T[T[ά]] ) can be 
cashed in in terms of the deployment of a HOT or higher order conceptual resources towards 
a conscious mental state. That mental state (T[ά]) in its turn, can be given an account in terms 
of a world-directed non-conscious sensory state (ά), towards which we might ordinarily 
deploy lower-order conceptual resources. These states (ά) are unconscious, and involve the 
kind of perception we see in the dissociations, and other states. This is already reductive in 
the sense that higher order mental states are being given an account in terms of lower order 
mental states. However, such (ά) states themselves look amenable to reduction – certainly 
more than the conscious, introspective higher order kind. Theories such as those suggested by 
Gennaro (2012) suggest there may be a route through some version of strong 
representationalism40, but one advantage of HOT theory is that it is not committed to any, or 
any particular reductivist strategy, and can leave the final step in explanation to others. So, 
while many of the HOT theorists might ultimately be materialists, their contribution is simply 
to provide an explanation of conscious mental states in terms of unconscious mental states 
(mentalistic reduction). 
 
The elimination of an underlying pre-systematic conceptual architecture. 
It is maintained by HOT theorists that the pre-systematic commitment to the idea that mental 
states are intrinsically conscious has all the hallmarks of a pre-Keplerian commitment to the 
idea of anima motrix. This might share similarity with Dennett’s story of the rainforest tribe 
committed to the idea of fatigues. Sometimes concepts get off on the wrong foot, and the 
persistent commitment to them, can become a barrier to further progress. The idea of anima 
motrix as principle of motion intrinsic to the planetary body itself was not just wrong-headed; 
it forestalled scientific advance; we have made more progress in understanding cosmology by 
rejecting it in favour of other conceptual structures. In the same way, the HOT theorist will 
argue that the neo-cartesian commitment to mental states as intrinsically conscious is also a 
 




blind alley. Philosophers who subscribe to it are constrained to speak of the neural correlates 
of consciousness, and the principle of coherence between consciousness and cognition. 
Framing consciousness in phenomenal terms puts consciousness beyond third-person, or 
scientific reach. To think of consciousness as having a necessary unity turns a blind eye to the 
richly interesting dissociations, and lessons learned from split brain and synaesthesia cases, 
which might prompt a more modular understanding of the workings of the human brain.  
If a complete case can be made for them, HOT theories could offer a pre-systematic 
framework in which the advances of neuroscience are welcomed as part of the overall theory 
of mind, rather than partitioned off, as Chalmers does, into a supporting work on psychology, 




In a short but provocative paragraph in Rosenthal 2005 he writes: ‘We typically come to 
make more fine-grained discriminations as we master more subtle concepts pertaining to 
various distinct sensory qualities. Experiences from wine tasting to hearing music illustrate 
this process vividly. An account in terms of higher-order thoughts explains the bearing these 
concepts have on our very awareness of sensory differences. [However] if consciousness is 
intrinsic to sensory states, the relevance of concepts remains mysterious. The cartesian might 
just deny that sensory differences exist when we are unaware of them. But it will be even 
more difficult to explain how learning new concepts can actually cause sensory qualities to 
arise that previously did not exist’ (Rosenthal, 2005, p.40). 
In the interests of exploring HOT theories, let us amplify this argument. The claim is 
that learning new musical theory for example, in mastering concepts such as 
augmented/diminished chords, major/minor keys, hemiolas, syncopation, 
aeolian/lydian/mixolydian (etc) modes, consonance/dissonance, the listener is equipped to 
hear music differently, and with greater richness. This can be accounted for in two ways, 
according to the position taken by our different theorists – either: our learning of new 
concepts results in our perceptual or sensory states being revealed as having qualitative 
properties they had, but were not unlocked, or brought to the surface, or: all the qualitative 
properties were already present and transparent to the mind in perceptual states before the 
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moment of our learning a new concept, and the learning of a new concept involved the 
creation of an entirely new qualitative property. The two routes are very different.  
The neo-cartesian, in maintaining that consciousness is intrinsic to sensory states, 
would have to subscribe to the latter; qualitative properties are present in our sensory states 
and transparent at all times, and the role of new concepts learned is to create entirely new 
properties that were not there before, and the process by which this happens is mysterious. 
If we subscribe to a higher order thought theory, which has, in the foundation of its 
account, unconscious mental states, (including sensory states), our explanation of the new 
experience, upon learning new concepts, is the process of acquiring new concepts amplifies 
the content of our perceptual experience – bringing to the fore properties already there, but so 
far unnoticed. The qualitative character of our music appreciation, the taste of the wine on 
our tongue can vary in proportion to our conceptual sophistication. 
We can now begin to make a preliminary judgement concerning this point. If a neo-
cartesian commitment to consciousness being intrinsic to mental states de facto commits 
them to the view that learning new concepts can create new sensory qualities beyond what is 
already there, then those philosophers owe us an account of how this can happen. They must 
account for the idea that concepts and concepts alone can somehow create new sensory 
qualities that were not there before the concept was learned. No-one has offered such an 
account. On the other hand, the HOT account would appear to be in a better position to 
describe how, although our basic experiences must remain broadly the same, through 
conceptual refinement and sophistication, we have developed a richer appreciation of 
experience. A developmental account of consciousness may be possible, contrasting with the 
neo-cartesian position which seems far more static. Let us pursue this further. 
 
Animals, pre-linguistic children and evolution. 
Seager points out that those who subscribe to HOT theory, must hold that beings without 
thoughts are not conscious (Seager, 1999, p.83). He points out that this is problematic for 
animals, and we can extend this difficulty to children in the early stages of development – we 
might want to hold that higher animals and children are conscious; but how can this be? They 
would lack the conceptual sophistication to have a thought about their sensory states, and so 
209 
 
fail to have a higher order thought about them. Rosenthal offers an answer, suggesting that it 
depends on what is involved in a higher order thought at this level.  
Clearly, to have a higher order thought about a propositional mental state (I believe I 
have drunk too much coffee) requires a set of sophisticated concepts which it would be 
unreasonable to expect of non-verbal children and animals. However, a higher order thought 
concerning a sensory state does not require such sophistication; ‘Relatively weak conceptual 
resources will suffice for a higher-order thought to refer to one’s own sensory states’ 
(Rosenthal, 2005, p.186). Presumably, one would need to be able to individuate, to compare, 
to locate sensations in the appropriate sensory field, and so on, and these would be resources 
available to higher animals.  
If we accept this answer as sufficient, it is possible to see how it can be the beginnings 
of an evolutionary and developmental account of consciousness. As our ancestors (and 
ourselves in early stages of development) developed language and conceptual sophistication, 
they/we became equipped with the ability to have higher order thoughts, and more complex 
higher order thoughts about our mental states. They/we have been able to extend our 
consciousness to include propositional states, and increase the range of sensory states we 
have become conscious of. We have an account which has within it, a sense of degree and 
progression. 
Here then, is the beginnings of a HOT account of the evolution of consciousness. Our 
early ancestors would have been capable of sensory registration and perceptual states that 
allowed them to evade predators and identify food. Such states would have been, at the 
relevant stage in our evolution, much like the states of unconscious perception or automatism 
we have been dealing with. We have identified them in our menagerie of mental states as: ά. 
Gradually, as our conceptual repertoire and language developed, we would have become 
capable of projecting thoughts upon our perceptual states and the beginnings of 
consciousness would have flickered into being. Such thoughts, together with the sensory state 
of which they are the focus, can be designated as non-introspectively conscious states. We 
have identified these as T[ά] – occurrent thoughts about our sensory states. We can speculate 
that such higher order thoughts were made possible as the result of new neurological 
processes and structures– feedback and reflexive mechanisms between responsible centres in 
the brain. There is evidence that new neural pathways open up as ways of thinking are 
developed, and attention is focussed (eg Lau and Rosenthal 2011). Our range of concepts 
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would also have expanded to include belief and other intentional terms, allowing us to frame 
propositional attitudes, to create further first order mental qualitative states (If there is a 
distinctive what-it-is-like character to the belief that the Eiffel Tower is tall, then this would 
feature here.) 
Eventually, still more conceptual resources are developed, - terms such as ‘self’ and 
‘I’, and the ability to reflect upon one’s condition becomes possible – the thought that I am 
aware of seeing a green tree becomes a feature of human mental life: I am now 
introspectively aware of there being mental states I am in. We designate them as T[T[ά]]. 
This is the culmination of the evolution of consciousness; a process made possible throughout 
by the development and acquisition of greater, more sophisticated conceptual resources. 
Those concepts allow us to pay closer attention to (possibly ‘to activate’) qualitative states 
which are already inherent in our sensory states. 
By contrast, the neo-cartesian view would appear to be far more static. It takes the 
view that consciousness is an all-or-nothing condition – it is an intrinsic property of mental 
states. This feature of neo-cartesianism is committed to the idea that new concepts can 
somehow create entirely new phenomenal qualities in our experience that were not there 
before. This has yet to be fleshed out with an explanation of how it can be accomplished. 
Short of this, the neo-cartesian position lacks a sense of degree, and thus of development. If 
consciousness is an intrinsic property of mental states, it was always an intrinsic property of 
mental states. But how, and at what point did it leap into existence? 
 
The Higher Order Thought thesis and the Unity Principle. 
Recall that Bayne and Chalmers are committed to the proposition that our experiences seem 
to be tied together in a deep way – by being unified as part of a single encompassing state of 
consciousness (Chalmers, 2010, p.497). They take the view that when we have three 
experiences concurrently, (A, B and C – savouring the taste of red wine, looking at its colour 
and hearing Shostakovich quartet) there is something it is like to taste wine, see the colour 
and hear the quartet, but there is also something it is like to have all three together. They 
advance the idea that these experiences are necessarily unified (Chalmers, 2010, p.498). Their 
unity is defined phenomenally – it can be characterised in what-it-is-like terms. Bayne and 
Chalmers take the view that the unity claim puts a constraint on theories of consciousness. 
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Specifically: ‘If the higher order thesis is true, the unity thesis is false. And if the unity thesis 
is true then the higher-order thought theory is false’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.533). Our chapter on 
Bayne’s position was directed mainly at the claim of necessity, and instead argued that a 
subject’s consciousness is often or usually disunified: the claim of unity is mistaken. If that 
succeeded, the constraint is lifted, and the way is clear for the HOT model to give its own 
account of the ‘the robust intuition we have that our conscious mental states constitute in 
some important way a unity’ (Rosenthal, 2005, p.340). This section will present Rosenthal’s 
case. 
Rosenthal argues that higher order thoughts sometimes operate on clusters of mental 
states, as evidenced by the ‘cocktail party effect’. He suggests that one suddenly becomes 
aware of hearing one’s name in a conversation that one had until then consciously 
experienced only as part of a background din. ‘For one’s name to pop out from that seeming 
background noise, one must all along have been hearing the separate articulated words of the 
conversation. But, since one was conscious of one’s hearing of the words only as an 
undifferentiated auditory experience, the higher order thought in virtue of which one was 
conscious of one’s hearing all those words must have represented the hearing of them as a 
single undifferentiated bunch, that is, as a background din.’ (Rosenthal, 2005, p.341). This 
therefore makes a claim that we can have higher order thoughts of a collection of 
experiences, which might help to explain the sense of unity they seem to share.  
This would only impose a sense of unity on an otherwise fragmented collection of 
mental states. We might also consider a philharmonic concert. It does not seem plausible to 
say: there is a unity in experiencing the concert, and that that unity is comprised of what-it-is-
like to hear the oboes, what-it-is-like to hear the violas, what-it-is-like to hear the trumpets, 
what-it-is-like to see the conductor set the tempo, what-it-is-like to smell the perfume of a 
neighbouring listener, all taken together with what it is like to experience the concert. Not 
only does this seem unnecessarily to overload me with an overwhelming amount of what-it-
is-likes, it is not really how it feels. On considering the concert, it does not feel as if all the 
contents of these perceptions are integrated into a conscious whole – the contents are 
experienced on a piecemeal basis and not all at once (Plachias, 2011, p.88). Instead of 
thinking that our sensory state is a unified whole, conscious all the time, it seems much more 
credible to say (and it is certainly how it feels) that we apply a higher order thought to 
different features of the sensory tumult. Only some of our sensory states at any one time are 
conscious – those to which a higher order thought is directed – and there is likely a limit to 
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this number. We flit around the sensory manifold, and form higher order thoughts of the 
violins, now the conductor’s shirt tails, now back to the double bass, miss the delicious 
suspended chord in the woodwind because a competing higher order thought brought to 
consciousness a perception of the falling music score.  
If this is right, the HOT model is more compelling; it is, in the view of Platchias, more 
explanatory (2011, p.89). In the account offered by Bayne and Chalmers, Platchias points out 
that there is no principle of unification: it just seems a happy coincidence that we seem to 
have a smooth and unified experience of the philharmonic concert. Nothing about the various 
mental qualitative properties of each component part of the experience seems to be able to 
account for the apparent unity. However, by appealing to the HOT model we have a 
mechanism for structuring our experience. Kant argued that it was through the application of 
concepts that our chaotically confused and unstructured sensations became organised and 
comprehensible. The concepts brought to bear by the specific higher order thought launched 
have that kind of impact on the sensory states we direct our higher order thought towards.  
 
Blunting the challenge of the phenomenal zombie. 
One of Chalmers more famous creations is the phenomenal zombie (Chalmers, 1996, pp.96 et 
seq). This is a being which is functionally and behaviourally indistinguishable from other 
human beings, but which lacks internal phenomenology – they generate no pain qualia on 
sitting on the drawing pin, or colour qualia on encountering the tomato; there is nothing it is 
like to be a zombie. Chalmers first postulates their conceivability, saying that it seems 
logically possible that they could exist. ‘I can discern no contradiction in the description’ 
(Chalmers, 1996 p 96). 
From this premise, he then argues that their conceivability entails their possibility. 
(Critics of this argument have focussed their attention on this move.) If this is conceded, then 
the argument proceeds to the conclusion that physicalism is false. This can be done by 
invoking Kripke (1972), who contended that all identity statements are necessarily true – ie 
true in all possible worlds. The same should apply to mind-brain identity claims. The 
possibility of a world in which zombies exist demonstrates that the mind-brain identity claim 
is not necessarily true, since as, postulated, it has no internal phenomenology. Hence 
physicalism is false. Physicalism fails because phenomenal zombies show that something 
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extra needs to happen for consciousness to be a feature, even of suitably complex physical 
systems. Consciousness (as defined in phenomenal terms) is thus a non-physical, non-
reducible feature unexplained by the laws of physics and properties of matter.  
Much ink has been spilt on the zombie question (Kirk 2008 and many others), but it 
not my project here to engage with these arguments. I want to argue that the HOT model 
might offer a way of blunting or even embracing the zombie hypothesis.  
It seems clear that, if we consider lower forms of life, there is really not much it is like 
to be them – this would be the case with molluscs or insects, perhaps. At some point in our 
own phylo-genetic biography, we were presumably creatures for whom it could not be said 
that there was much that it was like to be that creature. At some point in our evolutionary 
history, we perhaps were in the same class of animal as zombies. Our behavioural responses 
to snakes, predators and other stimuli was all of it at the level of early vision described in 
chapter two. As we developed, our range and sophistication of conceptual resources 
contributed understanding to our sensory states, and brought conscious awareness into being - 
late and extra, and for many functions, unnecessary. The zombie state is part of the natural 
history of humans.  
Today, although we now do enjoy conscious awareness of many mental states, there 
are still many lower sensory states that do not reach awareness, precisely because a thought is 
not directed to them, as we have argued – the somnambulist, the long-distance driver, the 
blindsighted subjects. 
Although he was not defending HOT theory when he made the comment, Dennett has 
claimed something similar – ‘Are Zombies possible? They’re not just possible; they are 
actual. We’re all zombies’ (Dennett, 1991, p.406)41. This is the claim I wish to make – HOT 
theory can embrace zombies. 
Furthermore, for the kind of zombies we were and sometimes are, HOT theory can 
provide a compelling rationale for their behaviour, and Chalmers cannot. In the picture 
presented by Chalmers, the zombie has no qualia (necessarily conscious qualitative 
properties) to account for all the sophisticated behaviour they show. But then, what story can 
 
41 Dennett footnoted this: ‘It would be an act of desperate intellectual dishonesty to quote this 
assertion out of context’. Referencing him here is slightly out of context (he was dealing with 
epiphenomenalism at the time) but my supposition is that this is sufficiently true to the spirit of what 
he is claiming to escape the charge of desperation. It might in any case be said that Dennett subscribes 
to a kind of HOT model (Seager, 1999, p.83). 
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Chalmers present to explain that behaviour? The conceivability of such creatures depends at 
least in part on a convincing explanation of their behaviour. Without such an account, their 
acts of snake-flinching will remain a mystery. 
HOT theory, as we have argued elsewhere, does have an account of behaviour at this 
level. Our claim is that we have established that perceptual states can occur unconsciously. 
Discrimination tests suggest that red sensory states can be distinguished from blue sensory 
states, even when there is no awareness, ie if there is nothing it is like for one to be in that 
state. To put it slightly differently, our lower order mental states (ά) are characterised by 
qualitative properties sufficient to make distinctions, even if they are not brought to 
consciousness by a HO thought. As Platchias puts it: ‘[..] I do not see why we should not take 
such ascriptions of unconscious mental states as literally and realistically as we take 
ascriptions of conscious mental states in psychological explanations of ordinary behaviour’ 
(Platchias 2011 p. 70). 
There is a further, and rather odd consequence to HOT. If the kind of zombie that 
Chalmers is imagining were somehow spontaneously created today, but equipped with 
sufficiently powerful conceptual resources42 to apply to its perceptual states, our argument is 
that it would not stay a zombie. We may contend: the true possession of a concept C is found 
in the ability to discriminate between instances of Cs from non-Cs, and the ability to 
recognise or identify instances of Cs from sensory input. If the zombie has this facility, we 
can expect it would be capable of directing a higher order thought towards its perceptual 
states, and, in keeping with the HOT thesis, its lower order mental states would become 
conscious. Put like this, we expose a problem with the zombie argument as developed by 
Chalmers – if the HOT model is right, a zombie with the capacity for perceptual states and 
sufficient conceptual resources, capable of self-reflection and launching these resources in the 
direction of the perceptual states, is a contradiction in terms.  
In short, in subscribing to the HOT model, we naturalise zombies, make them more 
credible by providing them with a psychology, and ultimately, extinguish them. In doing so, 
we deprive the zombie hypothesis all of its appeal for dualists. 
 
 
42 ie resources which we can assume it has, if it is capable of talking about its inner life, and wields 




HOT theories – a conclusion. 
This thesis concedes that this section is only a rough outline of higher order thought theories 
and their place in the broader picture of the philosophy of mind. We have identified some of 
the main claims of the position, and some of the more obvious problems, - and indeed some 
of the advantages - but the section here cannot be, and does not claim to be a comprehensive 
treatment of HOT theory. The case made here is to suggest that the dissociations under study 
might help remove some of the obstacles which neo-cartesianism level against the HOT 
model. If our case against the necessary unity of consciousness is successful, then, as Bayne 
and Chalmers concede, then the ground is opened for a more sympathetic reception of the 
HOT model. Certainly, further work with dissociations offers the prospect of further 

















This thesis has been an exploration of the difficulty presented by our dissociations for certain 
neo-cartesian philosophers. If it is possible to generalise, their approach to the philosophy of 
mind has a difficulty with the dissociations insofar as they can be considered as unconscious 
perception. There is, further, the challenge those dissociations present to the idea of the unity 
of consciousness.  
Working back through our targets, we saw that Ian Phillips argued the empirical 
ground for classifying our dissociations in such a way that takes them off the table as cases of 
unconscious perception. At first, his efforts extended simply to raising questions about the 
paradigms working to explore them – problems of the criterion and other confounds. It was 
claimed that there was legitimate doubt about that the paradigms established that cases of 
blindsight constituted real cases of unconscious perception. His arguments then extended to 
the definitions of perception and consciousness, which, once in the frame, work to raise the 
bar for any condition to be considered as a case of unconscious perception. If our discussion 
dealt with this successfully, we kept alive the possibility of unconscious perception against 
his argument, but it should be noted that Phillips’s case against unconscious perception does 
not rule out exemplars in principle. He puts a great deal of pressure on the proponents of and 
arguments for unconscious perception, such that cases of it may not be so clear cut, but he is 
open to the possibility that paradigms might one day be conclusive. Accordingly, while it 
might be important to blunt his challenges, our argument against him need not be conclusive 
either.  
Against the claim made by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, that there is a necessary 
unity of experience, and the concomitant claim that the dissociations do not constitute a case 
for thinking differently, we found that the dissociations were not so easily dismissed. Cases 
such as the alien hand syndrome, and other conditions work against the unity thesis. Matters 
are acute when we enlist the split brain cases as variants in the dissociation stable. 
Maintaining the unity thesis against the evidence derived from such cases is tortuous and 
difficult to maintain. The unity thesis also faces problems from recent interest in 
synaesthesia. Bayne does not consider the syndrome, but if synaesthesia cases are cases of 
phenomenological ‘danglers’, then they also constitute a problem for his version of unity. If 
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our discussion here was successful, we removed the constraint that his unity contention puts 
on higher order thought theories. 
In the discussion on Chalmers and The Conscious Mind, we saw that Chalmers sets 
out with a pre-systematic commitment in identifying consciousness with the possession of 
mental qualitative properties – qualia. According to this position, mental states are 
necessarily conscious – an approach, which neo-cartesians hope, is fleshed out by the ‘what-
it-is-like’ locution: there is something it is like to smell a rose, or coffee. Perceptual states to 
him are by definition the possession of qualia. Chalmers would extend this characteristic to 
propositional attitudes as well – there is something it is like to think of a lion: when I do so, 
‘there is a whiff of leonine quality to my phenomenology’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.10). However, 
it is clear that, if perceptual states are by definition conscious states, then that definition rules 
out dissociations as cases of unconscious perception. There can be no such thing. Our 
approach in this section was to consider the problems associated with neo-cartesian 
phenomenal concepts, and on the strength of this, a case for extending the conception of 
perception to allow it to embrace unconscious perception. 
Where Chalmers does allow that blindsight and other dissociations might be 
problematic, is for his principle of structural coherence between psychological properties and 
phenomenal properties. With this principle, Chalmers hopes to establish a parallel between 
the scientific understanding of consciousness (‘cognition’) and what he understands as the 
phenomenal aspect of consciousness. As he remarks, the dissociations are sometimes put 
forward as cases in which consciousness and the associated functional role come apart. ‘If 
there were truly a case in which the functional role and experience were dissociated, it would 
clearly create problems for the coherence principle’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.227). 
It has been the contention of this thesis that blindsight and other dissociations do 
create problems for the coherence principle; his dismissal of blindsight, can, on the present 
view, be met with new paradigms and fresh evidence. In this section, the argument turns to 
more empirical matters. Chalmers hoped that the coherence principle might be helpful in 
providing an indirect way to research consciousness – it ‘acts as a kind of epistemic lever in 
allowing researchers to infer conclusions about experience from third-person data’ 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.234). In arguing for this, Chalmers wants to preserve an account of mind 
which is at once grounded in materialism – a functional account of the workings of mind, 
relying on the neural correlates of consciousness, together with a commitment to the non-
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reductive phenomenal account of consciousness – as he puts it: ‘a non-reductive 
functionalism […] a way of combining functionalism with property dualism’ (Chalmers, 
1996, p.249). However, to repeat, Chalmers himself concedes that blindsight could create 
difficulties for this coherence. We can now see that it (and the other dissociations) do indeed 
challenge his notion of coherence. 
Chalmers also calls his position: ‘naturalistic dualism’ (Chalmers, 1996, ch 4). The 
non-reductive, phenomenal account of consciousness (the dualism) is hard to square with the 
naturalism: the commitment to some version of physicalist monism. Such a ‘cakeist’ position 
then also requires costly, exotic accounts of the causal relationship between phenomenal 
properties and the physical world. Chalmers wavers between epiphenomenalism (Chalmers, 
1996, p.160) and panprotopsychism (Chalmers, 1996, p.293). Our arguments here should be 
understood as contributing in a small way, to the general case against Chalmers’ philosophy 
of mind – in removing some of the neo-cartesian impediments to other positions, we open the 
door to theories which do not have such a tension in them. 
  
The dissociations. 
We return now to the main thrust of this thesis. The argument has been that the dissociations 
here – blindsight, agnosia, neglect, optic ataxia and so on make a powerful case for a 
stipulative treatment of perception that allows for unconscious perception. They also provide 
empirical evidence for unconscious perception where philosophers are open to the idea. It is 
clear to see why neo-cartesianism is uncomfortable with these phenomena, why they might 
closely examine the paradigms exploring them, and be inclined to dismiss them. Philosophers 
who incline to a version of neo-cartesianism and who are open to testing their position 
empirically, (here, Phillips and Bayne) have put the dissociations very much under the 
microscope. Despite their efforts, the dissociations make a real case for thinking that some 
mental states do not have some intrinsic property of consciousness.  
 The pre-theoretical, stipulative position taken by Chalmers, - the view that perception 
is necessarily conscious – is of course immune to the empirical evidence presented by 
dissociation studies. But a different conceptual position would seem, on the strength of what 
we have dealt with, seems all the more reasonable. Chalmers’ phenomenal concepts 
ultimately commit him to problematic or costly consequences – his stipulation involves the 
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non-reducibility of qualitative mental properties and this has led him and others to 
problematic accounts of their relationship to the physical world - emergence, the possibility 
of epiphenomenalism, or a commitment to the view that experience is a fundamental feature 
of matter, alongside mass, spin, and charge.  
On the other hand, a pre-theoretical stipulation that does not regard unconscious 
perception as an oxymoron is more plausible in that it would seem to permit an account 
which grounds consciousness more convincingly in the physical world. That account, it is 
contended, makes better sense of the empirical work in the field. While Chalmers and others 
build the notion of consciousness into verbs of perception, and experience, our argument has 
been – the dissociations constitute cases of unconscious perception, and prompt the idea that 
we should uncouple consciousness from its role as a necessary feature of perceptual states. 
The same case has already been made for intentional states. Once this uncoupling is done, a 
new architecture of explanation becomes possible, with greater explanatory power. That 
architecture offers a more naturalistic account of mind, and it also provides for a 
developmental account of consciousness. 
We can accordingly argue thus: to be conscious is to have a mental state which we are 
conscious of. Not all mental states are ones which we are conscious of. Our experiential field 
is sparse, not lavish. Mental states we are conscious of are ones (according to the HOT 
hypothesis) towards which we direct a higher order thought. In the early stages of our 
development, we might lack the conceptual resources that brings mental states to 
consciousness. Gradually, as we acquire the conceptual resources necessary for a higher order 
thought, we make it possible for more of our perceptual and intentional states to become 
conscious. In certain situations, a subject has suffered some trauma – blindsight cases, for 
example, some mental states are perceptual states, which it is difficult to become conscious of 
in virtue of damage to the feedback mechanisms in the brain’s neurology. The role of V1 in 
the visual system is part of the neurological mechanism allowing us to fashion a thought 
about our visual states. Once compromised, in blindsight, we remain partially functionally 
capable of perceiving stimuli, but without the capacity to generate consciousness of that 
perception.  
Of course, this kind of perception (if that is what it is) is not like that in standard 
cases, and describing blindsight successes, and successful discriminations in neglect and 
prosopagnosia as cases of perception is yet regarded as a stretch by some. In each case, 
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something is generally absent or unusual – subjects have to be prompted, or they lack 
subjective awareness of the stimuli, or they have an unaccountable superfluity of phenomena, 
as in synaesthesia. On the other hand, as we have seen, this is often accompanied by an 
astonishing success – TN’s navigation down an obstacle strewn corridor, DF’s ability to catch 
a ball she is insistent she does not see, and so on. It is this feature of the cases that merits a re-
think of our definitions.  Whatever definition of perception we arrive at must be broad 
enough to accommodate these exceptional cases.  
We might also advert to our prefatory remarks at the beginning of the chapter on 
Bayne’s Unity Contention. There, we wrestled with the temptation to ascribe psychological 
predicates to hemispheres of the brain, arguing that in the split brain cases, a case can be 
made for thinking that one hemisphere perceived stimuli that were denied to the other. If in 
the end we were not entirely successful in avoiding the temptation, that perhaps makes a 
further point about the concept or definition of perception as it is used by philosophers and in 
unexceptional cases. Dramatic changes to the brain’s workings of the kind we see in all these 
cases put considerable pressure on us to consider the extension of concepts such as 
perception.  
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers urges us to take consciousness seriously, and that 
we should avoid the temptation to redefine it as something it is not (Chalmers, 1996, p xii). In 
a similar way, this thesis urges that we should take the dissociations seriously, and not define 
them, and the concepts they concern, in such a way as to take them out of consideration. They 
present a more interesting challenge than that. Philosophy is richer if it accommodates them, 
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